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'rhe key to better management of public spending, including
investment  programming, lies in the process by which programs
are identified, prepared, approved, and implemented. Strength-
ening this process should lead to expenditure programs that are
a more appropriate size and are more attuned to overall develop-
ment goals.
The Policy. Planning, and Research  Conplex  distributes PPR Working ?ap"JS  to disseminate the findings of work in progress and to
encourage the exchange of ideas amnong  Bank staff and all others intem ted in developrnent issues  These papers carry the names of
the authors reflecL  only their views, and should be used and cited accorWngly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
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* Development of a well-designed program of
The Bank is paying increasing, though stil  operationally oriented, detailed case studies of
unsystematic, attention to the institutional  specific country experiences tsuccesses and
dimension of public expenditure management.  failures) from which to draw lessons for future
This implies analysis of the processes and  operations and country and economic sector
procedures by which programs are put together  work.
with an assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the institutions involved and the links  Addressing these issues may also have
between them.  Advising governments on these  implications for the type of lending instrument
aspects requires more expertise than most Bank  the Bank uses.  Reforms of public spending are
staff members possess.  The Bank should  usually dealt with through structural adjustment
develop staff skills in this area through:  loans, backed up by technical assistance opera-
tions - but these may not always be suitable.  If
- Better coordination in the Bank of public  major policy decisions are required to bring
expenditure reform issues.  about important long-term structu  l' changes, a
broader, more flexible lending instrume-.: may
* More intensive,  systematic staff training,  be more appropriate.
and more contact with academics and other out-
side experts through such vehicles as seminars.  One approach being explored is to fimance  a
time slice of the country's public investment
* Closer collaboration and more systematic  program (either on a sector-by-sector or aggre-
exchange of views between operational staff and  gate basis, depending on the scope of the re-
the Policy, Planning, and Research complex,  forms to be introduced) to support not only more
including incorporation of feedback from the  appropriate programs but also institutional and
seminars held by the Economic Development  procedural reforms of the ways in which public
Institute.  expenditures are prepared and implemented.
This approach could combine quick-disbursing
* A closer working relationship with the IMF,  balance of payments support with the longer-
especially the Fiscal Affairs Department.  term approach needed to encourage institutional
reform.
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THE  MANAGEMENT  OF PUBLIC  EXPENDITURES:
AN EVOLVING  BANK  APPROACH
Summary  and  Conclusions
Improving  Public  Expenditure  Management:  the  Main  Issues
(i)  Effective  public  expendtlture  management  has  become  vital  to
developing  countries  in the  context  of the  severe  fiscal  adjustments  of the
1980s.  Unfortunately,  however,  neither  the  conceptual  tools  nor the
administrative  instruments  at their  immediate  disposal  have  been  adequate
in  equipping  governments  to  meet  these  challenges.  First,  on the  conceptual
plane,  financial  shortages  and  a changed  view  of the  role  of government
have  combined  with  a  much  more  uncertain  environment,  externally  and
internally,  to  undermine  the  perceived  usefulness  of long  term,
comprehensive  planning  as a development  tool.  However,  this  has  not  yet
been  replaced  by an alternative  paradigm.  Consequently,  in  their
understandable  preoccupation  with  the  short  term,  policy  makers  in
developing  countries  may  frequently  be unaware  of the  trade-offs  between
different  expenditure  patterns  within  and  between  sectors.  Second,
administratively,  the  increased  size  and  complexity  of the  public  sector
had  clearly  overstretched  the  management  capabilities  of many  governments
even  before  the  crisis  of the  1980s.  Fiscal  constraints  have  accentuated
the  management  problem  through  their  devastating  effect  on real  wages  for
many  public  servants  at  managerial  level.  The  consequent  draina--  of talent
and  damaged  morale  of those  who  remain  has  made it  still  more  difficult  for
governments  to cope  with  the  competing  claims  made  on limited  fiscal
resources.
(ii)  Effective  public  expenditure  management  makes  heavy  demands  on
government  institutions.  Each  of its  sub-activities  --  the  formulation  of
the  macroeconomic  framework,  project  preparation  and  investment
programming,  the  link  between  planning  and  budgeting,  the  coverage,
preparation  and  classification  of the  budget.,  and  budget  implementation  and
expenditure  control  --  has  an institutional  and  political,  as well  as a
technical  or economic,  dimension.  A review  of the  experience  of many
countries  trying  to  address  these  issues  reveals  an awesome  array  of
problems  which  are  at least  as likely  to  have institutional  roots  as
technical  ones.  Economic  analysis  and  forecasting,  even in the  relatively
short  term,  is  often  so deficient  that  it leaves  the  authorities  unprepared
for  major  deviations  from  the  program  necessit_ted,  for  example,  by a
substantial  external  shock. Unable  to cope  with the  uncertainties  inherent
in the  planning  and  budgetary  processes,  governments  are  forced  to  reactPage  2  of 6
with  damaging,  ill-thought-out,  across  the  board  cuts.  Frequently,  it  will
be found  that  the  linkages  between  the  macroeconomic  framework  and the
investment  program,  and  between  both  and  the  budget  process,  are  fragile  or
non-existent.  Many governments  encounter  considerable  difficulty  in
formulating  an investment  program  that  is  more than  an aggregation  of wish-
lists  drawn  up  by the  different  spending  agencies. Control  over  the
external  borrowings  of government  agencies  is frequently  less  than
desirable,  and  even  where  this  exists,  donor  pressure  can  at times
undermine  attempts  to  exclude  significant  but  economically  unljustifiable
capital  expenditures  from  the  investment  program. Phasing  of capital
spending  is  often  inadequate  or  non-existent,  while  the  recurrent  cost
implications  of  public  investments  are  rarely  taken  into  account.
Classifieation  of  bttdgetary  items  may  not facilitate  a policy  or  objectives
oriented  approach  to  public  expenditure  planning.  Budgetary  coverage,  both
in terms  of institutions  and  major  categories  of expenditure,  may  be
partial,  impeding  the  ability  of the  core  ministries  to exercise  effective
control.  On the  other  hand,  the  organization  of the  spending  agencies,
their  technical  capabilities  for  financial  and  economic  analysis,  and their
linkages  with core  ministries  may  be such  that  an integratid  and
coordinated  approach  to  revenues  and  expenditures  is,  at  best,  severely
impeded.  Accounting  and  financial  information  systems,  which  used to  work
reasonably  well,  have  deteriorated  in  many  couv-iies,  and  in some  cases
have  disintegrated  to the  point  where  they  ha  come  inoperable.  Their
restoration  is a  prerequisite,  though  far  frok.  fficient  condition,  for
strengthened  public  expenditure  management.
(iii)  Government  responses  to these  immense  difficulties  have  been,
perhaps  inevitably,  piecemeal.  Most  of them  have  concentrated  on
expenditure  control  with  an inevitably  short  term  perspes-ive.  Others,
however,  have attempted  major  organizational  reforms,  combined,  in some
cases,  with  wholesale  changes  to  the  planning  and  budgetary  systems.
Success  has  been decidedly  mixed.
(iv)  While  tightening  expenditure  control  at the  center  may  be a
necessary  and  valid  response,  at least  in the  short  term,  it is far  from
synonymous  with good  public  expenditure  management.  Even  when it is
accompanied  by strengthening  of core  institutions,  care  should  be taken  not
to  neglect  the  sectoral  ministries  and  line  agencies  where  institutional
improvements  are  equally  vital.  There  are,  moreover,  important  questions  of
accountability  and  autonomy  at stake.  Strengthened  central  control  carries
the  danger  of overdetailed  intervention  by core  ministries.  Long term
institutional  reform  should  concentrate  on improving  the  capacities  of  both
core  and line  agencies  to  manage  expenditures  in accordance  with the
objectives  of economic  policy.  This,  in turn,  means  developing  measurable
objectives  and  evaluation  systems  linked  to appropriate  rewards  and
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(v)  In an  effort  to improve  the  links  between  the  planning  and
budgetary  processes,  the  Bank  has frequently  become  involved  in
recommending  or supporting  organizational  changes  with  a  view to
integrating  the  functions  of budgeting  and  investment  planning. These
efforts  have  had  mixed  success  and  may, in  many  cases,  be a red  herring.
While  organizational  changes  are important,  they  can  sometimes  be an
unsatisfactory  substitute  for  deeper  procedural  and  policy  reforms.  It is
essential  not  to  confuse  the  two.
(vi)  Dissatisfaction  with  many  aspects  of public  exppnditure  management
has led  several  governments,  sometimes  with  active  support  from  the  Bank
and  other  external  agencies,  to  attempt  wholesale  reform  of the  entire
budgetary  or  planning  process.  Some  governments  have  endeavored  to
introduce  techniques  such  as  program  or  performance  budgeting.  While  these
contain  many  useful  lessons,  they  should,  from  an institutional  and
political  viewpoint,  be approached  with  caution.  Following  a few  simplo
(but  frequently  ignored)  rules  will  greatly  enhance  the  chances  of success
for  reforms,  be they  partial  or  general.  They  should  make the  greatest
possible  use  of existing  institutions:  the  grafting  of  new  ones  onto
traditional  structures  often  serves  merely  to increase  confusion. Reform
should  proceed  gradually  and  should  involve  all  the  principal  actors  from
the  outset. The  effort  needs  to  be guided  by a centrally  placed  agency
responsible  for  coordinating  training  and the  dissemination  3f information.
New  processes  and  procedures  should  be tried  out  in suitable  pilot
ministries  and  agencies  and  gradually  extended  to the  rest  of the
administration.  Moreover,  reform  efforts  need  to  be carefully  planned.
They  are  often  costly  in  terms  of the  human  and  financial  resources  needed
to  carry  them  out.  Failure  to  provide  for  this  will  undermine  the  reform
effort  itself  and  the  credibility  of its  goals.
(vii)  To stand  a reasonable  chance  of  addressing  the  complex
institutional  and  technical  issues  involved  in  public  expenditure
management,  governments  require  an analytical  framework  which  would  enable
them  to forecast  and  program  spending  over  a three  to five  year  period
(updated  annually),  taking  account  of  both  likely  resource  constraints  and
the  link  with the  economy  at large.  Such  a framework  --  which  can  be
described  in  summary  as  Medium Term  Expenditure  Planning  or  MTEP --  carries
many  of  the  virtues  of  the  comprehensive  planning  approach  to  public
finance,  an area  singularly  apt  to  benefit  from  them,  while  attempting  to
avoid  the  drawbacks.  It  would  contain  a  macroeconomic  framework,  linking
public  expenditures  and  revenues  to other  economic  variables;  projections
of the  major  items  of current  expenditure;  a  multi-year,  phased  public
investment  program  distinguishing  between  high  and  lower  priority  projects;
and  projections  of  revenues  from  tax  and  non-tax  sources  as  well  as
borrowing  needs.  It  should  also  be formulated  in  such  a  way  as to  help
policy  makers  cope  with  uncertainty  by preparing  alternative  expenditure
policy  strategies  corresponding  with different  economic  and  financial
scenarios.  It  would  thus  help to  achieve  consistency  between  expenditures
and  macroeconomic  assumptions  as  well  as placing  due  emphasis  on public
expenditure  as a  policy  instrument.Page  4 of 6
(viii)  Although  a full  MTEP exercise  may  be beyond  the  immediate  capacitv
of many  governments,  it  nonetheless  provides  a consistent  analytical
framework  for  expenditure  management  and  a relevant  goal  towards  which  to
strive.  Many of its  features  have  been  successfully  adopted  by a  number  of
countries.
Implications  for  the  Bank
(ix)  The importance  of the  institutional  dimension  of public
expenditure  management  has  become  increasingly  recognized  in  the  Bank  in
recent  years.  The  number  of structural  adjustment  and  technical  assistance
operations  which  address  these  issues  is  increasing,  especially  though  not
exclusively  in Sub-Sanaran  Africa. More  attention  is  also  being  paid to
them  in  economic  and  sector  work (CESW).  Although  it is  still  possible  to
encounter  major  public  investment  reviews  which  concentrate  almost  entirely
on the  size  and  composition  of the  nublic  investment  program,  with scant
regard  for  overall  expenditure  management  problems,  these  are  now  rare.
However,  Bank  work in this  area  ctill  needs  to  be more systematic;  at the
msoment,  in both  reviews  and  lending  operations,  there  is  substantial
variation  in  the  scope  and  depth  of  coverage  given  to institutional  issues.
This  may  not  necessarily  be in response  to any  corresponding  variation  in
the  extent  of institutional  problems  in the  particular  country,  but  may
rather  reflect  the  professional  knowledge  and interests  of the  Bank  staff
members  concerned. A more  systematic  approach  to the  political  and
institutional  aspects  of public  expenditure  management  needs  to  be
routinely  built  5into  Bank  reviews  and  operational  work.  The  high
institutional  content  of some  recent  reviews  is  an encouraging  tendency
which  should  be developed  further  through  training,  both "on  the  job"  and
otherwise,  and  through  the  judicious  use  of outside  expertise.
(x)  The  institutional  dimension  of public  expenditure  management  is a
highly  complex  and  sensitive  area.  The  multiplicity  and  diversity  of  public
agencies,  interest  groups  and  individuals  with a  vital  stake  in the  process
means  that  the  political  dimension  is  of primary  importance.  The  role  of
the  Bank  is thus  a  particularly  delicate  one.  Governments  understandably
resent  outside  interference  in such  a political  area  as the  allocation  of
public  expenditures.  In this  context,  it is  noteworthy  that  the  Bank  often
finds  itself  with a  more  problematic  role  to play  than  the  Fund.  The  latter
is concerned  witB the  "bottom  line"  of total  revenues  and  expenditures  and
the  consequent  fiscal  gap,  whereas  the  Bank  analyses  not  only  the  size  but
the  composition  of  public  investment  and, increasingly,  expenditure
programs.  Experience  indicates,  however,  that  the  key  element  to  better
investment  programming  in  particular,  and  public  expenditure  management  in
general,  lies  in the  Rrocess  by which  programs  are  identified,  prepared,
approved  and  implemented;  if the  process  can  be strengthened  then  this
should  lead  to  better  programs  of  a more  appropriate  size.Page  5 of 6
(xi)  To advise  governments  on the  institutional  dimensions  of this
process  requires  greater  expertise  in the  practicalities  of public
expenditure  management  than  most  Bank  staff  currently  possesA In the  short
term  this  can  be partially  alleviated  by outside  exp^rtise.  In the  long
run,  a  more  conscious  effort  should  be  made to  develop  staff  skills  in this
area  through:
more intensive  and  systematic  staff  training;
bettc  tternal  Bank  coordination  of  public  expenditure  reform
issU5s  staff  working on a particular country are often not fully
aware  c  similar  efforts  in the  'ame  region  let  alone  elsewhere  in
the  Bank.  The  potential  offered  by the  reorganized  structure  for
taking  more  systematic  advantage  of  work  carried  out  at a sector
or spending  agency  level  by "project"  staff  should  be more  fully
exploited.  The  minimal  coordination  provided  by occasional  public
expenditure  reviews  shoulG  be  replaced  by more  frequent  and
regular  instruments;
the  development  of a stronger  methodology,  guidelines,  and  a
checklist  of questions  for  the  use  of operational  staff;
more coordination  and  collaboration  between  operational  staff  and
EDI;  not  only  do the  courses  on public  expenditure  management
offered  by the  Institute  contain  valuable  material  for  Bank  staff,
but they  could  also  be a  useful  vehicle  for  obtaining  feedback
from  government  participants  who  are  the  daily  practitioners  in
this  area;
more  extended  and  intensified  collaboration  between  the  Bank  and
the  Fund (especially  the  Fiscal  Affairs  Department).  The  work  of
both institutions  could  greatly  benefit  from  more frequent  and
systematic  exchanges  of  views,  regular  exchange  of  documents,
participation  in  missions,  etc.
- greater  contact  with  academic  and  other  experts  outside  the
Bretton  Woods  institutions,  as  well as  participation  in seminars,
conferences  etc.;  and
- a  well-designed  program  of operationally-oriented,  detailed  case
studies  of specific  country  experiences  (successes  and  failures)
from  which  to  draw  lessons  for  future  operations  and  CESW.Page  6 of 6
(xii)  The lending  instrument  so far  most  closely  associated  with  public
expenditure  reforms  has  been the  SAL,  frequently  backed  up by technical
assistance  loans  of  varying  effectiveness.  It is  questionable  whether  these
are  always  the  most  suitable  instruments.  The  long-term  nature  of the
issues  to  be tackled,  and  the  variation  in  country  experience,  calls  for
flexibility  in  operational  approach  and  style. If  major  policy  decisions
are  required  to  bring  about  important  structural  changes,  then  policy-based
lending  may  be the  best  way to  support  this;  however,  it  may  be more
productive,  especially  from  the  point  of  view  of sustainability,  to  use
longer  term,  broader,  and  more flexible  instrument  than  the  traditional  SAL
or sector  loan.  An interesting  approach,  which  is  already  being  explored  in
some  parts  of the  Bank  would  be to  finance  a time-slice  of the  country's
public  investment  program  (on  a sector-by-sector,  but  preferably  on an
aggregate  basis)  to support  not  only  a  more  appropriate  size  and  composition
of the  program  itself,  but also  institutional  and  procedural  reforms  in  the
D2.3cess  by  w.ich  public  expenditures  are  prepared  and  implemented.  This
could,  if  carefully  designed,  combine  the  appeal  (from  the  Government's
standpoint)  of quick  disbursing  balance  of  payments  support  with the  longer
term  approach  required  to encourage  and  support  institutional,  reforms.THE  MANAGEMENT  OF PUBLIC  EXPENDITURES:
AN EVOLVING  BA1%K  APPROACH
Introduction
1.  World  Bank  lending  and  advice  to  support  institutional  and  policy
reform  of public  expenditure  management  is  of recent  origin  and  of limited,
but  rapidly  expanding,  scope. The  area  where  this  concern  has  been  most
sharply  focussed  is  on the  management  of public  investment  programs. Such
programs  are  frequently  a drag  on  public  sector  activities  and  hence  in  need
of attention. However,  in seeking  to improve  the  decision-making  process
with a  view,  for  example,  to  curbing  inappropriate  or excessive  investment,
or ensuring  a more  economic  use  of  public  resources,  the  Bank  has inevitably
been  led  away from  exclusive  concentration  on the  investment  program  E=  se-
and  towards  wider  expenditure  issues. At the  most  superficial  level,  this
can  be seen  in the  accelerating  substitution  of  public  expenditure  reviews
at the  expense  of public  investment  reviews. More  significantly,  it
reflects  an increasing  awareness  that  the  difficulties  of investment
programing  cannot  be dealt  with  in isolation  from  the  more  general  problems
of  public  expenditure  management,  including  the  budgetary  process,  the
institutional  capacity  of both  core  and  line  agencies,  relations  between
core  and  line  agencies,  and the  political  economy  of  budgetary  reform.  This
intensifying  focus  on institutional  issues  arises  from  the  well-founded
belief  that  reforms  are  unlikely  to  be durable  unless  the  related
institutional  capacity  is  strengthened.  This  type  of change  is  often
difficult  to  effect  given  characteristic  shortages  of skilled  manpower  in
most  developing  countries.  It therefore  requires  both  a longer  time  period
for  implementation  than  most  Bank-supported  activities  and  presents  a new
challenge  in terms  of devising  appropriate  lending  instruments.  It is
leading  the  Bank into  areas  of increasing  institutional  complexity  and
political  and  technical  controversy  where  there  are  no  easy  guidelines  or
precise  solutions.
2.  This  paper  attempts  to  address  some  of these  issues  in the  light
of recent  Bank  experience.  Despite  the  fact  that  that  experience  is  short,
the  paper  attempts  to develop  some  guidelines  for  the  future  direction  of
the  Bank's  work in  this  area. However,  the  conclusions  should  be taken  as
indicative,  not  only  because  prescriptions  should  be tailored  to  fit  each
country's  circumstances,  but  also  because  institutional  reform  by its  nature
does  not lend  itself  to strict  models  or  blueprint  approaches.
3.  The  paper  begins  with  a  brief  overview  of the  Bank's  recent  work
on public  expenditures  both in  the  context  of  country  economic  and  sector
work (CESW)  and  lending  operations.  Itis  based  primarily  on the  projects
and  documents  listed  in  Annex  I.  This  analysis  indicates  the  lack  of a
consistent  or systematic  approach  to the  institutional  and  procedural
aspects  of public  expenditure  management.  As background  to  an attempt  to
develop  more  consistency,  the  paper  goes  on to  discuss  the  Bank's  changing
approach  towards  public  expenditures,  starting  with  the  concepts  of economic-2-
planning  and  public  investment  programs It  describes  how the  BanPs
concerns  have  pushed  beyond  the  confines  of investment  programing  alto  the
wider  area  of the  planning  and  management  of  public  expenditure  and  ';rom
there  to  the  reform  of  budgetary  processes  and  prcradures. This  covers  not
only  the  link  between  the  expenditure  program  and  the  budget,  which  is the
principal  administrative  instrument  for  program  i  plementation,  but  also  the
budgetary  process  itself. The  paper  then  discusses  some  of the  difficulties
and  issues  involved  in this  process,  particularly  from  the  political,
institutional  and  procedural  standpoints.  This  is followed  by an analysis  of
alternative  approaches  to  budgetary  reform  which  are  evolving  outside  as
well as inside  the  Sank  and  which  aim  to improve  the  budget's  utility  as an
effective  instrument  of economic  policy. It  attempts  to  offer  some
tentative  operational  guidelines  based  partly  on recent  experience,  and
partly  on the  "state  of the  art" in  some  industrialized  and  developing
countries. These  are  summarized  in  Annexes  II  and  III,  while  Annex  IV
distils  some  of the  main  sequential  features  of the  ba. 'tary  decision-
making  process.
Overview  of the  Bank's  Recent  Experience
4.  The  Bank  has traditionally  approached  public  expenditure
management  issues  through  three  closely  interrelated  activities: structural
adjustment  lending  operations  (SALs),  technical  assistance,  and  country
economic  and  sector  work (CESW). All  structural  adjustment  loans  support,
inter  alia,  a  rationalized  public  investment  program,  the  size  and
composition  of  which  is  discussed  with  the  Bank  and  included  in the  loan
documentation.  In  addition,  in  nearly  all  cases,  the  country  has  entered
into  a Standby  Arrangement  or Extended  Fund  Facility  (EFF)  agreement  with
the  IMF  which  normally  supports  a number  of  measures  to reduce  or
rationalize  public  current  expenditures  with  a view  to increasing  public
savings. By the  very  nature  of the  agreements  concerned,  these  programs
tend  to  be focussed  on the  short  term. The  Fund  also  automatically  requezts
Bank  endorsement  of the  public  investment  program  for  an EFF  and,
increasingly,  for  Standby  Arrangements  also.
5.  The  extent  to  which  the  Bank  has  gone  beyond  these  "traditional"
concerns  (size  and  composition  of the  investment  program  plus short-term
financial  stabilization  normally  with  parallel  support  from the  Fund)  varies
considerably  between  SALs. Thirty-six  such  loans  and  credits,  approved
between  November  1981  and  June 1986,  featured  rationalization  of  public
investment  programs,  and  most  incorporated  IMF-supported  budget  deficit
reduction  measures.  However,  few  explicitly  included  institutional  or
procedural  reforms  to  back them  up.  The  lack  of sufficient  institutional
underpinning  carries  the  danger  that  programs  will  not  be sustained  beyond
the  short  term. Alth-  gh  there  have  been improvements  in public  investment
programing  in  most cG  .tries  undertaking  strcutural  adjustment  programs,  the
1/  No specific  public  expenditure  reform  loan  or  credit  has  yet  been
submitted  to the  Board,  though  some  potential  operations  are in
early  stages  of  preparation.-3-
administrative  and institutional  support  frameworks  are  still  fragile.
Permanent  improvement  will  require  continuing  vigilance  on all  aspects  of
in3titutional  structure,  including  retention  of capable  staff,  use  of
economic  crite_ia  for  project  selection  and  evaluation  in  operating
agencies,  and inter-ministerial  planning  and  budget  coordination.  In  some  of
the  more  recent  Bank-supported  adjustment  programs,  total  public  sector
expenditures,  including  both  current  and investment  expenditures,  are
considesed  appropriate  targets  for  policy  reform.
6.  The second  principal  lending  instrument  used to  approach  public
expenditure  management  issues  has  been technical  assistance  lending. Unlike
*.._  SkLs,  these  loans  and  credits  focus  more  on long-term,  institutional
problems  which  they  seek  to  overcome  no mally  through  the  financing  of
temporary  expatriate  assistance  and  through  training. Typicallv,  they  would
include  strengthening  key functions  in the  core  agencies  (finance  and
planning  ministries,  plus  in some  cases  the  central  bank  or office  of the
comptroller  and  accountant  general)  such  as  macroeconomic  strategy
formulation,  investment  programming,  budget  preparation  and  expenditure
control,  and  the  establishment  of central  accounting  and  monitoring  systems.
Line  agencies  are  covered  more  rarely  since  sectoral  management  capabilities
are  frequently  the  focus  of  Bank  project  work.  In  most  cases,  the  TA
projects  are too  recent  to  permit  judgements  concerning  success  or failure. 2
However,  several  of them  have taken  considerably  longer  to  get  off  the
ground  than  was  anticipated  at appraisal,  reflecting  to  some  extent
administrative  delays  (in  finding  and  appointing  expatriate  experts,  for
instance,  or completing  complicated  formalities  for  the  contracting  of
consultants),  but  also  lack  of government  interest. This,  in  turn,  reflects
some  resistance  among  governments  (notably  in  Latin  America)  to "studies  for
their  owr  sake"  especially  in  politically  sensitive  areas  such  as  budgetary
procedures.  For those  operations  more focussed  on implementation  than  on
study,  it is  perhaps  unrealistic  to expect  most governments  to undertake
deep-seated  and  politically  difficult  actions  in the  absence  of  more
powerful  financial  incentives  than  those  provided  by most  technical
assistance  operations.
7.  The  third  instrument  used  by the  Bank is  country  economic  and
sector work (CESW),  notably public investment and expenditure reviews,  a
considerable  number  of  which  are  performed  each  year.  These  activities  are
evolving  in  a way  which,  on  balance,  shows  an increasing  concsrn  for
institutional  issues  and  a widening  of interest  from  investment  to  problems
of current  expenditure  management.  An analysis  of the  more  recent  reviews,
prepared  by the  Bank's  Country  Econbomics  Department  (CECEM),  shows  that
several  of them  address  issues  such  as:  (i)  the  ability  to  plan  and  appraise
projects;  (ii)  the  decision-making  process  concerning  which  projects  are
included  in the  investment  program;  (iii)  the  ability  to monitor  and
evaluate  projects;  and (iv)  budgetary  procedure.  However,  the  coverage  and
depth  accorded  to such  subjects  varies  considerably  among  the  reviews: a
2/ See,  however,  Annex  III  for  a  partial  discussion  of the
Administrative  Reform  Project  in  Jamaica.-4-
,ew  deal  with  none  of them,  while  the  attention  given  to item  (i)  and  to a
lesser  extent  item  (ii)  generally  exceeds  that  afforded  to items  (iii)  and
(iv). It is  clear  that  there  is  no consistent  or systematic  approach  to
these  issues. Some  staff  question  whether  the  Bank  has the  expertise
necessary  to  make  recommendations  in this  area  and  the  credibility  to follow
them  up with appropriate  lending  instruments.  Such  self  questioning  is  to
be expected  and  is  characteristic  of  most  new  or rapidly  evolving  activities
which  the  Bank.undertakes.
8.  In addition  to  public  expenditure  reviews,  the  Bank  sometimes  uses
its  regular  reports  on the  economies  of  borrowing  countries,  or similar
vehicles,  to discuss  public  expenditure  management  issues. Again,  the
coverage  give'.i  to institutional  and  procedural  problems  varies  greatly  and
does  not follow  any  consistent  or systematic  format.
9.  Exceptionally,  CESW  is  used  as a tool  for  detailed  Bank
collaboration  with  Government  in implementing  improved  investment  programing
and  budgetary  systems  and  procedures.  A leading  example  is that  of  Zambia
where  the  CESW  approach  had zhe  great  advantage  of direct  involvement  by
Bank  staff  who  had  been  engaged  for  some  time  in  an intense  policy  dialogue
with  the  authorities.  However,  this  is  very  expensive  in  use of staff  time,  3
and  does  not,  unlike  a lending  operation,  involve  the  Government  in
implementation  deadlines. Although  it  may  be appropriate  to commence  with
such  a process  rather  than  policy  oriented  approach,  in  order  to  build  long-
term  sustainability  of the  reform  effort,  this  does  not,  as Zambia's
subsequent  experience  has shown,  eliminate  the  necessity  of deep-seated
policy  level  commitment  to  change.
The  Planning  Concept
10.  The  planning  experience 4 is  immensely  varied  among  developing
countries,  where  more  than  300  plans  have  been formulated  during  the  past 30
years. At the  risk  of over-simplifying,  countries  may  be divided  into  four
broad  categories: (i)  those  where  e-omprehensive,  central  medium-term
planning  has  been  practiced  with the  full  backing  of the  political
authorities  (Eastern  Europe  plus  some  countries  in  South  Asia,  especially
India,  and  North  Africa)  and  seeks  to directly  influence  private  as  well  as
public  spending;  (ii)  those  where  planning  is seen  as a  means  of controlling
and  directing  public  expenditure  and  of setting  a framework  of active
3/ In fiscal  year 1985  alone,  51  staff  weeks  were  used in  Zambia  with
a further  18  planned  for  the  next  two  fiscal  years. This  does  not
include  the  substantial  amount  of time  devoted  to these  issues  in
the  context  of economic  missions,  preparation  of  Consultative  Group
meetings,  and  the  broader  policy  and  sector  dialogue.
4/ The  discussion  in this  section  draws  upon  work  carried  out  by
Ramgopal  Agarwala  in  preparation  of the  1983  World  Development
Report  and  subsequently.  Much  of this  is also  summarized  in  his
"Planning  in  Developing  Countries:  Lessons  of Experience"  Staff
Working  Paper  No.  576.- 5 -
cooperation  with  a strong  private  sector  including  foreign  investment;  here,
flexibility  and  adaptability  to  changing  circumstances  are the  hallmarks
(Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  Malaysia);  (iii)  those  where  central  plans  were
formulated  but  where  comprehensive  planning  was  only  nominally  adhered  to  by
the  political  authorities  often  to  assist  in  mobilizing  external 5 aid (most
of Sub-Saharan  Africa);  and (iv)  those  where  there  is little  or no emphasis
on central  planning  and  where  private  investments  are  guided  essentially  by
price  signals  arising  from  a relatively  free  functioning  market  (Hong  Kong,
Thailand,  Colombia).
11.  Since  the  1950s  and  1960s,  a major  change  has  taken  place  in  the
attitude  of  developing  countries  towards  centralized  comprehensive  planning,
and  correspondingly  in that  of the  Bank.  In  many  of the  category  (i)
countries,  most  notably  India,  planning,  though  by no  means  abandoned,  has
lost  some  of its  emphasis  and  unquestioned  political  support;  even  in  East
European  countries  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  there  is  a tendency
towards  greater  reliance  on market  forces  and  individual  incentives.  Most
category  (iii)  countries  have  dropped  any  pretence  at taking  central
planning  exercises  seriously;  Ministries  of Planning  or their  equivalent  are
still  scattered  through  Sub-Saharan  Africa  but they  are  more  and  more
dedicated  to the  vetting  of investment  projects  and  programs  rather  than  the
elaboration  of self-contained  documents  providing  a blueprint  for
development.  Where  such  exercises  still  continue,  they  are  frequently
little  more than  academic  with  no real  political  backing. Indicative
planning  continues  in  many  of the  category  (ii)  countries,  especially  in
East  Asia,  reflecting  the  special  relationship  between  the  Government  and
the  private  sector. However,  these  plans,  although  at times  technically
sophisticated,  are  not  characterized  by strict  adherence  to targets,  but  by
consultation  and  flexibility.
12.  There  are  a number  of reasons  for  these  changes,  some  of them  due
to trends  in the  economics  profession  itself,  and  others  to the  different
circumstances  and  challenges  which  developing  country  governments  have  to
face.  First,  within  the  profession,  the  rise  of planning  coincided  with  a
view 6 that  developing  countries  are  characterized  by accumulated  cultural,
social  and institutional  rigidities,  which  inhibit  or prevent  change.
Consequently,  in  economic  terms,  agents  cannot  respond  readily  to  price
signals  and  the  supply  of  most  goods  and  services  tends  to  be price
inelastic. Hence  "getting  the  prices  right"  (even  if  possible)  can  only  be
expected  to  have  a limited  impact  at  best,  while  only  determined  government
action  to  change  the  structure  of  production  and trade  and  to reallocate
resources  within  the  economy  can  bring  about  modernization  and  development.
Hence  the  need  for  governments  not  only  to  closely  direct  economic  actions,
but to  establish  and  control  a  wide  range  of  prices  of goods  and  services.
Governments  responded  readily  to these  economic  paradigms  since  they  had the
5/  Where,  however,  several  other  instruments  of  a dirigiste  approach,
e.g.  price  controls,  are  applied  in  a largely  ad hoc  fashion.
6/ Encapsulated  in  what  came  to  be called  the  "structuralist"  view  of
development.-6-
effect,  inter  ali,  of increasing  still  further  the  relative  status  and
self-importance  of  officials  already  well established  in  many countries  by
the  bureaucratic  mores  inherited  from  the  colonial  powers.
13.  This  view  of the  development  process  has, in recent  years,  changed
considerably:  most  economists,  within  and  outside  government,  now  believe
that,  in  developed  and  developing  countries  alike,  quantities  are  in fact
more flexible  and  resources  more  mobile  than  previously  assumed,  economic
agents  do respond  to  price  signals,  and  markets,  despite  recognized
imperfections  and  partial  failures,  tend  in  many cases  to  be  better
allocators  of resources  than  governments.  This  change  ir.  attitude  is,  to
some  extent,  the  child  of  disillusion.  The  experience  of  detailed  and
comprehensive  planning,  as  a logical  corollary  of the  structuralist
approach,  was  generally  a severe  disappointment.  Even  where  some  targets
were achieved  this  was at the  price  of stunted  growth  and  feeble
institutional  development  outside  the  public  sector  itself. Overambitious
planning  spawned  large  public  projects,  some  of  which  remain  a costly
burden. Similarly,  the  growth  of a  vast array  of state  institutions  to
achieve  central  government  objectives  encouraged  the  formation  of interest
groups  which  in  many  cases  represent  a financial  burden  on the  State  and  can
hinder  the  execution  of development  policy.  7  Detailed  planning  failed  to
respond  to  changes  in the  international  economic  environment.  Even in  those
developing  countries  endowed  with  highly  sophisticated  economic  expertise
(e.g.  India),  analytical  techniques  and  the  administrative  apparatus  proved
incapable  of  coping  with the  complexity  of economic  change. In  most
countries,  the  institutional  framework  could  not  begin  to confront  the
requirements  of  a serious  economic  planning  effort. Consequent  heavy
reliance  on  expatriate  expertise  further  alienated  the  plans  from  the
national  reality.
14.  Second,  the  role  of central  planning,  with  all its  institutional
connotations,  received  a  major  blow  with the  onset  of the  financial  and
economic  crises  which  afflicted  much  of the  developing  world  following  the
oil  shocks  of the  1970's. Projections,  based  principally  on the  notion  that
the  future  would  be a slightly  modified  extrapolation  of the  past,  lost
their  practical  meaning.  Moreover,  sheer  financial  survival  became  the  order
of the  day,  and  there  was, therefore,  little  scope  or desire  to see  beyond
the  short  term. This  affected  not  merely  the  concept  of  medium  or long-term
national  planning  but  also  investment  programing  and  the  management  of
public  expenditure  in  general  which  now  tends  to assume  an intensely  short-
term  and  highly  selective  focus.
15.  While  few  would  question  the  severe  limits  to the  usefulness  of
detailed,  comprehensive  planning,  there  is a distinct  danger  that  the  crisis
may make  many governments  lose  sight  of its  virtues. Partly  through
ideological  change,  but  mainly  through  the  force  of  circumstances,  the
7/ Public  enterprises  in  most of Sub-Saharan  Africa  are  a case in
point. See  J. Nellis: "Public  Enterprises  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa",
World  Bank  Discussion  Papers  No. 1, 1986.-7-
authorities  of  many  developing  countries  have  de facto  resorted  to  reliance
on traditional  budgetary'  methods  for  allocating  resources.  Under  this
approach,  it  is inevitable  that  short-term  considerations  will  dominate.
Ministries  of Finance  frequently  impose  control  through  the  establishment  of
overall  ceilings  on government  expenditure.  If resources  are  less  than
anticipated,  then  the  problem  is resolved  by across-the-board  cuts.  This
implies  scant  regard  for  the  quality  of expenditure  composition: since  some
categories  are  considered  untouchable  (e.g.  personnel),  then  it is
inevitable  that  budgetary  ceilings,  unaccompanied  by planning,  will lead  to
a  progressive  deterioration  in  the  structure  of  expenditures,  in the  budget
as an instrument  of economic  policy,  and  in  the  quality  of government
services. This is  the  pattern  whiLh  has  become  depressingly  familiar  in
recent  years,  especially  though  far  from  exclusively,  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
16.  The  approach  increasingly  favored  by the  Bank  in its  dialogue  with
governments  places  greater  emphasis  on  programing  public,  as opposed  to
total,  expenditures  within  an overall  framework  of greater  reliance  on
market  prices  and  private  sector  decision-making.  This implies  shifting  the
focus  away  from  some  coincepts  of planning,  which  were  earlier  in  vogue,  and
which  conjure  up a  vision  of government  intervention  in  private  decision-
making.  It should  not,  however,  suggest  a  wholesale  rejection  of the  concept
and  usefulness  of planning. On the  contrary,  it  explicitly  recognizes  that
public  expenditure  programing  cannot  take  place  in  a  vacuum,  and  that  some
sort  of systematic  forecasting  framework  is  a sine  aua  non  for  effective
public  expenditure  management. In fact  it is  the  public  sector  which  should
attempt  to  plan its  own  activities  better  without,  however,  trying  to plan
those  of the  private  sector.
17.  While  choices  in the  short  run  may  be severely  limited  by
constraints,  both  exogenous  and  endogenous,  to  the  public  sector  and  the
economy  as  a whole,  over  a longer  period  choice  may  become  dramatically
expanded. Options  may  emerge  concerning  not  only  the  composition  and  size
of the  public  expenditure  program,  but  also  between  different  totals  and
allocations  of current  and  capital  expenditures  (some  of them  functions  of
.the investment  choices  made),  as  well as their  phasing. Political  decision-
makers  and  their  technical  advisers  are  frequently  unaware  of the  trade-offs
between  different  expenditure  patterns  even  within,  let  alone  between,
sectors.  Comprehensive  awareness  and  consideration  of these  issues  entails
the  coordination  of macroeconomic  analysis  with  public  expenditure  planning
and  budgeting  over,  say,  a three-to-five  year  horizon. This  coordination
process  may  also  be described  as  medium-term  expenditure  planning  (MTEP),
which,  in  essence,  carries  many  of the  virtues  of the  comprehensive  planning
approach  to the  area  of  public  finances,  an  area  which  is singularly  apt  to
benefit  from  them,  while  attempting  to avoid  the  drawbacks.
18.  In outline,  the  characteristics  of  an MTEP  would  be built  from  the
following  components:
(a) macroeconomic  analysis  linking  the  growth  of  national  income,
savings,  investment  and  balance  of  payments  to  public  expenditures
and  revenues;-8-
(b) a rolling,  multi-year  public  investment  program  with  phased
outlays  reviewed  annually;
(c) a fiscal  plan,  including:
(i)  -evenue  forecasts  at existing  rates  of taxation  consistent
with the  macroeconomic  assumptions;
(ii)  forecast  of  non-tax  revenues  (surplus  of  public  enterprises,
fees,  user charges,  etc.)  based  on  macroeconomic  projections
but  without  any  changes  in  policy;
(iii)  estimation  of additional  revenues  which  may  be mobilized  by,
for  example,  higher  tax  rates,  a different  tax  structure,  or
institutional  and  administrative  reforms  in tax  collection;
(iv)  estimation  of additional  income  resulting  from  changes  in the
policy  framework  for  public  enterprises,  public  sector  pricing
policy,  charges  in the  social  sectors,  etc.;
(v)  estimates  of resources  ava 4lable  from  domestic  and  external
borrowing  and  grants;  and
(vi)  projections  of current  expenditure  including  debt-servicing,
defense,  administration  and  recurrent  expenditure  on
development  (sub-divided  between  committed  and  anticipated
discretionary  expenditures).
19.  Consistency  may  be insured  by establishing  balances,  year  by year,
for  the  plan  period,  between  the  sum  of  domestically  genqrated  resources  and
net  inflow  of  external  resources  on the  one  hand,  and  total  public
expenditure  (including  public  capital  spending  and  net transfers  to
autonomous  public  entities)  on the  other. Given  the  inherent  uncertainties
in  forecasting  exercises,  the  trade  offs  to  be considered,  and the
iterations  that  would  be required  to achieve  consistency,  it  would  in  most
countries  be more feasible  to formulate  the  MTEP  over  a three  rather  than  a
five-year  period. Ideally,  it should  be a rolling  program,  updated
annually.
20.  Clearly,  the  MTEP  exercise  is  fraught  with  difficulties.  Export
volumes  and  prices,  interest  rates,  and  the  availability  of foreign  capital
can  all  vary  due to  changes  in  external  conditions.  Also,  governments
change,  and  with them  perceptions  as to the  principal  objectives  of economic
policy.  Moreover,  in  most developing  countries,  the  exercise  is
"unrealistic"  in the  sense  that  if  governments  were  able  to formulate,  and
subsequently  adhere  to,  a  multi-year  rolling  MTEP  this  would  in  and  of
itself  be a clear  indication  that  they  had  their  public  sector  finance
problems  under  control,  at least  from  an institutional  and  managerial
standpoint. It is,  nevertheless,  useful  in  providing  an  analytical
framework  for  public  sector  expenditure  planning,  which  ensures  consistency
with  macroeconomic  assumptions  and  is itself  a  benchmark  against  which
existing  systems  of  planning  and  budgeting  may  be judged. Moreover,  it-9-
greatly  facil.tates  the  view  of  public  expenditure  as a policy  instrument
rather  than  meraly  stressing  the  "good  housekeeping"  aspect  of  budgeting.
Once  a government  has formulated  a  policy  framework  in  the  context,  for
example,  of a structural  adjustment  program,  this  can  then  be broken  down
into  constituent  parts,  some  of  which  will  likely  involve  the  establishment
of targets  and  the  enactment  of reforms  in  the  public  sector. An MTEP
exercise  can  illuminate  the  revenue  and  expenditure  implications  of
achieving  these  targets,  thereby  enabling  a sharper  focus  on the  extent  and
depth  of the  specific  reform  measures  required. It  also facilitates
analysis  of the  projected  impact  of the  policy  measures  on the  rest  of the
economy  through  the  systematic  linkage  between  the  public  sector  variables
and  the  macroeconomic  model.
21.  The institutional  problems  encountered  in the  establishment  and
successful  operation  of such  a system  of reformed  public  expenditure
planning  are  formidable.  For  the  Bank  to  be of greater  assistance  to
developing  country  governments  in  overcoming  them,  it is  necessary  for  staff
to  be fully  aware  of the  issues  involved  and  how they  might  be tackled.
While  not  neglecting  the  traditional  concerns  such  as the  composition  and
size  of the  public  investment  program,  and  whether  or not  major  projects  are
subjected  to  cost  benefit  analysis,  this  does  involve  going  considerably
beyond  them  into  areas  which  are  fraught  with  political  as well  as
institutional  difficulties.
22.  Each  separate  sub-activity  of  public  expenditure  planning  --  the
formulation  of the  macroeconomic  framework,  project  preparation  and
investment  programming,  the  link  between  planning  and  budgeting,  the
coverage,  preparation  and  classification  of the  budget,  and  budget
implemenitation  and  expenditure  control  --  has  an institutional  and
political,  as  well  as a technical  or economic,  dimension.  This  dimension
raises  a  number  of key  questions  which  need  to  be answered  if  the  potential
obstacles  to reform  are  to  be more  fully  understood.  The  detail  with  which
each  issue  needs  to  be addressed  will  inevitably  vary in  accordance  with
each  country's  circumstances.  Frequently,  however,  it  will  be found  that
the  linkages  between  the  macroeconomic  framework  and  the  investment  program,
and  between  both  and  the  budget  process,  are  fragile  or non-existent.  The
demise  of compreheisive  economic  planning  is in  danger  of bringing  in its
wake  a  withering  of all  planning  capabilities  in  many  developing  countries
to  the  detriment  of effective  expenditure  management.  Many  governments
encounter  considerable  difficulty  in formulating  an investment  program  that
is  more than  an aggregation  of  wish-lists  drawn  up by the  different  spending
agencies. Macroeconomic  analysis  and  forecasting,  even in  the  relatively
short  term,  is  often  so deficient  that  it  leaves  the  authorities  unprepared
for  major  deviations  from  the  program  necessitated,  for  example,  by a
substantial  external  shock. Classification  of  budgetary  items  does  not
facilitate  a  policy  or objectives  oriented  approach  to  public  expenditure
plannine. Control  over  the  external  borrowings  of different  government
agencies  is frequently  less  than  desirable,  and  even  where  this  exists,
donor  pressure  can  at times  undermine  attempts  to  exclude  significant  but
economically  unjustifiable  capital  expenditures  from  the  investment  program.
Phasing  of  capital  spending  is  often  inadequate  or non-existent,  while  the
recurrent  cost  implications  of public  investments  are  rarely  taken  into- 10  -
account. The organization  of the  spending  agencies,  their  technical
capabilities  for  financial  and  economic  analysis,  and their  linkages  with
core  ministries  are  such  that  an integrated  and  coordinated  approach  to
revenues  and  expenditures  is,  at  best,  severely  impeded.
23.  The  rest  of this  paper  attempts  to analyze  these  and  other
difficulties,  from  the  standpoint  of identifying  the  institutional  reforms
which  may  be necessary  if  public  expenditure  planning  is  to  become  an
effective  policy  instrument.
The  Macroeconomic  Framework
24.  When  the  Bank  undertakes  a  public  expenditure  review,  it  normally
includes  an assessment  and  projection  of the  macroeconomic  framework  for  a
period  of three  to five  years  ahead. This  provides  not only  background  and
a cortext  for  public  expenditures,  but is  also  the  basis  for  revenue
fore  asts.  However,  it is  often  unclear  from  the  reviews  whether  the
authorities  themselves  are  capable  of  carrying  out  a similar  exercise  or,  if
s^,  whether  this  is consistent  with that  of the  Bank. To be sure,  the
review  is  normally  discussed  with  the  government,  but this  discussion
frequently  focusses  on the  results  of the  pro.  ctions  rather  than  how they
were  produced. Moreover,  the  time  lag  between  the  initial  review  mission
and  the  discussion  with the  government  is  sometimes  of such  duration  that
the  Bank's  assumptions  may  have  lost  much  of their  relevance.
25.  Institutionally  and  technically,  the  Bank  should  assess: (i)  what
capabilities  exist  for  macroeconomic  analysis  in the  country  concerned;
(ii)  what  agencies  are  responsible  for  it;  (iii)  in  what format  the
projections  are  produced  (e.g.  in a  medium-term  plan,  through  a forecasting
model,  through  an annual  economic  report);  (iv)  whether  the  model  or
methodology  used  is sufficiently  flexible  to  permit  consideration  of
alternative  scenarios;  and  (v)  whether  it  permits  the  analysis  of the  impact
of alternative  expenditure  strategies  on economic  variables. Even  where
such  capabilities  exist,  institutional  factors  may impede  their  usefulness
or  practical  application.  Where,  for  example,  are  they  located  within  the
administrative  machine? How  effectively  do they  communicate  and  coordinate
with other  parts  of the  administration?  How  seriously  are  they  taken  by dhe
highest  political  authorities  and  by those  responsible,  in  both the  core  and
line  ministries,  for  the  preparation  of  plans  and  budget  estimates? Is
there  adequate  coordination  of the  efforts  of  different  agencies  with
consequent  consistency  of  assumptions  and  results?  If the  answers  to these
questions  reduce  the  relevance  and  effectiveness  of plans  and  budget
estimate,  what  measures  are  required  to correct  the  situation?
26.  A related  set  of  questions  concerns  the  quality  of  background
material  and  guidance  provided  to those  responsible  for  planning
expenditures.  Those  Bank  reviews  which  have  addressed  this  issue  usually
find  this  of low  quality  or altogether  absent. Again  this  is  by no means
confined  to the  leaz developed  countries: a recent  report  on  a major  Latin
American  country  found  that  no norms  were  provided  to parastatals  or
spending  ministries  concerning  macroeconomic  variables  such  as the  expected- 11  -
rate  of inflation,  exchange  rate  movements,  etc.  Each  agency  thus  produces
its  own  with  resultant  inconsistencies  which  must  be resolved,  if at all,  at
a later  stage  of the  expenditure  cycle.
27.  Finally,  what  kind  of feedback  is  provided  by macroeconomic
analysis  into  the  budget  execution  and  monitoring  process? Are contingency
review  meetings  attended  by forecasters?  Are strategic  choices  analyzed
when  resources  are  less  than  anticipated? If  so,  by whom?  Do the
institutions  involved  have the  capacity  and  the  authority  to  carry  their
task  out  adequately?  Are governments  provided  with the  necessary  information
and  guidance  to react  in  any  way  other  than  simple  across-the-board  cuts?
Again,  the  answer  to these  questions  is frequently  in the  negative.
Investment  Programing  and  Project  PreRaration
28.  The  institutional  arrangements  which  exist  for  the  preparation  of
medium-term  plans  and investment  programs  vary  enormously  from  country  to
country,  but in  only  rare  cases  could  they  be described  as acceptably
satisfactory  according  to the  criteria  r.3rmally  applied  by the  Bank.  This  is
perhaps  less  than  encouraging  in  view of the  immense  effort  which  the  Bank
has  put  in over  the  years  to improving  public  investment  programing. This
is  not  to say  that  these  efforts  have resulted  in  unmitigated  failure. Some
improvements  have taken  place,  especially  within  the  framework  of a general
economic  reform  program  whether  or not  directly  supported  by Bank  structral
or sectoral  adjustment  lending. In a considerable  number  of countries,
thanks  to financial  pressures,  public  investment  expenditures  have  been
substantially  reduced  to levels  more  consistent  with overall  resource
availability.  To a lesser  extent,  the  composition  of programs  has  also  been
improved  especially  where  Bank  financial  assistance  has  been directly
provided. Nevertheless,  among  the  difficulties  which  remain  in  many
countries  are:
(a)  Considerable  and  deliberate  overprograming,  reflecting  an
unwillingness  or inability  to  make  hard  decisions  as to
priorities.  This  leads  not  only  to the  formulation  of  programs
way out  of line  with  domestic  or foreign  resource  availability,
but also  to too  many  projects  being  started  at the  same  time,
excessive  dispersion  of  available  skills,  slowdowns  in  project
implementation  and  lower  returns  from  investment.
(b)  The  lack  of  criteria  for  choosing  which  projects  should  or  should
not  be included  in  the  program. This  has  been  addressed,  with
varying  degrees  of success,  through  Bank  and  other  technical
assistance  to  both  planning  ministries  and  spending  agencies.
Bank  reports  contain  many  recommendations  for  improved  project
appraisal  capability.  Over  the  years,  thousands  of officials  from
developing  countries  have  been trained  in  analytical  methods,
through  EDI  courses  and  other  means. Nevertheless,  although  no
systematic  survey  or assessment  of  country  practices  has  been
undertaken,  it is  clear  from  references  in  expenditure  reviews  and
other  documents  that  a permanent  institutional  capacity  is  being
built  up only  gradually  and in  a limited  number  of countries. In- 12
some  parts  of  Latin  America, 8 a  high level  of  project  appraisal
capability  has  become  established  in  public  sector  utilities  and
other  implementing  agencies  to  which  the  Bank  has lent;  in other
countries  of the  region,  the  picture  is less  encouraging.  In Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  there  have  been  many  attempts  to  develop  project
appraisal  techniques  in core  ministries. Despite  all this  effort,
relatively  few  countries  have  systematically  established
procedures  or institutional  capacity  for  economic  project
appraisal  at either  s.ectoral  or core  ministry  level. Even in
Turkey,  a recipient  of five  structural  adjustment  loans,  a 1985
public  expenditure  review  found  "important  eeficiencies  in  project
preparation  and  selection  even  in the  case  of agencies  with  high
technical  competence."  Political  considerations  seems  to  dominate
in  project  choice.  There  is still  a widespread  ignorance  and/or
mistrust  of cost  benefit  techniques,  well  justified  in  many
sectors.  Such  techniques  are,  perhaps,  most  widely  accepted  in
transport  where  they  are  more  refined,  and  where  there  is
reasonably  good  knowledge  of recurrent  cost  implications  and  of
trade-offs  between  capital  and  recurrent  expenditures.  In other
areas  (especially  agriculture  and the  social  sectors),  such
knowledge  is less  developed  and  hard  data  is often  difficult  to
come  by.  This  is  not  to argue  against  the  use of cost  benefit
techniques  with the  appropriate  institutional  backing;  at  best,
they  can  lead  to  vast improvements  in  public  investment
programming,  and  at  worst  they  can  be conducive  towards  a more
rational  political  debate  on  project  choice.  Perhaps  that
partially  explains  the  slow  progress  in  promoting  their  use.  In
poorer  countries,  with a  high  proportion  of donor-financed
projects,  there  may  perhaps  be more  projects  subject  to  economic
analysis,  though  donor  pressures  to  proceed  are  also  strong. In
any  event,  few  projects  financed  by other  donors  seem to  meet  Bank
standards  of analysis.
(c)  The  lack  of  priorities  and  ranking  of  projects. Governments,
together  with  the  Bank,  have tried  to address  this  through  the
formulation  of "core"  investment  programs. An agreement  is
reached  that  the  government  abandon  a  policy  of partially  funding
all  or  most  projects,  and  distinguishes  between  "core"  projects
which  should  receive  funds  under  all  circumstances  and  standby
projects  which  are  funded  only  when additional  resources  are
available. It is  important  to emphasize  here that  "funding'
includes  not  merely  capital,  but all  current  resources  required  to
complete  and  operate  a  priority  project. "Core"  programs  should
also  be concentrated  on strategic  projects  and  should  exclude
white  elephants  even  where  funding  is  assured.  However,  such
programs  need  to  be  formulated  against  the  background  of
consistent  overall  macroeconomic  objectives  and  should  take
account  of the  constraints  faced  by the  public  sector  and  by the
economy  at large  through  the  balance  of payments,  etc. Their
8/ For  example,  in Chile  and,  at least  until  recently,  Panama.- 13 -
preparation  therefore  frequently  runs  up against  t'ne  same
institutional  and  manpower  constraints  facing  the  formulation  of
macroeconomic  strategies.  In Sub-Saharan  Africa,  it  is far  from
un'known  for  the  core  program  to  be hastily  prepared  by Bank  staff,
in  advance  of a Consultative  Group  meeting,  with  marginal
participation  on  behalf  of  nationals.
(d) Lack  of coordination  among  donors  and  donor  pressure  for
unjustified  projects. Theoretically,  "core"  programs  should
provide  a framework  within  which  donors  can  agree  to  concentrate
their  efforts. However,  difficulties  can  and  do  arise  when  a
donor's  pet  project,  perhaps  already  underway,  finds  itself
excluded  from  the  "core"  program. Despite  much rhetoric  to the
contrary,  there  is  incomplete  recognition  of Bank  leadership  and
coordination  of donor  support  for  investment  programs  ever.  when
this  is  institutionalized  through  Bank-organized  Consultative
Croup  (CG)  meetings. Examples  of successful  resistance  to donor
pressure  for  economically  unjustified  projects  are  not  unknown
(e.g.  in Panama  and  Chile),  though  they  are  still  exceeded  by
failures. Reluctance  to  accept  a Bank  leadership  role  stems  from
both  donor  and  recipient  governments  for  fairly  obvious  political
reasons. It can  only  be gradually  overcome  through  increases  in
the  scope  and  depth  of  Bank  CESW  and  policy-based  dialogue  with
governments.
(e)  Poor  coordination  between  macro-analysis  and  expenditure  planning
can  also  lead  to  a lack  of appreciation  of the  impact  of the
general  policy  framework  on the  success  of a  public  investment
program. In some  countries,  the  opportunity  provided  by a  Bank-
supported  structural  adjustment  program  has  been taken  to increase
government  awareness  of inappropriate  policies  which  impose  a
heavy  fiscal  burden  and  devour  resources  that  would  otherwise  be
available  for  investment.  Chief  among  these  are:  (i)  pricing
policies  leading  to  large  subsidies  which  are  not  only  a direct
strain  on the  budget  but  may  also  discourage  production  and  hence
reduce  resources;  (ii)  substantial  and  unproductive  overemployment
in the  public  service;  (iii)  inadequate  control  over  the
expenditures  of local  authorities  and  autonomous  agencies;
(iv)  public  ownership  of inefficient  and  loss-making  enterprises,
established  with  the  intention  of remedying  market  failures  or
achieving  social  objectives,  but in  practice  doing  neither;  and
(v)  the  general  incentive  and  policy  framework. If  there  is,  in
broad  terms,  a failure  to  encourage  efficiency  through  economic
incentives,  then  this  will,  of course,  affect  the  quality  of  both
public  and  private  investment.  Poor  private  investment  decisions
can  in  turn  feed  back on the  public  sector  through  not  only  fewer
resources  but  also  a sense  that  the  public  sector  "must  do
everything."
(f)  Poor  implementation  and  operation  of  projects,  often  due  to
general  underfunding,  lack  of prior  analysis,  including
identification  of interlinkages  between  projects,  and  failure  to
foresee  current  expenditure  implications  for  operation  and
maintenance.- 14 -
29.  As a result  of the  fact%.s  listed  above,  the  pAblic  investment
portfolios  of  many  borrowing  countries  are  less  than  satisfactory,
containing  poor quality  projects  and  rates  of  return  well  below
expectations.  Bank  dialogue  has responded  to this  by stressing  the  need to
improve  the  productivity  of existing  investments,  particularly  in  view of
the  scarcity  of resources  for  new  projects. In some  countries,  governments
have thus  been stimulated  into  placing  greater  emphasis  on maintenance,
rehabilitation  and  changing  inappropriate  pricing  policies,  an emphasis  made
easier  by direct  Bank  support  through  project  or sector  lending.
30.  Although  important  partial  improvements  have  been  attained  in  a
minority  of borrower  countries,  it  is recognized  within  the  Bank that  a
great  deal  remains  to  be done in  achieving  lasting  improvements  to  public
investment  planning  and  programing.  Much  of this  can  be summed  up under  the
heading: "the  institutional  dimension  of  reform." To begin  to  addrass  this
dimension,  Bank  staff  need to  go  beyond  the  programs'  size  and  composition
and  consider  a number  of  key institutional  questions,  9 the  answers  to  which
could  at least  initiate  measures  aimed  at  a solution.
31.  First,  is the  planning  function  adequately  coordinated  or is it
fragmented  over  a number  of institutions?  In  Egypt,  for  example,  it  was
found  that  the  Ministry  of Planning  prepares  five-year  and  annual  plans  and
coordinates  and  channels  foreign  aid. The  National  Investment  Bank finances
approved  projects  and  monitors  physical  progress. The  Ministry  of Finance
mobilizes  domestic  resources  for  project  finance. The  Ministry  of Economy
is  responsible  for  channelling  foreign  expertise  and  grants  and  transfers.
Second,  if  there  is fragmentation,  why does  it  exist? Is it  because  of
historical  factors,  the  addition  of new  functions  which  overlap  with
existing  ones,  or the  result  of a  deliberate  decision  to split  judicial
power  so that  the  real  authority  rests  elsewhere? Third,  what  would  be
necessary,  in the  context  of each  individual  country,  to achieve  greater
effective  coordination?  Could  this  be accomplished  by simple  merger  or
combination  of the  efforts  of existing  institutions,  or,  more typically,  is
the  lack  of coordination  the  result  of deeper  factors?  Fourth,  to  what
extent  is  each  phase  of the  planning  function  related  to different  sets  of
interest  groups  with  varying  political  priorities,  and  how  far  does  this
account  for  what  may  appear  from  the  outside  to  be institutional
fragmentation?
32.  Fifth,  it is important  to  plot the  Rrocess  by which  the investment
program  is  actually  put together. The  first  step  would  be to examine
existing  laws  and  regulations;  monitoring  what  occurs  in  practice  is,
however,  more difficult.  Perhaps  the  best  way to  do this,  which  would  also
answer  some  of the  questions  raised  in  the  previous  paragraph,  would  be to
track  typical  investment  decisions  from  their  inception  to their  inclusion
in the  investment  program. This is  by no  means  an  easy  task  and involves
understanding  and  penetration  of the  governmental  decision-making  process.
9/ Some  already  address  a number  of these  issues. However,  as stated
earlier,  there  is considerable  variation  in  Bank  treatment  of them
and  a notable  lack  of  a systematic  approach.- 15  -
Recommendations  at a technical  level  (e.g.  improving  project  evaluation
techoiques)  would,  however,  be of little  use  outside  the  political  context
in  which  they  will  be applied.  It is  important  to distinguish  clearly
between  the  political  and  technical  phases  in  the  decision-making  process,
so that  it  becomes  as transparent  as possible.  This  will  enhance  the  chances
of effective  resistance  to abuses.
.33.  Typically,  though  not  exclusively,  a  project  will originate  in  a
sector  ministry  or autonomous  executing  agency  (e.g.  a  public  enterprise).
Are these  agencies  capable  of generating  sensible  capital  expenditure
proposals? Are  coherent  sector  strategies  developed  or is there,  rather,  a
"bottom  up"  approach  to  project  selection  influenced  by the  availability  of
donor  finance  and  the  political-power  and  administrative  skills  of a
particular  minister  in getting  a  project  approved  by Cabinet  before  it is
properly  vetted? What  are the  capabilities  in  a sector  ministry  or
executing  agency  for  developing  a  medium  term  strategy  and  for  project
evaluation,  including  the  practical  application  of cost  benefit  techniques?
In  some  cases,  there  may  be no clearly  delineated  responsibility  for  such
activities. In  others  there  may  be a  proliferation  of such  agencies  with
duplication  and  overlapping  functions  impeding  the  development  of a coherent
sector  strategy. For  example,  in  Zaire's  transport  sector,  planning  units
were  established  in  each  of the  major  public  enterprises  responsible  for  the
bulk  of the  sector's  public  investments,  and  in the  sectoral  ministry.
There  is,  moreover,  a transport  unit  in the  Ministry  of Planning.  The  role
of each  is  not  clearly  defined  and  differentiated.  The  resulting  overlap  in
responsibilities  results  in  poor  communication,  repetition,  waste  of
resources,  and  an inability  to  clearly  identify  and  resolve  critical  issues.
34.  A related  set  of issues  concerns  the  links  and  division  of
responsibilities  between  core  and  sector  ministries.  Often  there  is  a
tension  between  them  which  is far  from  creative. Some  of this  is
inevitable:  sector  ministries  are  driven  by technical  considerations  while
core  agencies  are  driven  by financial  ones. The  core/line  agency
relationship  is complex  and  varies  greatly  from  country  to country.  Much
depends  on the  financial  links  --  whether,  for  example,  the  line  agencies
funding  comes  from  the  central  budget  or from  its  own  or independent
sources.  In  many  countries,  a large  proportion  of public  expenditure  is
administered  by public  enterprises,  the  efficiency  of  which  depends  on a
greater  autonomy  and  accountability  than  they  are  frequently  granted.  In
Turkey,  the  Government  has expanded  the  use  of extra-budgetary  funds  over
which  the  se_.tor  ministries  have  a greater  degree  of independent  control.
The issue,  however,  becomes  problematic  when overall  expenditure  control
mechanisms  are  weak,  technical  capacity,  at  both  central  and  sectoral
levels,  questionable,  and  political  intervention  pervasive. This situation
often  leads  core  ministries,  themselves  overstretched,  to intervene  at a
level  of detail  inevitably  incompatible  with  their  knowledge  of the  sectors
and institutions  concerned.  Factors  such  as these  not  only  lead  to poor
management,  but defies  the  principle  of  autonomy  and  accountability  required
at the  level  of those  responsible  for  implementing  and  operating  projects.- 16 -
35.  Sixth,  to  what extent  do existing  institutional  mechanisms  and
incentives  impede  the  translation  of broad  priorities  into  coherent
expenditure  programs? All too  frequently  government  bureaucracies  place  a
high  premium  on following  established  procedures  even  when these  conflict
with declared  objectives,  and  encourage  centralized  decision-making  while
discouraging  initiative.  There  may  be a myriad  of checks  and  regulations  to
prevent  improper,  wasteful  or  unauthorized  expenditures,  which  at times  can
contradict  the  aim  of investing  in  economically  justified  development
projects. Accountability  is often  diffuse  and  there  appears  to  be little
concern,  even  at the  highest  levels,  as to  whether  targets  are  met  or not.
Indeed,  a greater  premium  is sometimes  placed  on failure  to spend  alloted
sums. This is  partly  because  spending  targets  are  regarded  as ends in
themselves  rather  than  the  means  to achieving  an objective.  This in turn
reflects  the  difficulties  involved  in  establishing  measures  of output  and
performance  in  much  of the  public  sector,  and  getting  all  parties  to  agree
to them.  Ex  post  evaluation  is sometimes  carried  out,  rather  perfunctorily
to  meet  donor  requirements,  but  usually  little  attempt  is  made to  draw
lessons  from  it to streamline  procedures  or improve  agency  performance.
36.  In summary,  efforts  to improve  institutional  investment  planning
capabilities  should  concentrate  on:
(a)  the  coordination  of the  planning  effort  among  the  core  agencies;
(b)  improvements  to the  process  of investment  planning  and  budgeting,
including  the  ability  of implementing  agencies  to generate  and
evaluate  projects  and  of line  ministries  to review  them  within  the
context  of  coherent  sector  st-ategies;
(c)  improving  the  link  between  investment  planning  and  financial
allocation  through,  for  example,  the  establishment  of rolling
plans  to decide  on expenditure  priorities  and  the  sensible  phasing
of expenditures;  and
(d)  strengthening  control  and  scrutiny  by the  central  planning
authority  to  which  a  project  appraisal  unit  should  be attached.
The  Link  Between  Planning  and  Budgeting
37.  One  notable  trend  in  most  recent  Bank  reviews  as  well as in
policy-based  and technical  assistance  operations  has  been a  widening  of
concern  to  encompass  not  only  investment  but  public  expenditure  in  general.
This explicitly  recogTizes  the  importance  of the  institutional  dimension  and
of an integrated  approach  and  represents  a marked  departure  from  the
traditional  separation  of Bank  and  Fund  concerns,  with the  former  focusing
on "planning"  issues  and  the  latter  on "budgeting."  This  blurring  of
demarcation  lines  was inevitable  in the  context  of  policy-based  lending
where  it  quickly  became  apparent  that  the  Bank  had little  option  but to
become  involved  in issues  pertaining  to the  whole  of  public  financial
management.- 17 -
38.  "Government  budgets  are  the  principal  administrative  instruments
through  which  public  investment  (or  expenditure)  prfgrams  are  transformed
into  tangible  achievements."  10  Unfortunately,  few  countries,  perhaps  only
one  in ten,  have a system  of  multi-year  budgeting  which  would  facilitate  the
integration  of multi-year  programs  with  annual  budgets. It is  also
discouragingly  true  that  after  great  effort  has  been  devoted  to formulating
an investment  plan,  the  budget,  even  for  the  first  year  following  the  plan's
adoption  may  bear  little  or no relation  to it.  In  Sierra  Leone,  for
example,  a 1985  review  found  that  "there  is  no evidence  that  the  overall
goals  of the  plan,  sectoral  objectives  or inter-industry  relations  are  taken
into  account  in  preparing  the  yearly  development  expenditure  budget  and in
selecting  the  projects  for  the  sectoral  inveatment  programs. Sometimes,  a
project  is included  for  political  reasons  in  disregard  of considerations
such  as total  costs,  availability  of funds  and  long  run  development
objectives. In  other  cases,  the  availability  of funds  becomes  the
determining  factor,  regardless  of the  project's  repercussions  on  other
sectors,  on the  balance  of  payments  and  on the  Government  budget."
Similarly,  in  Kenya,  it  was found  that  the  manner  in  which  new  projects  have
been  planned,  appraised,  approved  and  included  in the  budget  differs
significantly  from  the  pattern  stipulated  in  Treasury  circulars  and  the
guidelines  for  the  preparation,  appraisal  and  approv-.l  of new  public
investment  projects,  despite  the  existence  of a system  of forward  budgeting
designed  precisely  to  provide  a link  between  the  development  plan  and the
annual  budget.
39.  Common  reasons  for  the  failure  to  provide  an adequate  link  are:
(a)  "Crosswalk"  documents  11  and  systems  such  as forward  budgets  do
not,  unlike  the  regular  annual  budget,  have the  force  of law.
Consequently,  less  attention  is inevitably  paid to  them  by both
legislators  and  civil  servants.
(b)  Forward  budgets  are  frequently  overambitious  and try  to  tranrfer
to the  planning  and  forecasting  framework  the  full  complexity  of
budgetary  classification  and  line  items.
1C/  Chapter  on  Public  Investment  Programs  in "Investing  in
Development:  Lessons  of  World  Bank  Experience"  by Warren  C. Baum
and  Stokes  M. Tolbert,  O.U.P.  1985.
11/  A "crosswalk  documelAt"  provides  cross  references  between,  for
example,  two  budgets  which  use  different  systems  of
classification.  The  most  common  form  consists  of  a matrix  which
helps  the  reader  to determine  where  an item  (or  the  portion  of an
item  to  be financed  during  the  year in  question)  in  the  multi-year
planning  budget  may  be found  in  the  annual  budget  presented  to the
legislature.- 18 -
(c)  On the  other  hand,  the  development  plans  which  should  form  the
strategic  basis  for  budgetary  formulation,  though  specifying
general  sectoral  ceilings,  frequently  do not  contain  a  consistent
and  comprehensive  list  of  projects  and  programs.
(d)  The  iiistitutional  mechanism  for  interministerial  discussions  based
on  project  submissions  by the  sector  ministries,  and  involving
both the  planning  and  finance  ministries,  frequently  break  down  in
practice.
(e)  For  both legal  and  practical  reasons,  those  responsible  for
preparing  the  development  plan  and (if  it  exists)  the  forward
budget  frequently  have less  prestige  than  those  who  prepare  the
annual  budget  which  actually  determines  the  allocation  of
financial  resources.  Less  attention  is therefore  paid to their
work  by major  actors  at  all  stages  of the  process.
(f)  Those  responsible  for  preparing  and  executing  the  annual  budget
are  often  subject  to  overall  budgetary  ceilings  which  may  have  to
be suddenly  and  arbitrarily  lowered  in  response  to a  drop in
resource  availability.  This  inevitably  affects  the  credibility  of
the  planning  exercise.
(g)  The  time  available  for  completing  the  budget  cycle  is  often  barely
sufficient  and  does  not  make  allowance  for  the  more complex
requirements  of negotiating  and  incorporating  plan targets.
40.  In an effort  to improve  the  links  between  the  planning  and
budgetary  processes,  the  Bank  has  frequently  become  involved  in  recommending
or supporting  organizational  changes  with  a  view to integrating  the
functions  of  budgeting  and  investment  planning. These  efforts  have  had
mixed  success  and  may, in  many  cases,  be a red  herring. While
organizational  changes  are  important,  they  can  sometimes  be an
unsatisfactory  substitute  for  deeper  procedural  and  policy  reforms. It is
essential  not  to confuse  the  two.
41.  The  approaches  taken  towards  the  changes  are  basically  of three
types:  (i'  the  planning  agency  takes  over  the  budget  function  (Brazil,
Korea,  Panama);  (ii)  the  budgeting  office  of the  ministry  of finance  takes
over  the  planning  function  (Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Haiti,  Mauritania,  Kenya,
Tanzania  and  Zambia);  and  (iii)  establishment  of  budget  offices,  on the  US
model,  which  are  organizationally  independent  of  both  the finance  and
planning  ministries  (Thailand,  Philippines,  Nigeria). Most  of the
organizational  mergers  under  (i)  and  (ii)  faced  varying  degrees  of
difficulty  due  mainly  to the  fact  that  each  agency  had  developed  its  own
separate  identity  which  it  did  not lose  when integrated  with others.
Several  countries,  consequently,  reverted  to separate  budget  and  planning
agencies,  while  others  have  gone  through  a cyclical  process,  with the
separation  of functions  followed  by integration  and  eventually  by reversion
to separate  agencies  again. It is important  to  recognize  that  there  is  a
political  as well  as a technical  dimension  to this  question. The  addition
or subtraction  of  ministries  and  departments  from  a government  bureaucracy
sometimes  reflects  shifts  in  the  political  wind  and  can  make reform  efforts
more  difficult  rather  than  easier  to  sustain.- 19  -
42.  Even in the  light  of this  mixed  experience,  it  remains  true  that,
ceteris  garibus,  combining  planning  and  budgeting  offices  under  one  ministry
is likely  to improve  coordination  of expenditure  programs. It is  not,
however,  either  a necessary  nor  a sufficient  condition. At the  political
level,  moreover,  combining  finance  and  planning  functions  into  one  ministry
may create  too  powerful  a core  agency.  Much  more important  than  the  issue  of
location  are  a proper  decision-making  authority,  sufficient  trained  staff,
and  an adequate  flow  of information  for  the  formulation  of consolidated
public  sector  budgets. Moreover,  a separate  planning  authority  cen  provide
important  checks  and  balances  which  could  be absent  if  all  key core
functions  were  concentrated  in  o.Le  ministry.  Chile,  which  is  one  of the
leading  examples  of  better  budgetary  administration  among  developing
countries,  shows  how integration  of  plans  and  budgets  can  be tackled  through
procedural  measures  rather  than  organization  mergers: any  projects  not
appraised  according  to  methods  approved  by the  planning  agency,  and  reviewed
by that  agency,  cannot  be included  in the  budget. India  and  Thailand  have
also  developed  successfully  operating  "crosswalk"  procedures.  These  and
other  examples  should  be studied  in  more  depth  with  a view  to applying  the
lessons  learnt  to  other  countries.
43.  In simmary,  both  successes  and  failures  seem  to  point  to the
following  general  recommendations.  First,  the  prestige  and  importance  of
the  planning  process  should  be given  full  legal  recognition.  Whichever  body
is in  charge  of overall  investment  programing  should  have  the  effective
power  of  veto  over  which  projects  are  included  in the  annual  budget.
Second,  if this  body is  separate  from  the  finance  mirnstry,  then  there  must
be  very close  coordination  and  cooperation  between  them.  The  planners  must
be sensitive  to,  and  fully  cognizant  of,  the  resource  constraints  facing  the
government.  It is  not infrequent  that  lack  of such  coordination  leads  to the
preparation  of  excessively  large  investment  programs  which  subsequently
underm'ne  the  credibility  of the  planning  process.  Third,  the  procedures
linking  the  plan  to the  budget  should  be kept  as administratively  simple  as.
possible  to avoid  overtaxing  the  institutional  and  technical  capacities
available  to  most  governments.  Fourth,  the  process  should  be organized  to
allow  ample  time  for  full  discussion  by all  iinterested  parties. It  may  well
be that  in the  final  analysis  the  finance  minister  or head  of government
will  have to act  as arbiter;  but  if the  system  is to succeed  it is  essential
that  all  interested  parties  fully  participate  in the  preparatory  process.
Fifth,  the  miiaistry  or department  responsible  for  the  plan  should  be closely
linked,  and  in close  alliance,  with  that  responsible  for  the  annual  budget.
If this  is  not the  case,  then  it  is inevitable  that  the  exigencies  and  time
pressures  of the  annual  budgeting  exercise  will take  precedence  anid  the
exercise  will  be perceived  as  a Finance  Ministry  preserve.
Other  AsRects  of  Budgetary  Organization
44.  As well as the  link  between  planning  and  budgeting,  and  the
ability  of the  planning  agency  and  sectoral  ministries  to  perform  their
tasks,  it is important  to focus  on the  organization  of the  finance  ministry
itself  to  determine  whether  it  aids  or impedes  the  use  of the  budget  as an
effective  policy  instrument.  It  is  of little  use recommending,  for  example,
a greater  emphasis  on objectives  to  be achieved  through  budgetary
allocations  if there  is  no office  in the  ministry  of finance  which  is- 20  -
familiar  with  analyzing  government  operations  along  these  lines. At times,
the  finance  ministry  may  be unaware  of the  number  of civil  servants  in  each
of the  spending  ministries,  let  alone  the  activities  which  they  are  supposed
to  be accomplishing  (indeed,  the  spending  ministries  themselves  are
themselves  unaware  of this  in  a number  of countries).  Similar  ignorance  may
exist  on the  price/  volume  relationships  between  items  of non-wage  current
expenditures.  Until  such  basic  data  gaps  are  filled,  the  finance  ministry
will  be unable  to do  more  than  crudely  negotiate  global  expenditure  ceilings
with line  ministries.  The  only  information  it  will  have  at its  disposal
will  be the  previous  years'  expendttures  (perhaps  even  that  may  be out-
dated),  and  overall  ceilings  often  based  on optimistic  estimates  of future
revenues.
45.  A useful  start  can  always  be made  by carrying  out  an
organizational  diagnostic  of the  finance  ministry  from  the  viewpoint  of
objectives-oriented  budgeting. This  will  swiftly  identify  both  the
institutional  and information  gaps.  Frequently,  the  latter  can  be partly
filled  through  the  installation  of  electronic  data  processing  systems  in
both  core  and  line  ministries.  Many countries  have greatly  improved  public
sector  financial  management  through  the  automation  of the  wage  bill  and
method  of  payment  (though  see  paragraphs  64-66  for  a discussion  of the
prerequisites  for  the  successful  introduction  of automated  systems).
Institutional  deficiencies  are  rather  more difficult  to tackle. Even  here,
however,  they  may  be elements  in the  existing  organizational  structure  that
can  be built  upon relatively  quickly. Most finance  ministries  include,  for
example,  some  sort  of inspectorate  of finances  which  is  supposed  to fulfill
internal  auditing  functions  and  therefore  focus  on the  operations  of
spending  agencies. Such  inspectorates  could  be strengthened  into  a new
office  that  examines  the  desirability  and  efficiency  of government
activities  in  a  more integrated  fashion.
46.  Another  problem  area  which  could  be initially  addressed  through  an
organizational  audit  of the  finance  ministry  would  be that  of
superimposition  of overlapping  functions,  particularly  those  of treasury,
budget  directorate  and  audit. As with investment  decisions,  it  would  be
useful  to track  current  expenditure  allocations  through  the  system  from
their  initiation  to their  inclusion  in the  annual  budget. This  would  likely
highlight  a considerable  number  of  methodological,  procedural  and
information  difficulties.
47.  Other  institutional  factors  which  affect  the  efficiency  of budget
preparation,  and  which  need to  be taken  into  account  when  proposing  reforms
are:
(a) The system's  "heritage."  Procedures  and institutional
relationships  differ  according  to  whether  the  country's  budgetary
system  is influenced  by the  traditions  of Britain  (which  tends  to
emphasize  expenditures  rather  than  revenues  in  the  budgetary
process  as a result  of which  expenditures  can  sometimes  be
presented  to the  legislatures  unaccompanied  by revenue  estimates);
France  (strong  financial  control  and  a central  treasury  which  is
not  merely  a cashier  but  also  a  banker);  other  European  countries- 21 -
(in  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  greater  reliance  on commercial
principles  of  budgeting  including  depreciation  allowances  and
accrual  accounting,  in Portugal  and  Italy  a  more legal  approach
with  annual  specification  of  budgetary  allotments  by law);  the  US
(a  general  budget  and  numerous  trust  funds  that  are  not  subject  to
legislative  approa^h);  and  hybrid  systems  such  as those  in  Latin
America  that  reflect  the  Spanish  tradition  combined  with later  US
influence  and  the  results  of individual  country  experiences.  12
(b) The  budget  calendar. As noted  above,  one  of the  problems
frequently  encountered  when introducing  reforms  is insufficient
time  for  the  necessary  preparation  and  negotiations.  Budgeting  is
an  activity  which  tends  to "bunch"  as  critical  dates  (e.g.  the
submission  of  estimates  to  Cabinet  or the  legislature)  approach.  13
The  extent  to  which  this  can  be avoided  by stretching  the  process
out  is  limited,  first,  by the  annual  framework  and,  second,  by the
fact  that  data  and  estimates  can  swiftly  become  outdated.
Moreover,  flexibility  is important  since  estimates  are  subject  to
change  at each  stage  of the  political  hierarchy. Producing  a
rational  policy  instrument  from  this  complex  exercise  presents
many  difficulties,  often  compounded  by exogenous  factors  such  as a
high inflation  rate  and  uncertain  trade-based  revenues.
(c) The  appropriateness  of the  fiscal  year  which  should  talce  account
of factors  such  as the  crop  cycle,  the  anntal-  businessa  cele,  ete.
(d) Adequacy  of  budgetary  circulars  and  guidelines  which  are  the  main
instruments  available  to the  core  agencies  for  ensuring  that
estimates  are  in  accordance  with,  as a  minimum,  expected  revenue
constraints,  and,  at  best,  with  policy  guidelines.  Despite  their
importance,  budget  circulars  can  all  too  easily  become  routine
documents  which  become  notorious  for  what they  do  not cover  rather
than  for  what they  explain.
12/  For  a fuller  treatment  of the  implications  of different  budgetary
traditions,  see  A. Premchand: "Government  Budgeting  and
Expenditure  Control,"  IMF  publication,  1983.
13/  As a  minimum,  the  preparation  of  a budget  will involve  nine
separate  processes,  each  involving  substantial  demands  on
institutional  and  human  resources: (i)  preparation  of  budget
estimate  forms  and  guidelines  by core  ministries;  (ii)  preparation
of revenue  and  expenditure  estimates  by line  ministries  and
agencies;  (iii)  review  of consolidation  of  agency  proposals  by
responsible  ministries;  (iv)  transmission  of  ministry  requests  to
core  agencies;  (v)  negotiations  between  core  agencies  and  line
ministries;  (vi)  preparation  of draft  budget;  (vii)  Cabinet
approval  of draft  budget;  (viii)  transmission  of Cabinet
revisions;  and (ix)  preparation  of final  budget  and  its
presentation  to the  legislature  (see  Annex  IV for  a fuller
discussion).- 22 -
The Comprehensiveness  of the  Budget
48.  Few  developing  countries  currently  prepare  a consolidated  public
sector  budget. This  failure  not  only  places  severe  limitations  on
investment  programing  and  its  full  integration  with tta  budget,  it  also
reduces  the  possibility  of  using  fiscal  policies  for  stabilization  purposes.
A 1980  study  of Costa  Rica's  economic  administration  noted  that  some  550
autonomous  institutions  enjoyed  legal  financial  independence  and  operated
outside  the  control  of the  central  authorities.  Moreover,  even  within  the
Central  Government,  about  10  percent  of expenditures  took  place  outside  the
budget. Some  specialized  ministries  had their  own independent  budgets  while
about  half of total  tax  collections  were earmarked  for  specific  purposes.
In  1979,  a  major  step  forward  was taken  with the  setting  up of a  National
Budgetary  Authority;  prior  to that  the  responsibility  for  what little
central  budget  preparation  and  control  existed  was  split  between  the
Ministries  of  Finance  and  Planning. Drastic  reduction  of earmarking,  and
progress  in centralizing  and  consolidating  the  budgetary  process  were  major
components  in  Costa  Rica's  structural  adjustment  program  supported  by a
policy-based  lending  operation  in 1984.
49.  Other  examples  abound. In  Ecuador,  the  national  budget  was found
to  cover  only  62  percent  of public  revenues  and  43 percent  of expenditures,
with  the  rest  accounted  for  by special  funds  and  autonomous  agencies  and
public  enterprises.  In Brazil,  the  growth  of  autonomous  federal  agencies
and  powerful  public  enterprises  progressively  weakened  the  once  strong  hold
which  the  Federal  Treasury  had  on central  government  receipts  and
expenditures.  In the  Ivory  Coast  in  the  late  1970's,  the  budget  was split
between  the  Treasury  and  two  other  agencies,  while  a  multitude  of extra-
budgetary  accounts  were  maintained. In  Egypt, 14 a 1980  budgetary  reform
brought  a  number  of special  funds  and  separate  accounts  into  the  central
budget,  and  the  current  budget  was thus  unified. 15 However,  responsibility
for  financing  public  investments  was  transferred  to  a newly  established
National  Investment  Bank  so that  there  were in  effect  two  central  budgeting
agencies.
50.  Frequently,  the  budget  coverage  reflects  definitional  problems
resolved  more  by custom  than  by economic  considerations.  Defining  the
concept  of "public  investment"  is  not,  for  example,  without  its
difficulties.  Should  it  cover  only investment  by central  government
agencies? Should  it include  only  those  projects  financed  wholly  or
partially  through  the  budget? What  about  investment  by public  enterprises?
14/ "Public  Finance  in  Egypt"  by S.  Ahmed,  Staff  Working  Paper,  1984.
15/  This  should  not  necessarily  be regarded  as salutory  since  it  may
limit  the  autonomy  and  accountability  of enterprise  management.- 23
Or by joint  ventures? Should  it  cover  all  capital  expenditures  (as  defined
by the  IMF  which  excludes  only  defensel 6 but includes  office  furniture  and
equipment,  as  well as  police  stations,  courts  and  prisons)  or only  that
which  is  expected  to lead  to "development"?  Even  in  a narrow  "development"
context,  should  investment  be defined  to include  only  expenditure  on the
creation  of physical  assets,  or also  other  "development"  expenditure,  e.g.
on raising  the  level  of  health  services  or expanding  education? Development
or investment  expenditure  often  includes  some  recurrent  and  operating  costs
during  construction  which  can  easily  lead  to some  current  costs  continually
being  hidden  under  the  investment  umbrella. Current  Bank  practice  favors
defining  a  public  investment  program  which  includes  the  investments  of
wholly  owned  state  enterprises  but  excludes  joint  ventures  except  in
individual  cases  where  the  government  share  is  so  dominant  that  the  company
is  treated  de facto  as a 100  percent  public  enterprise.  All projects  funded
by external  aid  or  borrowing  tend  to  be included  (except  defense),  whether
or  not the  resources  are  channelled  through  the  government  budget. In
addition,  the  program  usually  covers  the  government's  entire  capital  budget
irrespective  of any  evaluation  of its  developmental  impact. This  at least
has  the  operational  advantage  of consistency  with IMF  definitions.  Current
expenditures  on "developmental"  items  such  as  health  and  education,  or  on
the  supply  of  agricultural  inputs,  are  usually  excluded  from  the  investment
program  except  where  the  country  has a  medium-term  development  plan;  in  such
cases,  all  expenditure  included  in  the  plan  as developmental  is  admitted
into  the  investment  program. This  latter  point  is  yet  another  reason  why
the  Bank's  interest  has evolved  beyond  the  purely  investment  concept  to  a
wider  concern  with  public  expenditure  as  a whole. 17
51.  On the  institutional  level,  the  achievement  of full  budget
coverage  is  far  from  easy.  In the  case  of state  enterprises,  government
marketing  boards,  or officially  sponsored  but  financially  autonomous
development  agencies,  it  is first  necessary  to  define,  as precisely  as
possible,  the  financial  relationship  between  these  entities  and  the  State.
This  definition  must include  not  only  direct  flows  of funds  but implicit
subsidies  or charges  brought  about  by government  policy  as well  as an
updated  and  economically  accurate  picture  of the  entity's  balance  sheet  and
current  financial  operations.  This  is frequently  a difficult  technical
exercise  which  taxes  the  quality  of available  data  to the  hilt.  In  many
lesser-developed  countries  this  data  is largely  unavailable  to government
despite  the  existence  of elaborate  rules  and  regulations  "obliging"  entities
to  provide  the  information  on  a systematic  basis.  In  Zaire,  for  example,
the  government  is  only  provided  with  the  accounts,  frequently  unaudited  and
inaccurate,  of the  largest  and  most  important  public  enterprises  some  18
16/  Defense  'capital"  spending  is  essentially  consumption  and  should
therefore  be placed  above  the  line.
17/  One  useful  distinction  is  that  between  discretionary  and  non-
discretionary  expenditures.  The former  would  include  not  only
capital  spending  Rer se,  but also  recurrent  items  other  than,  say,
debt  servicing  obligations  and (at  least  in the  short  run)  the
civil  service  wage  bill.- 24 -
months  after  the  event;  for  the  lesser  enterprises  there  are  often  no
accounts  at all.  The  usual  result  is  that  the  full  implications  of the
government-public  enterprise  relationship  are  not  appreciated  by the  core
ministries  until  a financial  crisis  occurs. Then  governments  find  their
ability  to  restrain  the  budget  deficit  hampered  not  only  by commitments  to
subsidies  and  public  enterprise  pricing  policies,  but  also  by non-payment  of
debts  between  public  entities,  declining  working  capital  (which  must  be
supplemented  by the  Treasury),  cumulative  losses,  non-payment  of interest,
and  finally  effective  default  on loans  necessitating  central  government
intervention  to  assume  the  debt  service  burden.18
52.  Nevertheless,  extending  budgetary  coverage  to autonomous  agencies,
and  especially  to  public  enterprises,  should  be undertaken  with  great  care.
The full  unification  of  public  enterprise  budgets  with that  of the  central
government  is  both  unnecessary  and  undesirable  since  it  violates  the
principle  of operational  autonomy  without  which  greater  efficiency  is
difficult  if  not impossible  to achieve.  Coordination  consistent  with the
proper  degree  of autonomy  could  be improved  through  the  following  measures: 19
(a) ensuring  the  adoption  of a  uniform  budget  year (with  the  possible
exception  of those  entities  whose  revenues  rely  heavily  on crop
cycles,  e.g.  marketing  boards);
(b) preparation  of entity  budgets  in  advance  of the  central  budget,
and  in  consultation  with  the  Treasury;
(c)  effective  central  government  control  over  external  and  domestic
borrowing  by autonomous  entities,  except  for  those  competitive
enough  to  obtain  funds  without  a government  guarantee;
(d)  inclusion  of  major  autonomous  agency  investments  in the  public
investment  program;
(e) explicit  provision  in  both  central  and  entity  budgets  for  all
receipts  and  payments  anticipated  between  the  government  and
public  entities;  and
(f)  a system  of cash  flow  monitoring  and  forecasting  permitting  the
revision  of  budgetary  estimates  of transfers  at least  on a six
monthly  basis.
18/  See  A. Premchand:  op.cit.  for  a fuller  treatment  of these  issues.
19/  Most  of these  elements  have  been suggested  by the  Bank in its
dialogue  with  governments  concerning  reforms  to the  institutional
mechanisms  for  monitoring  and  evaluating  state  enterprise
performance. See  especially  M. Shirley: "Managing  State-Owned
Enterprises,"  Staff  Working  Paper  No. 577,  1983.- 25 -
53.  Clearly  most  countries  have  as  yet  been  unable  to institute  most
of these  measures,  though  important  partial  successes  have  been  achieved.
In Zaire,  for  example,  Bank  technical  assistance  has  been instrumental  in
establishing  a debt  control  agency  which  has  vastly  improved  central
government's  ability  to  control  and  monitor  public  enterprise  external
borrowing. Similarly,  in  Thailand,  Bank  advice  was  an important  element  in
establishing  better  monitoring  of  public  entity  borrowing. In some  Latin
American  countries,  most  notably  Chile  and (until  recently)  Panama,  core
ministries  are  able  to exercise  effective  budgetary  and  administrative
control  over  all  public  sector  expenditure. 20 In these  countries,  fully
integrated  and  consolidated  public  sector  accounts  are  produced  annually,
cash  flow  information  is generated,  and  the  state  of public  finances  may  be
easily  monitored  on a quarterly  if  not  a  monthly  basis. In Sub-Saharan
Africa,  Botswana  was  found  to  have "a  well  ordered  and  effective  system  for
the  formulation,  preparation  and  execution  of its  annual  budget  ....  The
crucial  relationship  between  (the  recurrent  and  development)  sectors  of the
budget  are  appreciated  in  Botswana  and  this  was  a major  factor  in the
remerging  of the  planning  function  with  finance  in 1970.n21  Moreover,  the
government  exercises  effective  control  "over  a small,  manageable  number  of
parastatals."  In  each  of these  "success  stories"  Bank  and  Fund  technical
assistance  and/or  financial  support  were  important  contributory  elements.
Classification  of Budget  Items
54.  Irrespective  of organizational  structure  and  the  role  of the
different  tiers  in  the  planning  and  budgeting  process,  Bank  experience  shows
that  reclassification  of traditional  budget  categories  is necessary  if the
budget  is to  become  an effective  tool  of development  policy. These
traditional  categories,  which  still  have  a surprisingly  tenacious  hold in  a
wide  range  of developing  and  industrialized  countries,  were established
primarily  as a  basis  for  legislative  oversight  and  a source  of information
about  the  end  uses  of each  unit's  expenditure.  The  classification  is
usually  into  items  like  salaries,  equipment,  supplies  and  services,  etc.,
and  shows  what  each  organization  is  authorized  to  spend  under  each  heading.
They  yield  almost  no informaton  on the  objectives  of spending  such  as,  for
example,  raising  the  level  of literacy  in  a certain  area  or  providing
another  with irrigation.
55.  One  of the  most  common  devices  used to  address  this  issue  has  been
to  divide  the  budget  into  a recurrent  and  a  capital  or development  budget.
The  former  would  include  all "consumption"  items  while  the  other  would
ideally  include  not  merely  investments  in infrastructure  but  all
expenditures  which  might  contribute  to  development.  As noted  earlier  in
20/  Though  whether  this  power  is  appropriately  utilized  is  another
question.
21/  Nimrod  Raphaeli,  Jacques  Roumani  and  A.C.  MacKellar: "Public
Sector  Management  in  Botswana: Lessons  in  Pragmatism,"  Staff
Working  Paper  No.  709,  1984.- 26 -
connection  with  the  question  of  budget  coverage,  conceptual  and  definitional
difficulties  have sparked  a good  deal  of controversy  concerning  such  a
separation  of the  budget. Supporters  of the  dual  budget  claim  that  it
enables  a  clearer  identification  of the  uses  of  borrowed  funds  and  also  a
stronger  focus  on the  importance  of generating  current  account  savings  as a
policy  goal. Opponents  argue  that  it  places  too  much emphasis  on
infrastructure  investments  as the  basis  for  development.  There  is,
moreover,  increasing  concern  within  the  Bank  about  frequent  government
failure  to  provide  sufficient  domestic  resources  to projects  and  other
purposes  deemed  essential  for  development.  This  refers  not  only to  matching
capital  funds  but  also  to recurrent  funds  for  the  successful  operation  and
maintenance  of completed  projects. 22 However,  this  failure  would  seem  to
argue  in  favor  of  rather  than  against  the  separate  accounting  and  budgeting
of capital  and  curzent  expenditures.  Although  controversies  abound  on the
merits  of different  classifications  and  measures  of capital  outlays,  a
separation  would  certainly  facilitate  a systematic  approach  to  both  the
"local  currency"  problem  of  matching  capital  allocation  and  the  "recurrent
cost"  problem. It  also  makes  it  easier  to avoid  the "camel's  nose"
syndrome: the  allocation  of  a certain  manageable  sum  to a  project  in  the
first  year,  the  phasing  of  which  involves  far  larger  expenditures  in  years
2, 3,  etc.  when the  girth  of the  camel  makes  itself  felt. This  can  only  be
avoided  through  a system  of  multi-year  budgeting  and  the  use  of a common
system  of classification  for  the  investment  program  and  the  capital  and
budgets. Bank  efforts  should  focus  more  on assisting  governments  to
classify  their  budgets  in such  a  way that  the  public  investment  program  and
other  development  spending  car.  be tracked  through  line  items  of
appropriation  and  expenditures.2 3
56.  In  practice,  the  choice  of  whether  or  not to  consolidate  capital
and  current  budgets  has  important  institutional  as  well  as accounting
implications.  These  concern,  above  all,  the  respective  roles  of the  finance
and  planning  ministries  as discussed  in  paragraphs  40-42  above.  In  Zambia,
for  example,  control  of not  only  the  investment  program,  but  also  of the
capital  budget,  was  vested  in  the  Planning  Commission,  while  the  Ministry  of
Finance  controlled  the  recurrent  budget  only.  This  provided  the  Planning
Commission  with the  authority  to  promote  its  own  vision  of capital-led
development,  while  relegating  the  Ministry  of Finance  to  a less important
22/  This "recurrent  cost"  problem  has  been  examined  in  depth  by Peter
Heller  in "The  Problem  of Recurring  Costs  in  the  Budgetary  and
Planning  Process"  (1982). He  proposes  a proforma  for  project
summaries  which  would  be used  to  extrapolate  associated  current
cost  requirements  or,  alternatively,  the  calculation  of sectoral
ratios  based  on  historical  data. There  have  been several  cursory,
and  a few  detailed,  checks  of such  ratios  by Bank  missions  which
have found  them  on  balance  unstable. However,  the  Bank  could
usefully  carry  out  much  more  detailed  research  in this  amea.
23/  This is seldom  achieved  in  practice  though  some  countries  such  as
India,  and  more  recently  Thailand,  have  devised  "crosswalk"
documents  between  program  and  budget  items.- 27 -
accounting  function.  Under  the  guise  of  moving  towards  budgetary
consolidation,  de fagto  control  of capital  expenditures  was transferred  to
the  Ministry  of Finance,  while  the  Planning  Commission  was given  the  largely
theoretical  authority  to  plan  the  allocation  of the  complete  budget.  This
was  an essential  first  step  towards  the  eventual  goal (still  to  be achieved)
of  unifying  the  closely  linked  functions  of  planning,  budgeting  expenditure
control  and  evaluation.
57.  As with  so  much  else  connected  with  budgetary  reform,
reclassification  is clear  and  simple  on the  conceptual  plane,  but  complex
when it comes  to implementation.  Within  each  ministry,  when  the
classifications  that  civil  servants  have  become  accustomed  to change,
disruption  and  some  resentment  are  inevitable.  Also,  politicians  and  senior
functionaries  may  feel  threatened  by the  greater  transparency  and
"orientation  towards  objectives"  implied  by a reclassification  exercise.
This  will  occur  even  when  current  classification  is  properly  coded  in  a
manner  which  permits  automation.  In  many  countries,  however,  this  is  not
the  case. Not  only  is the  classification  and  coding  system  inadequate  from
a functional  standpoint,  it is  sometimes  so  haphazard  that  it cannot  be
automated. In  Morocco,  for  example,  the  codes  attached  to  ministries  and
line  items  change  each  year. Any  modification  in  a ministry's  or
department's  political  status  involves  a change  in its  coding. There,  as in
many  other  countries,  reclassification  along  development-oriented  lines  will
be a  major  exercise  which  will  have to  be preceded  by detailed  work at
individual  ministry  level  to  bring  the  current  system  into  order. Once  this
is  done,  electronic  data  processing  can  be introduced.  This  is essential  to
allow  flexibility  in  adjusting  and  updating  budgetary  classifications  to
reflect  changing  policies  and  circumstances.
Budget  ImDlementation  and  Control  of Expenditures
58.  So far  the  discussion  has focussed  on the  concepts,  procedures  and
structures  for  the  formulation  of investment  programs  and  budgets. Of equal
or greater  importance,  however,  are  the  problems  of  budget  execution  and
program  implementation.  Bank  approaches  to this  have  been  from  the
standpoint  of two  objectives:  first,  the  timeliness  and  adequacy  of the
flow  of  budgeted  funds  to  executing  agencies  and,  second,  the  effectiveness
of treasury  control  over  public  expenditures  and  enforcement  of spending
limits. There  is,  of course,  a tension  between  these  two  objectives  which
manifests  itself  particularly  strongly  during  periods  of financial  crisis.
59.  The  first  approach  is  exemplified  by experiences  in the
agricultural  sectors  of Zaire,  Kenya  and  Madagascar  which  illustrate  in
useful  detail  the  process  of  authorization,  disbursement  and  monitoring  of
public  expenditure.  In all  three  countries,  delays  in the  release  of funds
were found  to  be a major  factor  affecting  project  implementation,  resulting
in under-spending  of  budgeted  amounts. Systematic  monitoring  of expenditure
was rare  and  budgets  were  seldom  revised  during  the  course  of the  year.28
This is  not  always  due  to the  treasury's  delayed  release  of  budgeted  funds
as an instrument  in  dealing  with financial  crises. Sometimes,  budgets
themselves  are  unrealistically  formulated  in  terms  of real  resource
availability.  In  Morocco,  a recent  review  of  public  expenditure  found  that
of the  investment  expenditures  voted  by the  legislative  authority,  just  over
half  were incorporated  into  the  spending  plans  of executing  agencies
authorized  by the  Treasury,  and  that  of these  latter  amounts  slightly  less
than  half (i.e.  about  a  quarter  of the  original  appropriations)  were
actually  spent.
60.  In the  absence  of  carefully  implemented  institutional  and
procedural  reforms,  severe  financial  constraints  will always  militate
against  orderly  project  implementation.  Tightly  controlled  release  of
budget  funds  becomes  inescapable  when IMF  conditionality  imposes  quarterly
(or  even  in some  cases  monthly)  spending  ceilings. Of course,  in  principle,
once  budget  allocations  are  properly  approved  and  made,  the  responsibility
for  implementing  the  budget,  along  with the  requisite  freedom  to do so,
should  rest  with the  spending  agency. However,  for  this  to  be compatible
with  stringent  and  strictly  applied  spending  limits,  it  would  be necessary
for  these  agencies  to  be equipped  with  adequate  financial  management
capability.  This is  an issue  on which  substantially  greater  Bank  attention
should  be focussed. Few  would  dispute  that,  except  in  the  short  term,  tight
central  control  is  counterproductive  because  it is impossible  for  central
agencies  to comprehend  the  full  spectrum  and  detail  of government
operations.  However,  greater  freedom  for  spending  agencies  would  have to  be
matched  by  a degree  of accountability,  not  mere!-  for  executing  and
monitoring  of spending  but for  the  achievement  of  results, which  few  at
present  would  be capable  of assuming. Bank  assistance  needs  to  be directed
towards  building  up sectoral  financial  management  capability  to estimate  and
monitor  costs,  to fulfill  program  tasks  within  specific  cost  ceilings,  and
to  help  governments  devise  measures  to  ensure  accountability.
61.  Ensuring  a timely  flow  of funds  for  specific  program  and  project
implementation  is,  however,  cnly  one  of the  aspects  of expenditure  control.
An equally  important  requirement  is the  reinforcement  of the  core
ministries'  ability  to  exercise  control  over  public  expenditures  as a  whole;
indeed,  in  the  short  run,  given  the  severe  financial  constraints  under  which
most  borrowers  operate,  the  greater  attention  must  be focussed  on the  core
agencies. In order  to  minimize  the  damage  to development  objectives  caused
by revenue  shortfalls  and  general  financial  austerity,  it is important  that
the  capacity  for  control  of expenditures  be extended  beyond  the  ability  to
enforce  global  spending  limits  to that  of influencing  the  composition  of
expenditures  in accordance  with development  priorities.
62.  In  many countries  it is  nonetheless  necessary  to recognize  that
even  the  first  of these  abilities  is sorely  absent. It  would  be no
exaggeration  to say  that  the issue  of  expenditure  control  is  usually  the- 29 -
most important  and  difficult  problem  area  in the  budget  cycle. Whereas
budgeting  procedures  per  jj  can  be at least  marginally  improved  without
encountering  formidable  political  obstacles,  it  nearly  always  requires
considerable  political  determination,  administrative  skill  and  time  to
institute  solid  control  procedures  for  all  major  outlays. To assist
governments  in  this  difficult  task,  it is  necessary  to  become  familiar  with
current  procedures  and  the  "rules  of the  game,"  both  theoretical  and
practical,  which  regulate  them. Key  questions  which  should  be addressed
include:
(a) How many  categories  of expenditure  are  there  which  require
separate  procedures  for  making  commitments  and issuing  payment
orders,  and  how  many  different  agencies  are involved? In Zaire,
for  instance,  there  are  at least  eight  different  expenditure
tranches  (four  of them  involving  different  categories  of
remuneration),  the  control  of  which  (commitments  and  payments)  is
the  responsibility  of 12 different  institutions.
(b) What  percentage  of total  commitments  does  the  finance  ministry
control? Again,  in  Zaire,  the  ministry  controlled  only  about  30
percent,  essentially  those  for  the  operating  expenditures  of the
line  ministries  and the  small  proportion  of total  capital
expenditures  financed  out  of the  central  government  budget. Wage
and  salary  commitments  of the  Presidency,  the  military  and
government-financed  political  institutions  escape  the  ministry's
remit  entirely.
(c) How  many  separate  budgets  are  there? In several  countries,
commitments  are  made  by semi-autonomous  institutions  without  any
participation  on the  part  of the  Finance  Ministry. Nevertheless,
the  operating  expenses  of these  institutions  are frequently
financed  by government,  often  through  an annex  to  the  main  budget
or in  a separate  budget  document  altogether.  Sometimes,  indeed,
there  is  no prior  documentation  at all  and  the  treasury  finds
itself  with  payLent  obligations  for  which  no allowance  has  been
made.
(d) What is  the  system  for  ordering  and  controlling  actual  payments?
In  some  countries,  sector  ministries  have  complete  autonomy  in  the
receipt  and  spending  of earmarked  funds  and  even  of donor  finance.
This  often  takes  place  in the  absence  of  guidelines  or of a system
of ex  Rost  accountability.
(e)  Even  when  all,  or  most,  payments  are  issued  through  the  finance
ministry  this  may  not  imply  control  over,  or even  awareness  of,
the  amount  or composition  of outlays. Sometimes  the  payment
orders  may  simply  serve  to transfer  alloted  sums (perhaps  a fixed
proportion  of annual  commitments)  to the  spending  agency  which
determines  both  how  much is  spent  and  on  what.  This  may  be
partially  modified  by the  requirement  of a finance  ministry- 30 -
endorsement  on all  departmental  checks  issued. However,  this  does
not solve  the  basic  problem: control  over  payment  orders,  while
important,  is  usually  too  late  because  a liability  has already
been incurred  on  which  the  government  cannot  renege.
(f)  To  what extent  are  existing  rules  and  procedures,  even if  adequate
in  theory,  bypassed  in  practice? It is inevitable  that,  from  time
to time,  political  pressures  will  be put  on a finance  minister  to
circumvent  normal  procedures  to speed  up a  payment  or to  authorize
a payment  not included  in eitner  the  normal  or supplementary
budget. The important  question,  however,  is  whether  this  occurs
frequently  and  with  regularity.
(g)  It is  also  important  to guard  against  the  opposite  tendency:
because  the  institutional  framework  is often  so  weak,  and in
particular  because  the  finance  ministry's  pA  ante  control  over
commitments  is so  partial,  the  only  way in  which  the  ministry  can
control  the  total  level  of spending  is  through  delaying  tactics.
Requests  for  payment  orders  or endorsements  are  bogged  down  within
the  ministry's  bureaucratic  system,  checks  are  issued  but  not
sent,  etc.,  etc. While  an  understandable  last  resort,  this  is  an
extremely  inefficient  way of  controlling  public  expenditures  which
has  very damaging  consequences  for  the  country's  development
effort. It involves  delays  in the  execution  of  development
projects  and  programs  which  can  dramatically  reduce  their  rate  of
return;  it distorts  the  structure  of spending  in favor  of  wages
and  salaries  since  these  cannot  be delayed  (except  In  extremis);
it  undermines  the  real  accountability  of the  implementing  agency;
and it  is  highly  vulnerable  to  political  pressure  (a  powerful
minister  can  appeal  over  the  finance  minister's  head to finance
favorite  activities  to  the  further  detriment  of development
projects).
63.  To address  these  problems  over  the  medium  term,  it is  necessary  to
recognize  the  political  dimension  of the  issue. First,  studies  and  Bank
staff  reports  should  make it  clear  to the  authorities  that  budgetary  control
is  weak either  because  of the  inadequacy  of existing  rules  and  regulations
or  because,  though  adequate,  they  are  regularly  and  frequently  circumvented.
In the  latter  case,  it  should  be clearly  pointed  out  that  this  is  an ominous
precedent  which  may  evolve  into  a tendency  throughout  the  administration  to
ignore  or to interpret  loosely  the  laws,  rules  and  regulations.  Although
budget  formulation  is  as much,  or  perhaps  more,  a  political  process  of
negotiation  than  a technical  one,  governments  should  be encouraged  to
recognize  that  once the  budget  has  been  decided  upon and  formally  approved,
its  aim  is defeated  if  at any  time  the  agreed  allocation  of resources  can  be
altered  or spending  limits  ignored. Clearly,  there  must  be flexibility  and
sensitivity  to  changing  needs,  but the  mechanisms  and  procedures  for  review
and  response  to  changing  circumstances  should  be clearly  spelled  out  and
adhered  to.- 31 -
More  Effective  Financial  Management  Information  Systems
64.  Once  governments  accept  the  above  principles  as a starting  point,
then  the  next step  would  be to install  procedures  to improve  central
expenditure  control. At the  heart  of  such  procedures,  and  the  prerequisite
to  more  deep-seated  reform,  is  a public  accounting  system  which  provides  the
timely,  regular,  detailed  and  accurate  information  necessary  for  expenditure
monitoring  and  evaluation.  This  would  nearly  always  require  the installation
of electronic  data  processing  methods,  since  a manual  operation  would  be
unlikely  to  cope  with the  size  and  complexity  of a  modern  government
accounting  system.  The installation  of  electronic  data  processing  should
not,  however,  be regarded  as a substitute  for  the  institutional  and
procedural  reforms  which  are  necessary  to  permit  any  accounting  system,
whatever  its  technical  sophistication,  to  work  as intended.  Among  the
preconditions  for  success  are: (a)  the  existence  of detailed  budgets  for  all
government  departments,  institutions  and  agencies  (including  the  military
and  the  presidency);  (b)  the  existence  of up-to-date  files  on existing
personnel  and  detailed  organigrams  for  each  agency; 24 (c)  an adequate  system
of reporting  and  review  for  monitoring  the  expenditures  of  all  government
agencies  which  depend  upon  the  central  budget;  (d)  proper  procedures  for
ensuring  adequate  scrutiny  of payments;  (e)  clearly  delineated
responsibilities  among  departments  and  their  personnel;  (f)  a classification
of the  major  items  of revenue  and  expenditure  consistent  with  a streamlined
accounting  structure;  and  (g)  an  adequately  trained  staff  with  sufficient
incentives  to  remain  in government  service. 25
65.  A few  other  simple  rules  which  will  enhance  the  chances  of
successful  installation  of improved  management  information  systems  are: 26
(a)  keep  the  system  as simple  as  possible;  (b)  all  the  key  players,  in  both
core  and  line  agencies,  must  understand  the  system  and  have  an effective
input  in designing  and  improving  it;  (c)  identify  at an  early  stage  what can
be done  given  the  short  term  staffing  constraints  and  order  the  equipment
accordingly;  (d)  apply  the  system  as  flexibly  as possible  since  it is
difficult,  if  not impossible,  to  be precise  in  advance  concerning  where  new
systems  are  likely  to  be most  useful  (elaborate  feasibility  studies  are  thus
24/  See  B. Nunberg: "Public  Sector  Pay  and  Employment  Policy  Issues
in  Bank  Lending: An Interim  Review  of Experience."  PPR  Working
Paper  (forthcoming)  for  an  analysis  of the  difficulties  involved
in  public  sector  manpower  planning
25/  In  Kenya  it  was found  recently  that  nearly  all  statistical  surveys
processed  by the  Government's  Computing  Center  could  have  been
done  faster  manually.  The  root  cause  of this  was  unfilled
vacancies  for  programmers  and  systems  analysts  because  of  better
job  prospects  in  the  private  sector.  (See  Clay  G.  Wescott:
"Building  Information  Management  Systems  for  Developing
Countries,"  paper  presented  at a  conference  on  Policy  Aspects  of
Microcomputers  in  Developing  Countries,  National  Research  Council,
Washington  DC,  January,  1988.
26/  Wescott:  op.  cit.- 32  -
likely  to  be a waste  of time  and  money,  at least  until  several  pilot
projects  have  been completed);  (e)  train  and  retrain  more  people  than  seem
to  be needed  to cope  with the  likely  losses  to the  private  sector;  (f)  focus
training  on substance,  not  on technology;  (g)  share  the  benefits  of the  new
system,  particularly  the  increased  volume  of (hopefully)  relevant
information,  as widely  as  possible,  and  certainly  with all  key  actors  whose
work  performance  could  be improved  by possessing  it;  and (h)  start  with  the
core  ministries  (especially  finance):  sector  ministries  often  have their  own
sources  of  donor  financing  which  can  complicate  later  attempts  at achieving
consistency  between  sub-systems.
66.  It is really  only  when  a reasonably  well functioning  system  of
central  control  has  been established  that  it  becomes  meaningful  to  consider
wider  planning  and  budgeting  principles  such  as objective-oriented  spending
or greater  autonomy  and  accountability  of line  agencies. A well-functioning
expenditure  control  system  should  permit:  (a)  greater  flexibility  on the
part  of spending  ministries  in  reallocating  resources  to sustain  core
activities  and  support  key  objectives; 27 (b)  concentration  of scarce
resources  on delivering  key  services  which  are  essential  for  economic
recovery  and the  development  of  human  resources.
Coping  With  Uncertaintv
67.  Perhaps  the  greatest  challenge  facing  governments  who  wish to
improve  their  public  expenditure  management  is  dealing  with the
uncertainties  inherent  in  all  budgeting  and  planning  exercises.  Budgeting
techniques  have  not  been  well  designed  to  cope  vith uncertainty;  indeed,
they  may  be said  to thrive  on stebility.  As Naomi  Caiden  so aptly  puts it, 28
"budgeting  works  best  where  year-to-year  adjustments  are  marginal,  where  it
is  possible  to  make firm  commitments  in  advance  of expenditures,  where  the
recent  past is  a good  guide  to the  immediate  future,  and  where  results  may
be easily  and  promptly  evaluated."  This  is  a far  cry  from  the  reality  facing
policy  makers  in  most  developing  countries,  particularly  those  where  fiscal
revenues  rely  to a significant  extent  on  commodity  export  taxes,  and  where
the  publi_  investment  program  depends  on  uncertain  external  financing.  Even
in less  externally-dependent  economies,  the  vicissitudes  of an increasingly
unstable  environment  render  forecasting  hazardous.  Resource  availability
estimates  and  budget  allocations  may  require  frequent  readjustment  during
the  course  of the  fiscal  year.  To maintain  a rational  resource  allocation
under  such  circumstances  is  an immensely  difficult  task,  which  is  demandiug
not  only  upon the  individuals  concerned  with  policy  making  at a high  level,
but  also  in terms  of the  flexibility  of the  institutions  and  procedures
involved.
27/  One  of the  consequences  and  features  of inadequate  control  systems
is  that  expenditure  realignments,  especially  in  or out  of
personnel  costs,  can  only  be carried  out  by the  core  agencies;
this  reduces  flexibility  and  impedes  implementation.
28/  Naomi  Caiden:  "Public  Budgeting  amidst  Uncertainty  and
Instability,"  in "Public  Budgeting  and  Finance,"  Washington  DC,
Spring,  1980.- 33 -
68.  Uncertain  revenues  are,  however,  only  one  of the  causes  of
unpredictablility  in  budgeting.  The  growth  of the  public  sector,  both  in
size  and  complexity,  has  made it  much  more  difficult  to  predict  levels  and
allocations  of expenditure.  Institutional  and  managerial  capacities  have  not
kept  pace  with this  growth.  Even  within  the  short  range  perspective  of the
fiscal  year,  the  cost  of  programs  are  underestimated,  they  run  out  of money
and  require  supplementary  appropriations. 29 Since  resources  are  finite,  this
means  less  is  available  for  other  programmed  activities.  Such  difficulties
are  even  more acute  for  the  growing  proportion  of activities  which  require
to  be programmed  on a  multi-year  rather  than  on an annual  basis.  Such
programs  often  do not  get  the  stable  long  term  commitments  of funds  which
they  require.  In  an atmosphere  of semi-permanent  fiscal  crisis,  core
ministries  tighten  and  cen;ralise  control  procedures,  and  are  reluctant  to
commit  funds  for  more  than  the  shortest  legally  permitted  time.  The
authorities  managing  longer-te-m  programs  cannot,  therefore,  plan  ahead  in
the  knowledge  that  the  end  of  each  budget  year  will  not  bring  about  harmful
reductions  or even  a cut-  off  in  funding.  Alternatively,  administrations
faced  with uncertainty  attempt  to  do too  much  too  quickly.  Appropriations
are  not  spent  and  large  balances  accumulate  towards  the  end  of the  fiscal
year.  This  can  lead  to "panic  spending"  as agencies  fear  that  .the  balances
will lead  to reduced  allocations  in  the  next  budget  round.
69.  The  state  of the  art  on  budgetir,g  and  expenditure  planning  offers
little  to governments  trying  to  cope  with  uncertainty.  Refuge  is often  taken
behind  sweeping  global  reform  proposals  (see  the  next section)  whereas  a
more  modest,  partial  approach  may  be of  greater  practical  relevance.  Even
here,  however,  there  are  few  short  term  palliatives.  Over the  longer  run,
governments  can  be better  equipped  to deal  with  budgetary  uncertainty
through:
(a) judicious  use  of sensitivity  analysis  and  alternative  revenue  and
expenditure  scenarios;
(b) drawing  on comparative  analysis  and  experiences  of other
governments  and  the  private  sector;
(c)  the  adoption  of differential  time  spans  reflecting  the  varying
nature  of  programs;
29/ Supplementary  budgets  are  themselves  a  common  source  of abuse  of
the  system.  In  Zambia,  for  instance,  this  combines  with  diffuse
expenditure  authority  in  a  highly  detrimental  manner.  The  Central
Bank  maintains  a "revaluation  account"  under  which  payments  are
automatically  made,  irrespective  of  whether  authorization  was
given  in the  budget.  In  effect,  this  allows  spending  ministries  to
overdraw  their  accounts  and  initiate  new  projects  without  approval
from  the  Ministry  of Finance,  with  retroactive  authority  provided
through  the  suplementary  budget.  The  results  are  as  might  be
predicted:  in  1986,  the  supplementary  budget  was  almost  as large
as the  original  operating  budget,  yielding  a  very large  overall
deficit.- 34 -
(d) placing  much  more emphasis  on the  implementation  stage  of the
budgetary  process  (most  analysis  and  reform  proposals  concentrate
on the  preparation  stage)  in  terms  of planning  budget
implementation  processes,  reviewing  how  officials  work  with
budgets  during  the  year,  making  adequate  arrangements  to  ensure
cash  flow  at  critical  periods,  establishing  self-pacing
disbursement  schedules,  and  initiating  an incentive  system  for
compliance  with  budgetary  mandates;
(e) making  fuller  use  of  new  accounting  and  electronic  data  processing
techniques  to  compare,  track,  and  assess  expenditures  wich a  view
to  achieving  greater  decentralization  and  more  effective
accountability  at line  agency  level;  and
(f)  greater  reliar.ce  on  medium  term  financial  programming  with
appropriate  contingencies  for  shortfalls  in  anticipated  resources
and  a  closer  link  between  revenues  and  expenditure  planning.
70.  Botswana  presents  an interesting  example  of  how to  cope  with
revenue  uncertainties.  The  Government  is  highly  dependent  on trade  and
commodity-related  income  with  customs  duties  and  mineral  royalties
accounting  for  almost  three-quarters  of total  revenues  (excluding
development  grants).  Accordingly,  the  country's  sixth  National  Development
Plan (NDP)  contains  four  budget  scenarios.  The  base  case is  the  most
optimistic  both in terms  of expenditure  (it  assumes  an end  to the  then
current  drought)  and  revenues  (increased  mineral  exports  and  drawing  of
foreign  borrowing  above  historical  levels).  3  The  other  three  scenarios
were  designed  to test  whether  policy  actions  (either  new  revenue  measures,
or reductions  and  reallocations  of expenditures)  would  be needed  under  less
favorable  conditions.  They  assumed,  respectively,  higher  drought  relief
expenditure,  lower  diamond  export  receipts,  and  less  external  aid  funding.
The  model  used could  also  predict  the  effects  of all  three  phenomena
occurring  at  once,  though  this  "disaster"  scenario  was  not  published  in the
NDP.  The  approach  adopted  by the  Government  was  highly  useful,  not  only in
terms  of predicting  the  macroeconomic  impact  of deteriorating  revenues,  but
also in  preparing  the  authorities  for  the  eventualities  and  having  well-
thought-out  policy  responses  ready  for  them.
71.  Before,  however,  attempting  to apply  this  methodology  elsewhere,
it is important  to  note  that  in  Botswana  it  forms  part  of a  well-functioning
planning  and  budgeting  system  with institutions  and  procedures  that  should
be the  envy  of some  developed,  let  alone  developing,  economies.  Among  its
principal  attributes  are: (a)  well-prepared  macroeconomic  projections  to
underpin  the  Plan,  using  a  model  adopted  to the  country's  needs  and
characteristics;  (b)  a thoroagh  preparation  process  for  both the  NDP  and thp
annual  budget,  involving  each  ministry  and  spending  agency  at each  stage  o
30/  Though  it  is interesting  to  note,  en  gassant,  that  the  Bank  report
considered  the  revenue  projections  even  in the  base case  to  be
somewhat  conservative,  due  mainly  to different  exchange  rate
suppositions.- 35  -
the  process;  (c)  a  manpower  planning  system  and  population  growth
projections  designed  to guide  expenditures  in the  social  sectors  as  well  as
civil  service  size  and  salaries;  (d)  a  carefully  designed  public  investment
program,  using  (where  appropriate)  project  evaluation  techniques,  and
choosing  projects  on the  basis  of national  development  priorities;  and  (e)
recurrent  cost  implications  for  capital  expenditures  that  are  explicitly
calculated  and  taken  into  account.  In  brief,  the  system  possesses  many  of
the  attributes  of the  medium  term  financial  planning  "model"  discussed  in
paragraph  18  of this  paper.  The  so-called  weaknesses  described  in  the  Bank
report,  and  the  recommendations  for  addressing  them,  could  almost  be
described  as fine-tuning.  Unless  these  fundamental  characteristics  are  in
place,  at least  to  a significant  degree,  the  application  of modelling
techniques  to  deal  with  fiscal  uncertainty  will  be of little  use.
ComDrehensive  Budgetary  Reform
72.  The  pervasive  nature  of the  deficiencies  throughout  the  budgetary
system  have  persuaded  some  governments  and  observers  that  traditional
procedures  show  little  promise  of enabling  budgets  to fulfill  their  role  as
instruments  of economic  policy  in the  wider  sense. This  has led  to  attempts
in  both industrialized  and  developing  countries  to introduce  wholesale
reforms  to the  budgetary  process  which  seek  a clearer  definition  of the
objectives  and  outputs  expected  from  budgetary  allocations,  a  multi-year
framework  showing  costs  and  expected  results  and  a system  of evaluation  for
feedback  into  subsequent  budgeting. These  objectives  are  common  to a  number
of new  methods  which  have  been introduced  in  recent  decades  including
Planning,  Programing  Budgeting  System  (PPBS),  Rationalization  of Budgetary
Choice  (RBC),  and  Zero  Based  Budgeting  (ZBB).
73.  PPBS  is  a refinement  of the  concept  of  performance  budgeting  which
was  partially  introduced  in the  United  States  as early  as 1912.  Performance
budgeting,  as  well  as introducing  the  concept  of objectives,  embodied
classification  of  expenditures  by program  and  activity. The  proponents  of
PPBS  want to carry  this  further  by adding  the  notions  of need  and  efficiency
with  the  aim  of  quantifying  as far  as  possible  the  extent  to  which  the
chosen  objectives  have  been  met  with  the  means  used.  In  addition,  PPBS  has
a multi-annual  dimension  which  should  facilitate  the  linkage  between  the
planning  and  budgetary  process.
74.  The  schemata  of a typical  PPBS  process  is summarized  in  Chart  1.31
There  are  three  basic  phases  following  the  name  of the  method:  planning,
programing  and  budgeting. The  planning  phase  seeks  through  study  to
identify  present  and  future  requirements  (objectives)  and  to  evaluate
31/  For  a fuller  treatment,  see  A. Premchand:  "Restructuring  Budgeting
Systems  in  Developing  Countries: Relevance  of the  PPBS  System"
(1977)  and  L. Caramfalvi: "La  Reforme  Budgetaire:  Quelques
Experiences  Recentes"  paper  presented  at an IMF  Budget  and
Expenditure  Control  seminar  in 1984.- 36 -
different  possible  solutions  with a  view to  selecting  the  optimum  one.  It
is in this  phase  that  system  analysis  techniques  come  into  their  own.  The
programing  phase  takes  the  proposals  of the  planning  phase  and integrates
them  into  programs. These  should  not  only  be internally  coherent  and
consistent  among  themselves  but  should  form  a  hierarchy  of priorities. This
would  be pyramid-shaped  with the  top  priority  category  of  programs  and  sub-
programs  at the  summit. Decisions  concerning  categories,  programs  and
actions  would  be taken  at different  levels  of the  political  hierarchy. The
setting  of  broad  priorities  (program  categories)  concerning  health  policy,
agricultural  policy,  etc.,  would  be a cabinet  level  responsibility,  while
the  optimization  of individual  programs  would  be the  task  of sector
ministries.  Each  would  be multi-year  and  would  indicate  the  total  cost  and
timetable. Every  year,  each  program  would  be revised  and  updated  in the
light  of experience  and  reprojected  forward. The  third  phase,  that  of
budgeting,  is the  translation  of  each  multi-year  program  into  a set  of
specific  annual  actSons,  and  determines  who  does  what and  with  what
resources. Inevitably,  this  is the  most  difficult  stage  of the  process.
The  organic  structure  of the  budget  administration  is  different  from  that
implied  by a  programing  approach  and  cannot  be easily  altered. Moreover,
problems  suchtas  the  apportionment  between  programs  of expenditures  which
are  not  'directly  imputable  (like  wages,  for  example)  must  be solved  at this
stage. Finally,  the  system  provides  the  means  for  control  and  Rost  hoc
evaluation  uf results  which  should  then  be fed  back into  the  planning  and
programing  phases.
75.  RCB. introduced  in  France.  is  very  similar  to  PPBS,  to  which  it
owes its  inspiration.  Differences  between  the  French  and  US experiences,
although  important,  reflect  implementation  rather  than  substance. Both
experiments  were initially  attempted  in  a context  of expanding  resources  and
rapid  economic  growth. The  third  variant,  ZBB,  uses  essentially  the  same
techniques  but adapts  them  to a  more  austere  environment  of unstable  and
even  diminishing  real  revenues. As its  title  indicates,  this  method  starts
from  the  basic  assumption  that  the  fact  that  a given  activity  has  had
resources  devoteo  to it  previously  does  not automatically  entitle  it to  a
continued  renewal  of those  resources.  All activities,  except  in some  cases
of those  forming  part  of a continuing,  already-approved  program,  should
start  from  the  assumption  that  they  have  to  be fully  planned  and  justified
from  scratch.
76.  System-wide  budgetary  reforms  have  generated  a great  deal  of
controversy. In  particular,  installation  and  operation  of a complete  PPBS
has  not fully  succeeded  even  in the  sophisticated  administrations  of some
industrialized  countries. They  have  proved  to  be lengthy  and
administratively  complex  undertakings  requiring  extensive  revisions  of
traditional  accounting  systems  and  institutional  habits. In some  cases,  for
example  in the  United  States,  insufficient  attention  was  paid  to  making  them
compatible  with the  political  process  and  too  much  emphasis  was  placed  on
technical  considerations.  Nevertheless,  they  are  far  from  being  wasted
efforts,  and  the  experiments  of both industrialized  and  developing  countries
are  rich  in lessons  for  those  developing  countries  considering  embarking
upon  a similar  exercise. Annex  III  contains  a  more  detailed  discussion  of- 37 -
the  pitfalls  encountered  in  the  United  States  and  Belgium  with the
introduction  of PPBS;  of the  slow  but  not  wholly  discouraging  installation
of  RBC in  France;  and  of the  Dutch  experience  which  has relied  on  a more
gradualistic,  decer.tralized  approach. To complement  the  discussion,  two
recent  examples  of  budgetary  reform  in  developing  countries  are  described:
the  forward  budget  in  Kenya,  refined  by the  introduction  in  1985  of the
Budget  Rationalization  Program;  and  the  National  Public  Expenditure  Plan  of
Papua  New  Guinea  introduced  in  1979.
77.  In general  terms,  there  would  appear  to  be two  groups  of reasons
for  the  failure  of reform  efforts,  even  in  the  most  successful  countries,  to
live  up to their  initial  expectations.  First,  the  inherent  complexity
involved  in the  new  methods  was  not  made  fully  explicit  at the  outset. This
prevented  adequate  preparation  of the  planning  mechanism  and  procedures,  the
accounting  system  and  the  requirements  for  electronic  data  processing.  The
muddling  through  and  improvisation  that  followed  both  slowed  down  the  new
system's  installation  and  reduced  its  credibility  in the  bureaucracy.
Second,  as indicated  above,  the  technical  aspects  were  overemphasised  at the
expense  of the  political  dimension.
78.  Since  the  budgetary  process  is,  in  essence,  one  of political
bargaining,  then  it  should  be obvious  that  the  political  implications  of a
major  reform  should  be fully  and  explicitly  taken  into  account. Yet this  is
seldom,  if  ever,  the  case. The  very  nature  of the  political  debate
surrounding  the  budget  changes  profoundly  as a result  of the  introduction  of
programing  methods. The  approval  of a traditional  budget  presented  ander
the  usual  form  of  votes  and  line  items  is  very  different  from  that  of a
program  budget  with  quantified  objectives.  In order  for  politicians  to feel
secure  in the  rejection  or approval  of  a budgetary  item,  it is important  for
them  to  have  access  to the  same  information  as those  who  have  prepared  the
program. This is  difficult  to  achieve  in the  case  of sophisticated  and
complex  programs. For  example,  few  ministers  or legislators  in  France  have
the  time  or.inclination  to read  and  absorb  the  extensive  and  detailed
material  made  available  to them  In  the  program  budget  annexes. Moreover,
politicians  are  aware  that  the  probable  consequences  of their  decisions  to
approve  or refuse  an expenditure  application  will  be much  more transparent
if  costs  and  objectives  are  clearly  identified  and  quantified  than
otherwise. This is  by no means  necessarily  desirable  for  them. 32
79.  In  nearly  all  countries,  the  budget  is  strictly  regulated  by a
complex  set  of laws  which  govern  not only  its  structure  but the  means  of
presentation,  approval  and  execution. The introduction  of new  methods
ignores  this  at its  peril. The  kind  of reforms  discussed  here require
32/  At one  extreme,  "traditional"  budgetary  allocation  can  be viewed
wholly  as a political  process,  resulting  from  negotiations  between
interested  parties,  the  results  of  which  reflect  the  relative
power  of each. At this  extreme,  not  only is  there  no market
mechanism  in the  economic  sense,  and  hence  no "prices"  attached  to
inputs  and  outputs,  but the  introduction  of such  "prices"  might  be
viewed  by politicians  as,  at best,  unnecessary  and,  at  worst,
threatening.38 -
fundamental  changes  in  budgetary  legislation.  For  example,  in  most  cases
the  law  enshrines  the  principle  of annual  budgeting;  program  budgets,  by
contrast,  imply  a  multi-annual  framework. The  outcome  of this  dichotomy  is
that  in  none  of the  cases  examined  does  the  program  budget  have the  force  of
law. This inevitably  reinforces  the  tendency  to regard  it as  a
supplementary  exercise  somewhat  removed  from  whe-e  the  "real"  decisions  are
made.
80.  Institutionally,  it is  almost  certain  that  a reformed  budgetary
system  will  collide  with an  administrative  structure  and  mores  largely
incompatible  with it.  Either  the  institutions  must adapt  to the  new  method
or the  new  method  will  be forceably  adapted  to the institutional  structure
to  become  eventually  "neutralized"  or even  rejected. The experiences
described  in  Annex  I suggests  that  the  latter  is  far  more common  than  the
former. To prevent  or at least  mitigate  this  requires  considerable  effort,
forethought  and  expenditure  which  should  be explicitly  recognized  at the
outset. First,  there  is  a  need to  build  up support  for  the  change  at  a
"grass  roots"  level  within  the  administration.  The imposition  of change
from  the  tcp  by executive  order  is  nearly  always  fatal. The  new  methods
should  be introduced  gradually  on a pilot  basis  in  carefully  selected
ministries  which  are  willing  to  be used  as guinea  pigs.  The  fullest
possible  amount  of information  on the  new system  and its  broad  objectives
should  be widely  disseminated  among  those  potentially  affected. In
particular,  the  role  of 'outsiders"  (experts  and  analysts)  should  be
explained  to reduce  sensations  of insecurity  and irritation.  Second,  it
should  be recoganized  that  this  will  be an expensive,  thouRh  productive,
process. At least  three  new  cost  categories  will  have to  be met:
information,  training  and  equipment. The  depth  and scope  of data  required
for  program  budgeting  is  greatly  in  excess  of that  for  a normal  budgetary
exercise. Allowance  should  be made for  the  human  and financial  resources
that  this  implies. Similarly,  training  should  not  be regarded  as simply  a
"classroom"  exercise  of instructing  the  operatives  of the  new  method.
Rather,  the  government  should  tap  all  sources  of  expertise,  both  national
and international,  organize  seminars,  publish  articles,  and  conduct
experimental  workshops  in  which  participants  should  be made  to feel  pioneers
in  a new  process. Training  should  be regarded  as a continuous  process  of
"learning  by doing."  It  should  also  be recognized  that  program  budgeting  is
impossible  without  full  access  by both  core  and  sector  ministries  to
electronic  data  processing. The  full  costs  of equiping  and  training  the
administration  should  again  be gauged  on a  pilot  basis.
81.  Third,  while  avoiding  the  pitfalls  of dictation  from  the  core
ministries,  it is important  to establish  a thoroughly  professional  unit,
probably  located  in the  ministry  of finance,  which  is  responsible  for
coordinating  and  guiding  the  reform  effort. This  unit shculd  have  the  full
backing  of the  higher  political  authorities,  should  be responsible  for  the
dissemination  of information,  manuals,  etc.,  and  should  advise  ministries  on
the  acquisition  of appropriate  external  support. However,  the  decision  of
whether  or  not to  hire  outside  expertise  and  to  allocate  resources  to the
reform  effort  should  remain  the  responsibility  of the  executing  ministry.- 39 -
82.  Fourth,  it  should  be recognized  that  the  process  of reform,  to  be
successful,  must  be gradual. It should  be extended  beyond  the  pilot
ministries  only  as others  become  thoroughly  prepared. Partial  reforms,  such
as the  use  of cost  benefit  techniques  and  the  preparation  of sector
strategies,  could  precede  the  full  reform  effort. It is  noteworthy  in this
connection  that  Holland,  which  has  perhaps  the  most encouraging  experiences
in  wholesale  budgetary  reform,  has  been  discussing  and  debating  new  methods
since  1950;  by 1986  program  budgeting  had  been  extended  to  about  40  percent
of expenditures.
83.  Fifth,  procedures  should  be  kept as  simple  as  possible  and  should
be consistent  with the  availability  of  qualified  human  resources. For
example,  an attempt  to  subject  all  detailed  line  items  to a forward
budgeting  procedure  or the  full  range  of official  activities  to  a programing
approach  will  be impractical  in  most  countries  whether  indxistrialized  or
developing.  As the  experience  of Kenya  shows,  failure  to  be selective  can
swiftly  damage  the  reform  effort. On the  other  hand,  while  being  selective,
developing  countries  should  avoid  the  error  of Papua  New  Guinea  where  the
new  method  was confined  only  to  activities  which  could  be regarded  as
marginal. A good  start  might  be to introduce  cost-benefit  techniques,
forward  budgeting  and  performance  budgeting  to those  ministries  which
account  for  the  lion's  share  of the  core  investment  program,  concentrating
initially  on those  expenditures,  both  capital  and  current,  which  are  linked
to the  core  program.
84.  Finally,  overambition  is  highly  counterproductive  in  this  field,
and it is important  to  avoid  trying  to  swiftly  replace  the  traditional
system  in its  entirety  by a totally  new  approach. This  will inevitably
cause  resistance  at all  levels  of  public  institutions,  and  will  eventually
result  in  disillusion.  Rather,  developing  countries  should  remember  that
there  are  many  features  of a programing  budgeting  approach  which  are  useful,
indeed  vital,  if  a  proper  link  between  pLanning  and  budgeting  is to  be
achieved  and if  the  budget  is  to  become  an effective  policy  instrument.
There  is,  for  example,  the  basic  principle  that  government  objectives  should
be clearly  specified,  in  as quantifiable  a  manner  as possible,  and that
budgetary  categories  are  reclassified  so as to  be able to  track  more  easily
the  attainment  of these  objectives.  There  is  also  the  tenet  that  major
investment  decisions,  together  with their  current  expenditure  implications,
should  be objectively  scrutinized  and  subject  to  cost  benefit  analysis.
While  recognizing,  therefore,  that  the  experiences  described  in  Annex  III
illustrate  the  limits  of,  and  constraints  to,  budgetary  reform,  and that  few
would  argue  for  the  wholesale  import  and  installation  of  new sytems  in
developing  countries,  it is  nonetheless  important  to  avoid  an  unthinking
rejection  of the  program  budget  approach. Carefully  and  selectively
applied,  it  has  much  to  offer  developing  country  governments  anxious  to
improve  the  al.location  of  public  resources.ANNEX  I
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MANAGEMENT  OF PUBLIC  EXPENDITURES:
CHECKLIST  OF IPSTITUTIONAL  OUESTIONS  TO BE  ADDRESSED?'
1.  Macroeconomic  Framework
1.1  Are analysis  and  projection  of macroeconomic  variables  which have
an impact  on public  expenditure  planning  carried  out
systematically  and if  so, do they appear  to  be taken  seriously  at
a high  political  level?
1.2  Which institutions  are responsible  for producing  assessments  and
forecasts? What are their  staffing  and data  problems?
1.3  How frequently  is the  assessment  carried  out?  What is the
procedure  for  updating  it?
1.4  In  what format  are the  assessments  produced (e.g.  in a medium-term
plan,  through  a forecasting  model,  through  an annual  economic
report)?
1.5  What is the  link, formally  and in  practice,  between  these
assessments  and the  preparation  of investment  programs  and
budgets?
1.6  What is the  extent  and quality  of  background  material  provided to
those responsible  for planning  nn4  managing  expenditures  ( i:  wLz
rates  by sector,  investment  and savings  requirements,  expected
rate  of inflation,  exchange  rate  movements,  etc.)?
1.7  Does each  agency  produce  its  own macroeconomic  assumptions  with
consequent  inconsistencies?
1.8  What is the  degree  of feedback  between expenditure  planning  and
economic  assessments? Are there  regular  review  meetings?  Are
these  attended  by forecasters? How reliable  has their  advice  been
in the  past?  Are governments  provided  with the  necessary
information  to react  rationally  to shocks?
2.  Investment  Programing  and Project  Pregaration
2.1  To what extent  can the  problems  associated  with the investment
program  be traced  to institutional  deficiencies?
1/ This  Annex draws  heavily  not only  on reports  and conversations  within
the  Bank,  but also  on the  work  of the  staff  of the IMF  Fiscal  Affairs
Department. Messrs.  A. Premchand,  P. Heller,  L. Garamfalvi,  A. Tazi and
H.R. de Zoysa  have been especially  generous  with their  time  and advice.
Like that  of the  Bank,  the Fund's  work in this area is  constantly
evolving  as can be seen from the  Fiscal  Affairs  Department's  periodic
country  studies  as well as their  methodological  papers.ANNEX I
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2.2  Is there  a  planning  function? Is it  adequately  coordinated  or
fragmented  over  a number  of institutions?
2.3  Why  does  fragmentation  exist  (historical  factors,  the  grafting  of
"modern"  institutions  onto  traditional  structures,  deliberate
decisions  to divide  power,  etc.)?
2.4  What  would  be required  to achieve  greater  coordination?  Would  a
simple  merger  be enough  or are  deeper  seated  difficulties  more
significant?
2.5  What is the  Rrocess  by which  the  investment  program  is  actually
put  together?
2.6  What is the  capacity  of line  ministries  and  spending  agencies  for
generating  and  evaluating  investment  projects?
2.7  Are coherent  sector  strategies  developed  in  the  line  ministries?
2.8  Are there  clearly  delineated  responsibilities  for  each  stage  of
the  project  cycle  or,  rather,  overlapping  functions  causing
confusion  and  a  breakdown  of coordination?
2.9  What is the  relationship  between  line  and  core  ministries? Are
the  latter  forced  to intervene  at too  detailed  a level  because  of
lack  oL  capaCiLy  ;U  LI  LEULJ.UOnL
2.10  Does  an adequate  mechanism  exist  to  enable  core  agencies  to  make
strategic  choices  between  investment  alternatives,  or are the  line
ministry  submissions  more  like  shopping  lists?
2.11  What is the  influence  of current  rules  and  regulations  governing
the  formulation  of the  investment  program? Does the  system  of
checks  and  balances  and incentives  contradict  the  aim  of investing
in economically  justified  development  projects?
2.12  What is the  degree  of accountability  for  the  success/failure  of
development  projects? Is there  concern  whether  targets  are  met or
not?  Are  there  adequate  formal  arrangements  for U  yost  reviews
and  a feedback  into  investment  programing?
2.13  Has there  been  a tendency  to solve  institutional  weakness  and
address  lack  of technical  capacity  by the  grafting  of new
institutions  onto  a traditional  administrative  structure?  Has
this  blurred  responsibilities  still  further? What  have  been the
consequences  in terms  of "widening  the  technical  gap"  between  core
and  line  ministries?
3.  The  Link  Between  Planning  and  Annual  Budgeting
3.1  Is  there  a rolling  annual  investment  budget  linked  to a  multi-year
program?ANNEX I
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3.2 Are there  forward  budgets  and/or  "crosswalk"  documents  linking
investment  programs  with  -dial  expenditure  allocations?
3.3 What is the  coverage  and  de,,ree  of complexity  of forward  budgets?
Can  the  administration  cope  with them?
3.4 What is the  degree  of participation  of  planning  agencies  (both
core  and  line)  in the  annual  budget  preparation  process?
3.5 Are development  plans  and investment  specified  in the  right  amount
of detail  and  consistency  for  use in  the  budget  process?
3.6 What are  the  institutional  mechanisms  for  interministerial
discussion  of line  ministry  submissions?
3.7  Does  the  forward  budget/investment  program  have the  force  of law?
If  not,  what impact  does  lack  of legal  force  have?
3.8 What  are  the  factors  which  may  have  damaged  the  credibility  of the
programing  exericse?
3.9  Is the  time  available  for  completing  the  budget  cycle  sufficient
for  the  complex  requirements  of  negotiating  and  incorporating  plan
targets?
3.10  What is  the  attitude  of those  responsible  for  budget  preparation
towards  those  who  prepare  the  investment  program/development  plan?
3.11  What is  the  institutional  division  of responsibilities?  Would
coordination  benefit  significantly  from  having  planning  and
budgeting  in the  same  ministry? If  not,  then  what  can  be done  to
improve  matters?
3.12  Does the  central  planning  authority  have legal  power  of  veto over
which  projects/programs  are  included  in the  annual  budget? If so,
does it  have the  institutional  and  technical  capacity  to  make this
effective?
4.  Budget  Preparation
4.1  What is  the  organization  of the  ministry  of finance? Who  within
it is  responsible  for  budget  preparation? Is  there  an office
concerned  with  analyzing  government  operations  in terms  of their
objectives?
4.2  How  are  expenditure  estimates  prepared? Is the  process
essentially  incremental?
4.3  What information  is  available  to  the  finance  ministry  on the
number  of civil  servants  in  each  establishment,  on their
activities,  and  on the  price/volume  relationship  for  wage
expenditures?ANNEX$I
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4.4 Are  there  overlapping  functions  in  the  finance  ministry  or
functions  tnaW.  .1iould  be  fulfilled  but  are  not? Does  the  ministry
have  its  own  project  evaluation  capability?  If  so,  how  does  it
relate  with  that  in  planning?
4.5 What  sort  of  budgetary  system  is  in  operation  (e.g.  French
tradition,  US  tradition)?  How  amenable  would  it  be  to  new
procedures  from  a  different  tradition?
4.6 What  is  the  budgetary  cycle?  Are  there  problems  of  *bunching"  of
budgetary  decisions  which  affect  the  quality  of  the  outcome?
4.7 How  flexible  is  the  system  in  terms  of  accommodating  changes  at
each  stage  of  the  cycle?
4.8 How  appropriate  is  the  fiscal  year?
4.9 Does  the  ministry  of  finance  issue  circulars  and  guidelines  to  the
line  ministries?  If  so,  are  these  routine  documents  or  aro  they
used  to  disseminate  substantive  policy  guidelines?
5.  Budget  Coverage
5.1 How  much  of  total  revenue  and  expenditure  does  the  budget  cover?
Which  instituitions  are  esteludad  and  whv?  What  are  the
arrangements  for  the  channeling  of  donor  finance?
5.2 What  is  the  extent  of  earmarking?  What  would  be  the  institutional
and  economic  implications  of  curbing  it? Is  earmarking  authorized
in  the  constitution  or  in  laws  and  decrees  that  may  be  difficult
to  change?
5.3 How  many  special  funds  and  separate  or  supplementary  budgets  are
there  and  who  benefits  from  them?
5.4 Are  state  enterprise  investments  included  in  the  capital  budget?
5.5 What  measures  could  be  taken  to  improve  the  coordination  of
autonomous  agency  investment  without  full  incorporation  into  the
central  government  budget?
6.  Classification  of  Budget  Items
6.1 How  useful  is  the  current  classification  for  development  policy
purposes?
6.2 What  is  the  definition  of  capital  expenditures?  How  are  recurrent
costs  during  construction  treated?
6.3 Are  "development"  expenditures  separately  dealt  with? Do  they
include  recurrent  as  well  as  capital  costs?  If  not,  is  there  an
attempt  to  calculate  and  forecast  recurrent  cost  implications?
Are  the  results  incorporated  in  the  annual  and  forward  budgets?ANNEX  I
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6.4  What  would  be the  institutional  and  manpower  implications  of
reforming  classification?  Is the  coding  system  capable  of data
automation?
7.  Budget  Implementation  and  Control  of ExDenditure
7.1  What is the  institutional  capacity  of the  spending  agencies  and
line  ministries  to  exercise  greater  responsibility  for  budget
executien  and the  control  of expenditures?
7.2 At core  minist..y  level,  what  are  the  arrangements  for  expenditure
control? How  many  expenditure  categories  are  there? How  many
institutions  are  involved?
7.3  What  degree  of control  does  the  finance  ministry  exercise  over
commitments?  Who is  exempt  from  this  control  and  why?
7.4  What  are  the  procedures  for  ordering  and  controlling  actual
payments? What degree  of autonomy  do line  ministries  and  spending
agencies  have in the  expenditure  of earmarked  funds?
7.5  To what  extant  are  existing  rules  and  procedures,  even  if  adequate
in  theory,  frequently  and  significantly  by-passed  in  practice?
Why  is this  done?
7.6  To what  extent  does  the  finance  ministry  have to  resort  to
delaying  tactics  to  control  global  spending  limits?
7.7  Does  the  finance  ministry  have the  necessary  information  to
control  the  composition  as  well  as the  total  level  of spending?
What institutional,  procedural  and  manpower  changes  are  required
to  make  such  control  effective? Is it  politically  feasible?
7.8  If  control  mechanisms  are  adequate,  what is the  scope  for  allowing
greater  flexibility  on the  part  of spending  ministries  to
reallocate  resources  to  sustain  core  activities  and  deliver  key
services?
7.9  What instruments  are  available  to  achieve  flexibility  in
expenditures?  How are  supplementary  estimates  processed? Are
guidelines?  Are they  applied? Why  are  supplementary  estimates
necessary--initial  underestimation,  unforeseen  factors,  lack  of
flexibility  in the  reallocation  of resources,  etc.?ANNEX II
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BUDGETARY  REFORM: SOME  COVNTRY  EXPERIENCES
A.  Introduct]io
This  Annex  describes  the  experience  of four industrialized  and
three  developing  countries  in  the  implementation  of improved  budgetary
procedures  and  systems. All  six  experiments  have in  common  the  objectives
of  making  the  budget  a  more  effective  instrument  of economic  policy,  and  of
improving  links  between  planning  and  budgeting  and  between  policy  inputs
and  outputs. Accordingly,  they  aim  to improve  the  allocation  of
increasingly  scarce  resources  and  to  facilitate  the  preparation  of
expenditure  programs  consistent  with  economic  policy. The  experiments  with
reform  provide  a number  of important  lessons  for  developing  countries  which
are  discussed  in  the  main  text. None  of them  has  been fully  successful;
they  range  from  almost  total  failure  (the  introduction  of PPBS  in the
United  States)  to gradual  improvement  with some  hope  for  future  practical
improvements.  All  of them,  however,  amply  illustrate  the  political,
institutional  and  technical  difficulties  associated  with reform  in  this
complex  area.
B.  United  States
The  pioneer  experiments  in  program  budgeting  took  place  in  the
United  !.:ates.  Their  early  history  stemmed  from  the  need to  coordinate,  in
wartime,  the  availability  of strategic  metals  with  the  requirements  of the
military  for  finished  equipment.  This  resulted  in  the  preparation  of
Production  Requirements  or Controlled  Materials  Plans  which  linked  together
the  production  of armaments  with the  necessary  means  (metals,  labor,  etc.).
This  Plan  was thus  the  first  program  budget  prepared  under  official
auspices. After  the  Second  World  War,  the  methodology  was  developed  and
extended,  principally  by the  Rand  Corporation  working  with the  Department
of  Defense. Techniques  of cost  benefit  analysis,  systems  analysis  and
multi-criteria  analysis  were  refined  and  adapted  to the  needs  of military
production  and  strategy. In 1953,  the  preparation  of the  Air Force  budget
under  PPBS  techniques  was  proposed. Although  this  was  not  eievated  beyor.d
the  academic  stage,  the  Rand  Corporation  continued  to develop  PPBS  and  the
method  was introduced  into  the  Defense  Department  in 1961  by Secretary
McNamara. 1 In '965,  President  Johnson  ordered  the  extension  of the  system
to  the  entire  Federal  Administration.
After  six  years  of effort  and  very  discouraging  results,  the
experiment  was terminated.  Without  expressly  mentioning  PPBS,  a June  1971
circular  from  the  Budget  Office  informed  Departments  that  applications  for
budgetary  allocations  from  Federal  agencies  should  no longer  be accompanied
by multi-year  programs  or by analytical  studies. A number  of reasons  can
be cited  for  this  unhappy  experience.  First,  a  method  which  was  develcped
exclusively  in  one  Department  (Defense)  was imposed  by Executive  Order  on
all  others  without  considering  whether  they  had  the  means  with  which  to
comply. The  Budget  Office  issued  circulars  based  entirely  on the  Defense
1/ L. Garamfalvi: 'La  Reforme  Budgetaire:  Quelque  Experiences  Recentes,"
IMF  mimeograph,  1986.ANNEX I  I
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Department's  experiences  without  any  attempt  to  adapt  them  to the
requirements  of  other  Departments.  Nor  were  these  latter  given  any
assistance  from  the  Budget  Office  in  terms  of  either  methodology  or
coordination.  Some  Departments  tried  to  install  the  system  using  only
their  own  manpower  resources;  others  asked  for  aseistance  from  the  Defense
Department;  yet  others  hired  consultarts  from  the  universities  or  even  from
abroad.  Whatever  the  quality  of  their  academic  achievements,  these
individuals  were  usually  less  than  familiar  with  the  complexities  of the
U.S.  Federal  Government  system.
Second,  the  introduction  of  program  budgeting  was  not  preceded  by
any  serious  analysis  of  the  suitability  of  the  Federal  structure  for  it,
nor  of  the  administrative,  political  and  technical  aspects  of it. The
imposition  of  the  system  from  above  without  any  preparation  or taking
account  of  the  manpower  and  other  requirements  condemned  the  experiment  to
failure  before  it  began.
Third,  the  encouraging  experiences  in  the  Defense  Department
proved  elusive  elsewhere.  Quantifiable  objectives,  the  vital  raw  material
of  PPBS,  were  considerably  more  difficult  to identify.  There  was,
moreover,  an inevitable  clash  between  the  concept  of quantifiable
objectives  in  the  prog:am  budgeting  sense  and  the  implicit  objective
function  of  the  Federal  Administration  as  expressed  in  its  mores  and
administrative  structure.  This  always  occurs  to  some  extent,  and  it  is
unrealistic  to  hope  to  adapt  a  complex  political  structure  to  programing
ideas  except  very  gradually  and,  even  then,  incompletely.  However,  it  is
necessary  to  try  to  insure  a  minimum  ot  contormity  to  tne  ideais  of  tne  new
system  by  having,  within  the  Administration,  at  least  one  body  dedicated  to
its  management  and  dissemination.  This  was  missing  in  the  United  States.
Fourth,  the  introduction  of PPBS  encountered  a subtle  but
penetheless  formidable  opposition  from  administration  functionaries.  As it
was  not  instead  of,  but  rather  in  addition  to,  the  traditional  budgetary
procedures,  it  increased  the  volume  of  work  substantially.  Officials  were
charged  with  the  preparation  of  the  'normal"  budget,  plus  the  programs
budget  and  a crosswalk  document  (matrix)  linking  the  two. Officials  also
resented  what  they  saw  as  the  intrusion  of  analysts  and  other  technicians,
charged  with  the  planning  functions,  into  their  domain. Frequently  the
analysts  displayed  lack  of  knowledge  or  appreciation  of  the  difficulties
involved  in  the  practical  application  of their  theories.  Resentment  of
overworked  officials  was  also  reinforced  by the  knowledge  that  the  complex
and  controversial  programs  could  be seen  to  have  little  or  no influence
over  the  actual  allocation  of  resources.
C.  D.eleiu
The  approach  adopted  in  Belgium  from  the  late  1960s  onwards
differs  in  several  important  respects  from  that  of the  United  States.1
Instead  of starting  from  a global  or  centralized  planning  concept,  the
Belgians  attempted  to  identify  and  systematize  the  actions  followed  and  the
2/  Garamfalvi  op  cit.ANNEX II
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objectives  pursued  by individual  ministries.  This  approach  had  the
advantage  of identifying,  at  an  early  stage,  the  contradictions  between
declared  objectives  and  objectives  actually  pursued  in  accordance  with
actions  taken. The  exercise  was  developed  into  the  elaboration  of  programs
at  a  ministry-by-ministry  level,  and  then  converted  into  program  budgets
with  financial  values  attached  to  the  expected  inputs  and  outputs.  Two
ministries,  Agriculture  and  Health,  were  chosen  for  the  pilot  experiments,
and  between  1969  and  1971  the  operation  was  extended  to  five  more  entities
(the  Ministries  of  Labor  and  Employment,  and  of Social  Security,  the  Post
Office,  Scientific  Establishments,  and,  at its  own  request,  the  National
Savings  Bank). After  1971,  the  budgetary  requests  at  ministerial  level
could  be  made  in  wholly  program  form  for  the  two  most  advanced  ministries
(Agriculture  and  Labor  and  Employment).  Unfortunately,  this  was  the  high
point  of the  Belgian  experiment.  The  extension  to  other  ministries,  and
the  integration  of  the  programing  approach  into  traditional  budgetary
procedures  and  allocations  never  took  place. The  decision  to "formalize"
the  system  was  not  taken  and  it  accordingly  fell  into  disuse. After  1973,
the  method  was  progressively  abandoned  by those  ministries  which  had
adopted  it  and  the  central  team  established  to  coordinate  and  assist
program  budgeting  was  dismantled.
Four  main  reasons  may  be identified  for  the  fail  ze  of the
Belgian  experiment.  First,  not  only  the  parallel  continuL  ice  of
traditional  budgetary  procedures,  but  also  the  failure  of  the  political
authorities  to  give  any  weight  to  program  budgeting  meant  that  the  latter
never  lost  its  aura  of  being  no  more  than  a  rather  academic  experiment.
Sccond,  close  iiivulvement  and  understanding  ot the  new  method  was  confined
to  relatively  few  senior  officials  and  little  attempt  was  made  to  train  or
encourage  a  sympathetic  attitude  among  the  civil  servants  responsible  for
preparing  ministerial  budgets.  Third,  the  core  institutions  in  the
budgetary  process  (for  example,  the  Finance  Inspectorate  and  Budget
Directorate  of the  Finance  Ministry,  the  Parliament  and  the  Office  of the
Accountant  General)  were  not  involved  in  the  pioneering  of  the  system 3 and
never  displayed  more  than  a  qualified  enthusiasm  for  it. Fourth,  those  who
tried  to  apply  the  system  swiftly  found  that  it  was  impriact.cal  in  the
absence  of a  fully  computerized  management  information  system. At the  time
few,  if  any,  Belgian  ministries  possessed  such  systems.
D.  France
France  is,  perhaps,  the  country  which  has  gone  the  furthest  in
the  practical  application  of  program  budgeting.  More  than  in  most
industrialized,  non-Socialist  societies,  economic  planning  enjoyed
considerable  prestige  in  France,  at least  until  the  1970s,  both  as  an
authoritative  forecast  of  the  French  economy  and  as a  statement  of  proposed
government  policies. 4 Nevertheless,  even  in  France  the  economic
3/  The  pioneer  work  was  done  by  scholars  and  civil  servants  from  the  chosen
ministries  and  was  located  in  the  Institut  Administration-Universite,  an
independent  body  which  carries  out  research  work  in  public
administration  in  Belgium  in  collaboration  with  the  Civil  Service
Ministry.
4/  See  "French  Planning  Reforms  1981-84"  by  Martin  Cave,  Brunel  University,
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vicissitudes  of the 1970s,  combined  with an increasingly  "free  market"
orientation  of economic  policy  to push planning  into  disrepute.  Top be
sure,  plans continued  to  be produced;  but the  sixth  plan (1971-75)  was
disrupted  by the recession  following  the first  oil shbck,  while the
expansionary  seventh  plan collided  with the austerity  program  of Prime
Minister  Raymond  Barre  in the late 1970s.  It  was only after the  election
of a Socialist  Administration  in  May 1981, that  planning  began to be taken
seriously  again  at a high political  level.
It is important  to  bear this  background  in  mind when considering
the French  experience  with  program  budgeting:  this  was, in essence,  the
application  of planning  principles  to the annual  budgeting  exercise  and a
means  of linking  the  latter  to the planning  process.  As program  budgeting
was effectively  launched  in France  only in 1970,  its early  years  were
inevitably  tainted  by what  was seen as the increasing  irrelevance  of
planning.
Moreover,  several  other industrial  countries  attempted  to
introduce  program  budgeting  broadly  along  the  lines  first developed  in the
United  States.  Their  mixed  experiences  have  also  had  an  impact  on  the
French  experiment. The French,  however,  persisted  and it  would appear that
the  concept is  gaining  ground,  albeit  slowly.  Even in  France there is  a
long  way to go before  program  budgeting  is fully  accepted  or integrated
into  regular  procedures  but the French  avoided  some  of the  mistakes  of the
U.S. and Belgian  experiments,  and their  experience  provides  a number of
important  lessons.
Program  budgeting  in France  attempts  to capture  the concept  of
performance  evaluation  by results  introduced  in the  original  American PPBS
idea. 5 However, in  France  it  was launched  in  a more flexible  form;  no
directive  or general  instructions  were issued  by the core  ministries  and
coordination  was entrusted  to an Interministerial  Comm ssion  established  in
September  1970.  This  Commission  is expected  to "monitor  and coordinate  the
development  of the (program  budgeting)  tasks  undertaken  in  each  ministry
and to propose  to the  Government  the setting  up of  procedures  to assure  a
periodic  control  of the results  attained  from this  work.'
Perhaps  because  of this  relatively  flexible  approach,  program
budgeting  increased  its  coverage  of public  expenditure  activities  in
France,  often  at the initiative  of individual  ministries  and agencies.  By
1974,  fifty  analytical  studies  had been completed  or  were underway  and five
ministries  had prepared  program  budgets  which were annexed  to the finance
(budget)  law  of 1975.  By the  mid 1980s,  program  budgets  present  a rich and
systematic  source  of information  about the  great  bulk of public  sector
activities. The 1984  budget,  prepared  in 1983,  contained  annexed  programs
in 91 general  areas  and 395 separate  sub-groupings  representing  a total
expenditure  of 850  billion  francs (over  90 percent  of all state
5/ The following  paragraphs  draw  upon an excellent  evaluation  of the  French
program  budgeting  experience  in Robert  Poinsard:  "Les  Budgets  de
Programmes,  Quinze  Ans Apres" in "Economie  et Prevision'  published  by
the Finance  Ministry,  Year 1985/5,  Number  71.ANNEX II
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expenditures  foreseen  under  the  budget  apart  from  debt servicing  and  some
special  account). As a result  of this  expansion,  certain  "good  habits"
have  become  inculcated  and  in some  cases  have  become  legal  requirements.
The  carrying  out  of  cost  benefit  analysis,  for  example,  is  obligatory  and
the  absence  of such  analysis  or  of a positive  rate  of return  has led  to
administrative  decisions  being  reversed  at  ministerial  or cabinet  level.
Despite  these  important  advances,  program  budgeting,  even in
France,  has  not  become  fully  integrated  into  the  budgetary  decision-making
process. During  the  1970s,  the  budgetary  annexes  prepared  under  program
form,  while  expanding  in  number,  did  not  provide  the  basis  for  actual
expenditures  voted  into  the  budgetary  law. As noted  above,  this  coincided
with  the  increasing  disrepute  of the  planning  process e  se.  Gradually,
the  initial  ambition  of full  integration  into  the  budgetary  system  has  been
de facto  abandoned. Even  the  revival  of planning  under  the  Socialist
Administration  has  not  reversed  this  trend. Instead,  new  and  potentially
productive  uses  are  being  found  for  program  budgeting. Its  beginnings  in
France  coincided  with  a  period  of growth  and  increasing  resources. It  was
intended  both to  complement  and  to draw  upon  a centralized  system  of
indicative  planning  aimed  at maximizing  the  rational  use  of these  growing
resources. As the  external  environment  worsened,  these  ambitions  seemingly
dimmed  into  irrelevance.  However,  the  persistence  of the  French  civil
service  apparatus  with  program  budgeting,  despite  its  alienation  from  the
final  decision-making  process,  meant  that  not  only  the  administrative
machinery,  but  also  the  necessary  technical  and  intellectual  capabilities,
were  still  available  to  put  rhe  instrument  to  other  uses.  These  latter
were  more  compatible  with  an  environment  of scarcity  and  future  uncertainty
than  of abundance. Thus,  after  1980,  program  budgeting  has  been  marked  by
greater  emphasis  on increasing  the  productivity  of the  administration  and
on reinforcing  the  coordination  and  compatibility  of  cost  benefit  and  other
studies  aimed  at  enlightening  the  choice  between  alternative  expenditures.
The  failure  to  realize  the  original  ambition  of full  integration
of the  program  approach  into  the  budgetary  decision-making  is  not  entirely
due  to  external  factors. Internal  elements  are  also  at work  from  which
important  lessons  can  be drawn  for  developing  countries. First,
conceptually,  the  programs  frequently  fail  to  specify  their  final  objective
and  its  time  frame  with  the  same  degree  of  precision  as the  administrative,
financial  and  physical  means  that  are  to  be used.  Consequently,  impact
indicators  tend  to  be relegated  to  a more  modest  role  and  are  sometimes
absent  altogether.  The  program  budgets  thus  falls  far  short  of the
"production  function"  ideal  which  aims  to show  the  effect  on "output"  of
certain  combinations  of "input".
Second,  the  efforts  suffer  from  lack  of  basic  data,  and  from
disputes  about  interpretation  of the  information  that  was  available. For
example,  for  some  civil  servants  the  cost  of  an activity  means  only  those
juridically  and  financially  linked  to it;  for  others,  it  has  a wider,  more
economic  connotation  with  externalities  fully  taken  into  account. Often
the  former  won  the  day  if  only  because  those  elaborating  the  program  are
forced  to  resort  to inadequate  global  data  available  from  the  national
accounts.ANNEX I  I
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Third,  considerable  difficulty  is  encountered  in  establishing  and
maintaining  the  forward  character  of  the  program  budgets. The  overwhelming
institutional,  political  and  legal  concentration  remains  on  the  annual
budget. The  program  budgets  are  forward  budgets  of  three  years. The
crosswalk  between  the  rolling  three-year  budget  and  the  annual  exercise
leading  to the  finance  law  was  never  properly  constructed. 6 The  program
budgets  have  no legal  force  whatsoever.  Inevitable  forecasting  problems
and  consequent  weakened  credibility  compound  this  problem.
Fourth,  the  linkage  between  broad  planning  objectives  and  those
of  the  forward  budget  is  also  weak,  on  both  the  institutional  and  technical
planes. The  plans  consist  of  vague  and  general  goals  which  are  far  from
easy  to  narrow  down  to  quantifiable  objectives,  the  impact  of  which  can  be
measured.  These  difficulties  can  only  be compounded  when  the
quantification  is  done  by sector  ministries  and  executing  agencies  without
adequate  participation  by those  who  prepare  the  plan.
Fifth,  the  relative  lack  of importance  accorded  to  program
budgeting  by  decision-makers  has  inevitably  had  its  toll  on the  morale  and
quality  of  work  of  those  responsible  for  it. In  some  cases,  the  program
budgeting  office  in  a  ministry  has  been  closed  and  its  work  taken  over  by
the  general  budgeting  office  which  is  also  respc.sible  for  a large  number
of  other  tasks. Technical  and  executing  agencies  have  become  reluctant  to
elaborate  complicated  sets  of  information  for  an  activity  which  they  see  as
supplementary.  The  skills  and  techniques  used  to  prepare  the  programs  have
become  somewhat  stunted  in  their  development  due  to  lack  of adequate
training  and  professional  stimulus.  The  administrative  mechanics  and
procedures  for  producing  the  documents  are  consequently  showing  signs  of
wear  and  tear  and  an  increasing  tendency  to  jam  up.  This,  of  course,
contributes  to the  aforementioned  delays,  thereby  creating  something  of  a
vicious  circle. The  continued  devotion  of  enthusiastic  disciples  of the
approach  is insufficient  to  arrest  this  gradual  decay. Similarly,  on the
demand  side,  a  certain  loss  of  vigor  could  be  noted  by the  end  of the
1970s. Many  legislators  encountered  difficulty  in  absorbing  the  lengthy
and  dense  material  associated  with  the  program  budgets  and  their  desire  to
try  waned  as  they  observed  the  alienation  of  the  technique  from  decision
making. In 1979,  seven  ministries 7 which  regularly  prepare  program  budgets
were  asked  if  these  played  a significant  role  in  their  negotiations  with
other  parts  of the  administration  for  the  obtaining  of  funds. All  replied
in  the  negative.  Rather,  they  were  held  in  reserve  to  be used  only  if  the
course  of  the  budgetary  dialogue  so  dictated  and  only  if  the  necessary
documents  and  information  could  be  made  available  in  a timely  manner.
6/  This  problem  is  worsened  by the  poorly  coordinated  timing  of the
preparation  of  program  budgets  and  that  of  the  annual  finance  law. Each
program  document,  although  extremely  lengthy  and  detailed,  is  only
available  to  legislators  a few  days,  at  best,  before  the  definitive
voting  on the  allocations  under  the  annual  finance  law.
7/  Agriculture,  Economy  and  Budget,  Education,  Industry,  Environment,
Health,  Labor  and  Transport.Page 7 of 17
It would nevertheless  be a mistake to conclude from the above
that  program  budgeting in France  is a dead letter.  The revival  of planning
and the  adoption  of Rational  Budgetary  Choice to a more austere environment
have given it a new lease  of life.  Techniques  learned  and developed  since
1970 are  being applied in the  preparation  of Priority  Action Plans--'core"
expenditures  in times  of fiscal  shortage. 8 As noted  earlier, the  programs
approach is  being used to study  ways of increasing  the administration's
productivity.  Equally important,  at a technical  level,  have been the
efforts  made to reconcile  the  nomenclatures  of the  programs and the regular
budgets.  This  has worked in favor of the  programs approach  through,  first,
the  annexation  of program tables  to legal  budget documents  and, second,
through  the increasing  adaptation  of traditional  nomenclature  to a
programing  structure.  These developments  encourage  the  belief that  at
least  key elements in the  program approach  will not only become  more
integrated  into the  budgetary  process and  but also  extended to assess  past
performance  and improve  budgetary  control  mechanisms.
E.  Holland
As in France,  program  budgeting in  Holland  developed in the 1970s
in response  to experiments  conducted  elsewhere.  In 1971, the  Minister  of
Finance  established  an Interdepartmental  Commission,  chaired  by the
Director  General  of the Budget, to  develop  methodologies  and techniques  for
ex ante evaluation.  The efforts  of the Commission  were extended  to perform
a comprehensive  analysis of the objectives  of all the  ministries in a
manner characteristic  of the eentrAli7pa  annroach  of the time.  Politicians
and civil servants,  however, felt the exercise  to  be not only cumbersome
but threatening. Few studies  were completed  and the  commission  had to
admit failure  in its  evaluation  report.
In 1982,  the Dutch authorities  decided  on a new a:.proach.  The
Commission  was abolished,  and ministries  themselves  were made responsible
for their  own  policy analysis  studies.  A new department  for  policy
analysis  was  created in the  Ministry of Finance  to provide guidance.
Training  facilities  were expanded,  the  development  of techniques  became
more focussed  on the operational  problems  faced  by sector  ministries,  and
agencies  were given enlarged  possibilit'es  for  engaging  outside
consultants.  In 1984,  a permanent  mechanism  was established  to permit the
formal  exchange  of views and experiences  of the  new approach on a national
and regional  level.  Workshops  and seminars  followed,  by no means confined
to  civil servants  or even to Dutch  nationals.
What has emerged from  this process  is an interesting  hybrid of
the  rational  or program approach  to policy-making  and expenditure
management,  and the traditional  method of "muddling  through." 9 Politically,
8/ Although,  again, the relationship  between Priority  Action Plans  and
program  budgets prepared  by the same  agency is not always clear.
9/ See "Some  Important  Experiences  with Policy  Analysis  and Performance
Budgeting in the Dutch Central  Government"  by  A. Sorber  and J. Schild,
in "International  Review of Administrative  Sciences",  September  1986.ANNEX II
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the  latter  has  much to  be said  for  it:  it takes  full  account  of the  need
to  negotiate  and  to recognize  that  the  end is  often  a function  of the  means
chosen  to  attain  it.  The  introduction  of program  techniques  has  been
gradual  and  by and  large  voluntary. The  only  legal  requirement  is that  of
the  Government  Accounts  Act  of 1976  which  stipulates  that "to  each  relevant
chapter  of the  expenditure  estimates  there  shall  be attached  an annex
giving  information,  in  relation  to those  exnenditures  for  which  this  I&
possible  and  appropriate  (my  italics),  on the  results  attained  in
consequence  of the  activities  for  which  the  expenditures  are  incurred  and
on the  resources  associated  with those  results." The  decision  on  what is
"possible"  or "appropriate"  is taken  by each  ministry.
Although  program  budgeting  is  still  far  from  fully  integrated
into  the  Dutch  budgetary  process,  considerable  advances  have  been made
which  bear  witness  to the  success  of a gradual,  decentralized  approach.
Cost  benefit  analysis  is  nearly  always  used  to evaluate  infrastructure
projects. Not only  this,  but  policy  analysis  techniques  (development  of
sectoral  strategies  with  quantifiable  goals  and  cost  inputs  and the
application  of cost  benefit  techniques  to guide  expenditure  choices)  have
been  expanded  into  areas  such  as  health,  the  labor  market  and  crime
prevention. Between  late  1984  and  mid 1986,  methodological  advice  on
techniques  of project  and  program  evaluation  was  provided  by Finance
Ministry  and  private  consultancies  to  ministries  as diverse  as  Home
Affairs,  Foreign  Affairs,  Economic  Affairs,  Social  Affairs  and  Employment,
Education  and  Science,  Housing,  Physical  Planning  and  Environment,  and
Health. The  training  "infrastructure"  'and  the  supply  of expertise  has  been
kept flexible  and  methodologies  are  constantly  being  revised  and  updated  in
accordance  with  the  lessons  of experience.
Another  interesting  feature  of the  Dutch  experience  is  the  length
of time  taken  for  decisions  to  evolve  and  for  systems  to change
correspondingly.  The  formal  introduction  of program  budgeting  in 1976  had
been  preceded  by decades  of  discussion  and  experimentation:  the  idea  had
first  been  put forward  by two  Finance  Ministry  officials  following  a  visit
to the  United  States  in  1950.  In  keeping  with the  tradition  of
consultation  and  decentralized  decision-making,  the  core  ministries
gradually  allowed  a consensus  to  build  up rather  than  imposing  systems  from
the  center. As noted  earlier,  even  the  rather  toothless  interministerial
commission  was  dissolved  in 1982.
Similarly,  there  has  been  no attempt  to replace  traditional
methods  of budgetary  allocation  even in  those  areas  where  program
techniques  are fully  applied. Rather,  the  emphasis  has  been  on improving
and  complementing  traditional  methods. At one  extreme,  traditional
budgetary  allocation  can  be viewed  as a  wholly  political  process  resulting
from  negotiations  between  interested  parties. At this  extreme,  not  only  is
there  no market  mechanism  and  hence  no "prices"  attached  to the  inputs  and
outputs  of government  services,  there  is  no need  for  such  a  mechanism.
Agreements  are  reached  on expenditure  allocations  by "input"  (e.g.
staffing,  equipment),  without  regard  to  output. This  process  is  frequently
dominated  at a technical  level  by incrementalism,  while  at a  politicalANNEX  II
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level  both  the  physical  magnitudes  and  the  policy  objectives  behind  the
sums  of  money  are  all  too  often  lost. In  practice  this  is,  at  least  in
most  industrialized  countries  as  well  as the  more  sophisticated  developing
countries,  tempered  by the  application  of some  objective  evaluation
techniques.  In  Holland,  the  introduction  of  program  budgeting  is  aimed  to
increase  this  tempering  by  gradual  steps. The  integration  or  annexation  of
information  on  costs  and  outputs  is,  moreover,  being  done  in  the  least
threatening  and  "system  friendly"  way  possible. This  means  use  of  existing
information  and  institutional  structures  wherever  suitable  and  ensuring
that  any  changes  are  fully  compatible  with  the  existing  budget  mechanism
and  political  process  of  negotiation.  By 1986,  about  40  percent  of  Dutch
central  government  expenditures  were  covered  by  program  budgets  as  against
90  percent  in  France. It  appears,  however,  that  the  new  techniques  are
better  entrenched  and  more  widely  accepted.
F.  Forward  Budgeting  in  Kenya 10
The  Kenyan  budget  system  consists  of three  instruments:  the
forward  budget,  the  annual  draft  estimates,  and  the  supplementary  revised
estimates.  The  forward  budget  is  a  planning  tool  which  should  determine
annual  government  expenditures  for  the  next  three  years. It  was  first
introduced  in  1973  as  part  of  an  effort  to  relate  the  five  year  development
plans  with  the  annual  development  and  recurrent  budgets. Use  of the
forward  budget  as  a  planning  tool  was  somewhat  haphazard  until  the  mid
1980s  when  severe  fiscal  constraints  forced  the  Authorities  to  plan  the  use
of resources  more  carefully.  In  theory,  the  forward  budget  is  meant  to :
(i)  review  the  implementation  of  ongoing  programs  in  the  development  plan
to  ensure  that  their  execution  remains  consistent  with  national  priorities;
(ii)  provide  revised  financial  ceilings  for  the  current  fiscal  year  and
tentative  budget  ceilings  for  the  next  two  years;  and  (iii)  integrate
planning  and  budgeting  on  a continuous  basis.
A pilot  experiment  in  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  has  been  successful
in  implementing  many  of  the  features  of  a forward  budget  including:  (i)  a
better  link  between  planning  and  budgeting  (ii)  establishing  more  specific
criteria  for  determination  of  priorities;  (iii)  strengthening  project
evaluation  and  monitoring;  (iv)  better  intergration  of  parastatals  in  the
planning  and  budgetary  processess;  (v)  paying  more  attention  to  planning  of
current  expenditures  and  identifying  the  current  expenditure  implications
of capital  projects;  and  (vi)  changing  the  internal  structure  of the
ministry  to  conform  to the  requirements  of the  new  budgetary  system.
Inevitably,  extending  the  reform  to  the  rest  of the  Central  Government  has
been  more  problematic.  The  institutional  difficulties  inherent  in  major
10/  This  section  draws  on a  number  of  Bank  and  other  documents,  the
following  of  which  are  publicly  available:  Emery  M. Roe:  "The  Ceiling
as  Base:  National  Budgeting  in  Kenya," in "Public  Budgeting  and
Finance,"  Summer,  1986;  and  Glenn  Lehmann:  "Kenya's  Experience  With  a
Forward  Budget,"  EDI  Training  Materials,  July  1986.iNNEX
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changes  of this  nature  continue  to  manifest  themselves.  However,  the
Gove,nment  has in  recent  years  made  a determined  effort  to tackle  them.  In
February  1985,  it  announced  its  intention  to implement  a government-wide
budget  rationalization  program  (BRP)  of  which  the  forward  budget  would  be
the  principal  instrument.  The  BRP  has four  broad  aims:
(a)  to ensure  a more  productive  use  of scarce  resources;
(b)  to facilitate  the  seeking  of donor  support  in  a  manner  consistent
with (a)  above;
(c)  to increase  domestic  resource  mobilization  mainly  through  higher
user  changes  and  other  non-tax  revenues;  and
(d)  to improve  the  planning  and  budgeting  processes  in  both core  and
sectoral  agencies.
Considerable  progress  has  been  made  in recent  years  in  achieving
these  aims,  although  much  remains  to  be done.  Kenya  is  helped  by having  a
reasonably  well-working  basic  accounting  system  and  au  ability  to exercise
overall  control  of  expenditures  in the  central  government  agencies.  It  has
also  successfully  installed  a  computerized  financial  information  and
management  sytem  in the  Ministry  of Finance  as  well  as in  the  Ministry  of
Agriculture  as  part  of the  pilot  experiment  mentioned  above.  Improvements
are  gradually  being  made in  the  process  by which  the  forward  budget  is
prepared  and  in  tne  seriousnesu  wILL  wLL'I  I-  ,S  takea,  by corc  d  line
agencies.  Nevertheless,  the  BRP  is  still  a long  way from  achieving  its
objectives.  Expenditure  cuts  continue  to  be made in  response  to resource
shortages  without  clear  priorities  or concern  for  the  quality  of the
remaining  project  portfolio. The  wage  component  of current  expenditure  is
still  increasing  disproportionately;  as a consequence,  not  only  capital
spending  but  maintenance  and  operating  expenses  suffer. Many  projects  are
not  been fully  funded. The  link  between  the  plan and  the  budget  sometimes
remains  unclear.  This  is  a familiar  litany  of  problems  which  forward
budgeting  was intended  to  solve.
Its  difficulty  in  doing  so to  date  may  be attributed  to a  number
of factors  which  have important  implications  for  other  countries  attempting
similar  reforms.  First,  a series  of major  expenditure  retrenchments  have
made it  difficult  to  achieve  lasting  improvements  in the  composition  of
expenditure.  As the  experience  of industrialized  countries  has shown,  it  is
somewhat  easier  to introduce  budgetary  system  reforms  against  the  background
of abundance  than  in times  of austerity. Second,  Kenya,  although  less,
perhaps,  than  most  African  countries,  faces  acute  shortages  of the  human
skill  resources  required  to  make improved  budgetary  systems  work.
Particularly  at sector  ministry  level,  there  are  few  qualified  staff  to  fill
planning  officer  posts. As a consequence,  these  cfficers  have  not  been
fully  involved  in the  preparation  of forward  budgets  which  have  hence  coma
to  be regarded  as a  Treasury  preserve. Although  the  rules  stipulate  that
Sector  Planning  Groups,  chaired  by Planning  Ministry  officers,  should
provide  a forum  for  the  discussion  of line  ministry  submissions  to ensureAMjEX  II
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their  consistency  with  overall  planning  objectives,  these  groups  in  practice
rarely  reet. Moreover,  the  time  available  for  discussions  and  negotiations
is  often  too  short  to  permit  binding  agreements  to  be reached. Even  within
the  Ministry  of Finance  itself,  there  is  a difference  in status  between
planning  officers  and  Treasury  supply  officers  with  the  latter  playing  by
far  the  most important  role  in forward  budget  and  annual  estimate
preparations.
Third,  little  attempt  is  made to  simplify  classifications  or
concentrate  on priority  expenditures  when  formulating  the  forward  budgets.
Consequently,  they  become  three-year  projections  of the  annual  budget  items,
with  a  huge  number  of  votes,  sub-votes,  heads  and  sub-heads  with several
line  items  under  each  one.  The  turgid  and  unwieldy  process  would  tax  the
patience  and  resources  of  a highly  sophisticated  and  fully  automated
adminsitration.
Fourth,  there  is little  or  no flexibility  allowed  to  ministries  in
shifting  resources  between  budget  items,  particularly  between  the  capital
and  current  budgets. Moreover,  although  the  Government  is  aware  of the  need
to  rectify  the  imbalance  in  favor  of  wage  expenditures,  the  forard  budget
mechanism  is  not  used  to serve  this  end. This  is  because  personnel
expenditure  is  a "protected"  category  which  ministries  do not  have the
discretion  to increase  or  decrease. Moreover,  large  salary  increases  have
recently  been  granted,  the  number  of civil  servants  is  projected  to rise
(especially  in  health,  education  and  agriculture),  and  public  agencies  are
nhligPe  to  hire  certi-'.  schcCv  l aiv5b  HuIAI  Lu flind  work  in rne  private
sector. In these  circumstances  it  would  be  meaningless  to attempt  to  use
the  forward  budget  to  set  targets  for  relative  personnel  expenditures.
Fifth,  the  forward  budgeting  exercise  has,  until  recently,  been
mostly  confined  to the  Central  Government  administration:  the  activities  of
parastatals  and  other  "autonomous"  agencies  hardly  featured  in the  planning
or  budgeting  process,  though  they  inevitably  had  a major  impact  on budget
execution  through,  for  example,  their  subsidy  and  capital  transfer
requirements.  The  Government  has  expressed  its  intention  to correct  this
situation  and  to involve  both  parastatals  and  local  authorities  in the
preparation  of the  forward  budget: the  Treasury  has  been instructed  to
issue  appropriate  guidelines.
Sixth,  the  major  preoccupation  of the  Treasury  has  been to  keep
global  expenditure  below  ceilings  which  are  calculated  on the  basis  of
revenue  projections,  deficit/GDP  ratio  assumptions  and  historical
expenditure  patterns. By  contrast,  relatively  little  attention  is  paid  to
the  analytical  work (project  evaluation,  economic  categorization,  etc.)
which  is supposed  to  be carried  out  by the  Special  Planning  Groups. As
noted  earlier,  these  groups,  which  are  chaired  by planning  officers  from  the
Planning  Ministry,  rarely  meet  and  are  not  equipped  to  carry  out  this
analytical  work.ANNEX II
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Seventh,  the  Development  Phase  itself,  which  is  supposed  to
provide  the  basis  for  forward  budget  projections,  does  not  contain  a
systematically  formulated  list  of sector  projects. Rather,  overall  ceilings
are  set  for  sector  ministry  development  expenditures  with  little  attention
paid  to  content. Links  betwen  the  Finance  and  Plannin-  Ministries  are,
moreover,  weak  with the  latter  participating  to  only  a limited  degree  in
budget  execution.
Finally,  the  forward  budget  has  no legal  status,  unlike  the  annual
budget  which  forms  the  basis  for  the  finance  law. Even though,  as  part of
the  new  BRP,  the  Authorities  have issued  greatly  improved  and  more
comprehensive  guidelines  on how  to  prepare  the  forward  budget  and  review
investment  programs,  sector  ministries  will inevitably  continue  to  pay  more
attention  to the  annual  budget  which  has  a much  more  direct  impact  on the
resources  actually  made available  to them. Moreover,  these  comprehensive
circulars  need to  be complemented  by a  widespread  training  program,  at  both
core  and  sector  ministry  level,  or  both the  aims  and  techniques  of forward
budgeting.
The  difficulties  associated  with  Kenya's  forward  budgeting
experiments  should  not  be construed  as  a condemnation  of the  system  itself,
any  more than  those  encountered  by industrialized  countries  imply  the
wholesale  rejection  of  program  budget  techniques.  Indeed,  there  is  no
question  that  the  forward  budget  has  been  a useful  instrument  in  helping  the
Government  to think  more systematically  in  terms  of expenditure  priorities.
…S_*  __b_  _..__._  .e  .C*%  &.,.J.;g  .. 1  *_t  O_..___.%  td4_.eWt_
moreover,  encouraging.  Nevertheless,  the  Kenya  example  provides  at least
four  valuable  institutional  lessons  which  can  be of great  use  to countries
trying  to improve  budgetary  processes. First,  the  regulation  of the  system
should  be kept  as simple  as possible  so  as not  to  overtax  the  limited
administrative  and  technical  capacity  available  to  most  governments.
Second,  the  process  should  be organized  to  allow  ample  time  for  full
discussion  by all  interested  parties. It  may  well  be that  in the  final
analysis  the  Finance  Minister  or  Head  of Government  will  have to act  as
arbiter;  but if the  system  is to  succeed  it  is essential  that  all  interested
parties  fully  participate  in the  preparatory  process. Third,  the  ministry
or department  responsible  for  the  plan  should  be closely  linked,  and  in
close  alliance,  with  that  responsible  for  the  annual  budget. If this  is  not
the  case,  then  it is  inevitable  that  the  exigencies  and  time  pressures  of
the  annual  budgeting  exercise  will take  precedent  (it  is,  after  all,  the
Treasury  which  signs  the  checks!)  and  the  exercise  will  be perceived  as a
Finance  Ministry  preserve. Fourth,  it is  essential  that  the  budgeting
process  be as integrated  as possible,  covering  all  public  sector  entities
which  have  a significant  impact  on  public  finances. These  considerations
lead  on to two  vitally  important  aspects  of the  budget  as a developmental
instrument:  its  coverage  and  its  organization.
G.  National  Public  Expenditure  Planning  in  Papua  New  Guinea  (PNG}
The  National  Public  Expenditure  Plan (NPEP)  in  Papua  New  Guinea,
which  was  applied  during  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  was conceived  as aANNEX I  I
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method  of resource  allocation  distinct  from  both  conventional  and
theoretical  program  budgetinS,  though  sharing  some  of their  characteristics.
While  there  was  considerable  dissatisfaction  with traditional  methods  of
resource  allocation,  experience  had shown  that  most  developing  countries  had
neither  the  data  nor  the  trained  manpower  needed  for  the  kind  of deta/led
planning  involved  in  the  program  approaches  and  that  this  was  particularly
true  of PNG. The  country  was  especially  poorly  equipped  to select  projects
on the  basis  of social  returns. Since  program  budgeting  involved  the  prior
reclassification  of all  expenditure  as  well  as  a cost-benefit  approach  to
allocations;  it  was likely  to  prove  complex  and  difficult  to implement.
The  NPEP  aimed  therefore  to allocate  public  expenditure  through
the  budget  on the  basis  of  policy-determined  priorities.  An overall  ceiling
on  public  spending  would  be derived  from  macroeconomic  considerations,
including growth of  revenues,  expected capital inflows, etc.  Aggregate
public  expenditure  would  then  be divided  into  a  number  of sub-budgets,  each
directed  towards  a specific  goal  such  as food  production  and  nutrition,
other  economic  production,  social  welfare,  development  of relatively
backward  regions,  urban  management,  environmental  protection  and  so on.
Priorities  would  be laid  down  by the  Government  between  these  "strategic
objectives"  and  translated  by the  planners  into  allocations  of funds. The
intention  was that  all  public  spending  should  be covered,  bringing  general
administration  and  security  into  the  strategic  allocation  framework. No
distinction  was to  be  made  between  current  and  capital  expenditures,  to
avoid  the  danger  of  associating  development  only  with the  rolling  exercise.
In essence  NPEP  was  an adaptation  of the  UK Public  Expenditure  Survey
Process,  Ainrnlif4ed  t  Ut  Cad  ILviuts  in  PNv.
NPEP  has  been  an effective  instrument  of  macroeconomic  policy,
curbing  the  growth  of government  expenditure  in a  period  of severe  resource
constraint.  It  has  enforced  a system  of  priorities  and  strengthened
internal  controls  on new  items  of public  spending. The  concept  of forward
budgeting  has also  taken  root. Despite  these  important  advances,  the  system
as applied  has a  number  of shortcomings:
(a) At the  start  of  NPEP  the  idea  of  comprehensive  expenditure
planning  was  given  up as an immediate  aim,  largely  for  political
reasons,  and  the  methodology  was applied  only  to  new  activities,
leaving  prior  expenditures  to  be budgeted  as  before. The
anticipation  that  the  non-NPEP  part  of public  expenditure  would
decline  in relative  size  and  importance  was  not  realized,  and  the
"NPEP  wedge"  accounts  for  less  that.  a quarter  of  all  expenditure.
(b) Whereas  NPEP  became  the  exclusive  concern  of the  newly  created
National  Planning  Office  (NPO),  the  non-NPEP  budget  remained  with
the  Finance  Department,  creating  inevitable  institutional
conflict.ANNEX II
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(c)  Since  NPEP  covers  both  capital  and  current  costs  associated  with
new activity  levels,  recurrent  expenditure  in  such  fields  as
education,  health  and  rural  development  are  divided  in  the  PNG
budget  into  NPEP  and  non-NPEP  components,  leading  to confusion  and
overlapping.
(d) The "strategic  objectives"  defined  to serve  as the  basis  for  PNG's
national  development  strategy  have  not  proved  to  be particularly
helpful  for  budgetary  decision-making.  They  cut  across  both
departmental  responsibilities  and  the  functional  classification  of
expenditure.  SE  ante  the  development  agencies  do not  have
ceilings  to  work  against,  or  expenditure  targets  by objectives,
though  ex post  the  expenditure  is  cross-classified  by agency  and
project.
(e) The "strategic  objective"  approach,  coupled  with the  "project"
basis  for  the  allocation  of  NPEP  funds,  makes  sectoral  planning
difficult.
(f) Although  NPEP  is a four-year  rolling  plan  in concept,  in  practice
it  has tended  to  be largely  a  year-to-year  budgetary  exercise.
The forward  budget  format  has little  operational  content;  very  few
projects  are  initiated  in  the  later  years.
(g) Altogether  NPEP  procedures  for  approval,  funding  and  modification
of new  activities  are  too  elaborate  and  rigid. They are  uniform
for  both  large  and  complex  projects  and  for  minor  schemes,  even
for  small  staffing  additions  in  existing  organizations.  As a
result,  the  NPO  is involved  in  detailed  budgeting  and  expenditure
control  that  it  has little  time  for  the  more important  tasks  of
policy  analysis,  establishment  of investment  priorities  and inter-
sectoral  coordination.
H. The  Administrative  Reform  Program  in Jamaica
The fundamental  objective  of  Jamaica's  Administrative  Reform
Program  (ARP),  supported  by a  World  Bank  technical  assistance  loan  approved
in  May, 1984,  was to strengthen  the  line  ministries,  particularly  those
critical  to  structural  adjustment  and  long  term  economic  development.
However,  it  was determined  that  before  improved  management  structures  could
produce  results  in  the  line  ministries,  the "administrative  environment"
primarily  set  by the  three  core  agencies  --  Finance and  Public  Service
Ministries,  and  the  Public  Service  Commission  --  would  have to  be profoundly
changed.  With  regard  to the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  ARP aimed  to:  (i)
restore  its  institutional  capacity  by rationalizing  its  organizational
structure,  upgrading  staff  and  physical  facilities,  and  creating  or revising
procedures  and  systems  in the  areas  of  budgeting,  financial  administration,
and  public  enterprise  control;  (ii)  strengthen  the  staff  support  for  the
senior  civil  servant  (Financial  Secretary)  to enable  him to  devote  more  time
to  planning  and  policy  work  rather  than  crisis  management;  and (iii)Page  15  of 17
install,  over  a five  year  period,  a  performance  budgeting  and review  system
throughout  the  Government,  including  the  creation  of the  necessary
institutional  capacity  in  both the  Finance  Ministry  and line  agencies.
A review  which  took  place  some  three  years  after  the  loan  was
approved  concluded  that  notable  progress  had  been  made in  presenting  the
budget  on a  performance  basis.  Virtually  the  entire  budget  would  be using
the  PBS  format  by 1989;  even  more  significant  was  the  conclusion  that  the
new  method  had 'already  led  to  a better  definition  in  some  ministries  of
lines  of  responsibility  and  has  helped  pinpoint  financial,  management,
staff,  and  contracting  problems  impeding  the  timely  attainment  of stated
objectives.  The  quarterly  review  system  has  reportedly  proven  to  be
especially  useful  in  bringing  about  a  better  interaction  between  managers
and  operating  staff."  The initial  project  brief,  moreover,  concluded  that  "a
real  improvement  in  the  financial  management  and  control  of the  Central
Administration"  could  be observed  in  recent  years.  The  Government  had
carried  out two  SALs  and  Stard.bys  "successfully"  while  achieving
considerable  progress  in financial  management:  revenues  had increased,
expenditures  fallen  and  the  fiscal  deficit  reduced  from  nearly  25  percent  of
GDP  in 1984  to  about  7  percent  in 1987.  Politicians  and  senior  civil
servants  considered  that  the  ARP  had  played  an important  role  in  these
ae-hievements  and  wished  it  to continue.
Despite  these  important  successes,  the  installation  of the
budgetary  reform  itself  was  proving  problematic.  In late  1987,  a mission
suggested  that  fresh  thought  be given  to the  implementation  of certain
features  of the  proposed  performance  budgeting  system,  taking  account  the
limitations  of the  Jamaican  administrative  system.  In  particular:
(a)  the  government-wide  installation  of a woXrking  system  looks
unlikely  to  be accomplished  by the  target  date  of  mid 1989,  in
the  light  of  progress  made  to date;
(b)  the  government  has  not  yet  established  a satisfactory  link
between  the  planning  and  budgetary  processes  essential  to a
performance  budgeting  system;
(c)  the  respective  roles  of the  Budget  Division  of the  Finance
Ministry  and  the  Planning  Institute  have  not  been  clearly
defined,  and  the  integration  of the  Planning  Project  Staff
with the  Budget  Division  has  not  yet  been  successfully
accomplished;
(d)  as  a consequence  of (b)  and  (c)  above,  there  are  still  two
separate  budgets  for  capital  and  recurrent  expenditures  for
all  ministries  and  departments,  even  the  Ministry  of
Construction  Works  which  was  chosen  as a pilot  for  the
installation  of the  performance  budgeting  process;ANNEX  II
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(e)  organizational  units  in  the  line  ministries  and  agencies  have
not  been  realigned  to  match  the  new  budgetary  process;
(f)  consequently,  cost  centers,  which  should  produce  measurable
outputs  or services  with identifiable  cost  figures  for  each
ministry  and  department,  and  take  into  account  all  relevant
constitutional,  institutional,  and  organizational  aspects,
have  not  yet  been  successfully  established;
(g)  there  is  a serious  lack  of  qualified  technical  and  accounting
staff;  many  of those  trained  under  the  project  have  moved  to
other  positions  or  have  left  the  Government;
(h)  consequently,  there  is  no adequate  cost  accounting,  even in
the  technical  ministries;  the  current,  essentially  cash-based
accounting  model  continues  to  be used;  it is  not designed  to
yield  the  information  and  analysis  necessary  for  performance
budgeting;
*(i) evaluation  of results  is  rendered  difficult  by the  lack  of
capacity  to  check  work in  progress  except  in  cash  disbursement
terms;  and
(j)  the  leadership  role  assigned  to  the  3udget  Division  of the
Finance  Ministry  (essential  for  the  successful  installation  of
any  new  budgeting  model)  has  not  materialized  in  practice;
there  seems,  indeed,  to  be a lack  of close  cooperation  between
the  Division  and those  responsible  for implementing  the  ARP.
As a consequence,  the  momentum  and  enthusiasm  manifest  in  the
early  stages  of the  project,  has  been  lost.
As a result  of these  difficulties,  the  budgetary  reform  has largely
stopped  at the  format  preparation  stage,  and  performance  budgeting  concepts
have  not  yet  been introduced  as a working  management  tool  even  in the
selected  pilot  ministries.  Care  should,  however,  be taken  not  to interpret
these  results  as a  wholesale  condemnation  of the  system  and  all  it is
designed  to achieve.  Three  years  is  a  very short  time  for  the  successful
introduction  of reformed  budgetary  systems  even  in industrialized  countries.
Many  of the  problems  encountered  in  Jamaica  were familiar  in  France  three
years  after  RCB  began  to  be introduced  there.  As shown  above,  by persisting
with  the improvements,  the  French  now  have  a  budgetary  system  which,
although  a long  way removed  from  the  total  conversion  to  RCB  originally
envisaged,  is able  to  draw  on the  concepts  and  intellectual  discipline
involved  in  the  preparation  of  RCB to  benefit  the  financial  management
system  as a  whole  and  to improve  the  budget  as an economic  policy  tool.  It
would  be a pity  if the  Jamaican  Authorities  were to  become  so disillusioned
by the  early  setbacks  that  they  abandon  the  attempt  at  budgetary  reform.
Many  of the  concepts  embodied  in  performance  budgeting  are  sound.  If there
is  a major  lesson  to  be drawn  from  Jamaica's  experience  of the  ARP (other
than  the  normal  ones  concerning  the  institutional,  procedural  and  political
prerequisites  for  successful  reform  which  are  discussed  in the  main text),ANNEX II
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it is that  outside  agencies  like  the  Bank  should  be careful  not to  raise
expectations  too  high.  Five  years  was  always  too  short  for  such  a  major
reform  effort  in  a politically  sensitive  area.  It is  useful  in this  and
similar  endeavors  to  obtain  some  sound  successes which  can  help to  maintain
momentum.  High initial  expectations,  when  unfulfilled,  yield  disappointment
and  disillusion.ANNEX III
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THE  BUDGETARY  DECISION-MAKING  PROCESS
A.  Introduction
This  annex  serves  the  double  purpose  of summarizing  a  number  of
the  concepts  and  issues  dealt  with in  the  text  while  at the  same  time
focussing  on those  areas  of the  decision-making  process  to  which  Bank
staff  could  fruitfully  pay  particular  attention.  Clearly,  this  process
varies  substantially  from  country  to  country  so that  the  discussion
inevitably  suffers  from  a degree  of generalization  and  abstraction.
Nevertheless,  it  aims  to  highlight  the  main  defects  frequently  found  in
the  process  and  hence  point  the  way towards  improvements  in  procedures  and
institutions  required  to  make  public  expenditure  a more  effective
development  instrument.
The  annex  first  describes  the  framework  for  a typical  budgetary
process,  and  then  goes  on to discuss  how,  in  practice,  each  stage  presents
a  number  of institutional  and  procedural  difficulties  which  lead  to
deviations  from  the  idealized  schemata.  It concludes  by considering  some
of the  more common  responses  by both  central  and  line  agencies  to  defects
in  the  budgetary  process.  These  responses  frequently  have  damaging
consequences  of their  own  for  the  effective  conduct  of fiscal  policy  and
of economic  policy  in the  wider  sense.
B.  The  Budgetary  Process:  A Schemata
A typical  budgetary  decision-making  process  is  summarised  in the
following  table.  The  table  presents  an essentially  theoretical,  even
idealized  framework,  from  which  practice  can  deviate  in  a number  of
important  respects.  The  first  column  refers  to the  steps  which  should
normally  be followed  in  a typical  budgetary  cycle,  while  the  second
outlines  the  most  commonly  observed  methods  by which  each  step  may  be
carried  out.ANNEX  III
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Budgetary  Decision-Making  Process:
Typical  Steps.  Methods  and  Agencies  Involved
Stegs  Methods  and  Agencies  Involved
(i)  Determination  of overall  (a)  Estimate  of global  ceiling  by the
level  of  public  spending  central  authorities  communicated  to
within  budget  period.  sector  agencies.
(b)  Estimate  of individual  program  costs
by sector  agencies  communicated  to
central  agencies  for  compilation  and
aggregation.
(ii)  Initial  allocation  of  (a)  Current  budget:  allocation  usually  by
estimated  available  resources  agency  rather  than  program.  Core  agencies
between  sector  agencies  and/or  send  sector  agencies  budget  circular
programs.  indicating  economic  prospects,  broad
policy  objectives,  and  how the  budget  is
expected  to  help attain  them.  On this
basis,  the  circular  should  justify
proposals  for  increases  and  reductions  in
agency  allocations.
(b)  Budget  circular  restricted  to general
statement  of resource  availability  and
policy  objectives,  allowing  the  sector
agencies  to respond  with  their  own
proposals  for  allocation.
(c)  CaDital  expenditure:  sector  agencies
present  proposals  for  new  projects  based
on crit'ria  indicated  by core  agencies,
including  rate  of return,  availability  of
financing,  implementation  capability,  and
consistency  with  overall  economic  and
social  objectives.  Time  table,  again
prepared  by sector  agencies  proposes
annual  breakdown  of expenditures  for
inclusion  in the  budget.ANNEX III
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(iii)  Response  of sector  Negotiations  between  core  and  sector
agencies  to  budget  circular.  agencies  usually  at technical  level,  the
Cabinet  having  already  decided  on broad
aims  and  priorities.  Approach  often
incremental,  with  scrutiny  of  previous
expenditures  rare,  and  focus  almost
exclusively  on proposed  increases.
Negotiations  may  be conducted  on the
basis  of  programs,  but  most frequently  on
line  items  (salaries,  materials  etc.)
which  cut  across  programs.  The success  of
requests  for  higher  allocations  based  on
political  bargaining  power  of sector
agencies  concerned.
(iv)  Preparation  of draft  This is  the  responsibility  of the  core
budget document.  agencies. Since requests generally exceed
resources,  it is inevitable  that  core
agency  technical  staff  will  have a  major
input  through  adjustment,  integration  and
harmonization.
(v)  Approval  of draft  budget.  This  is  at Cabinet  level  and  can  be a
lengthy  process.  Due to  alterations  by
core  agency  technical  staff  (see  step
iv),  what  spending  ministers  read  may  be
significantly  different  from  what  they
thought  their  officials  had  agreed  to.  A
return  of a draft  budget  for  revision  and
modification  may occur  several  times
during  the  cycle.
(vi)  Preparation  of final  This  is the  responsibility  of core
budget  for  presentation  to  agencies.  This  can  be a technically
legislature.  complex  task,  involving  the  preparation
of a cogent  summary  and  copious  annexes.
(vii)  Consideration  by  Depending  on the  country,  tChis  may  be
the  legislature.  the  most  difficult  part  of the  process.
If the  legislature  takes  its  task
seriously,  the  review  can involve  several
sessions:  (a)  consideration  of budget
framework,  including  macroeconomic
policies  and  assumptions  behind  revenue
and  expenditure  forecasts;  (b)
examination  of detailed  proposals  at
budget  committee  and  subcommittee  level;
and (c)  final  plenary  session  to  pass
budget  into  law.ANNEX  III
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(viii)  Budget  implementation:  Core  agm=  responsibilities  include
release  of funds.  administering  payments  to sector  agencies
so as to  ensure  adequate  control  over  the
flow  of  expenditures.  There  are  three
basic  methods:  (a)  immediate  release  of
entire  budgeted  amount  to sector  agency
accounts;  (b)  release  of funds  against
payment  vouchers  or receipts  showing  that
the  sector  agency  has  effected  or is
about  to effect  payment;  (c)  periodic
release  of funds  to sector  agencies  (e.g.
one-twelfth  of the  budgeted  amount  per
month  or one-fourth  per  quarter).
Sector  agency  responsibilities  include:
(a)  preparing  forecasts  of requirements
over  the  year; (b)  preparing  commitments;
and (c)  acknowledgement  of receipts  of
goods  and  services  and  certification  of
expenditures  on them.
(ix)  Budget  implementation:  Sector  agencies  are  normally  responsible
capital  expenditures.  for  project  implementation.  This includes
the  preparation  of forecast  expenditures
over  the  year,  and  the  organization  and
administration  of  bidding  and  contracting
procedures.  Core  agencies  would  be
responsible  for  ensuring  that  laws  and
regulations  had  been  complied  with  before
releasing  funds.
(x)  Budget  implementationi:
procurement  Core  agencies  should  be responsible  for
establishing  uniformity  in contractual
procedures  to  ensure  as  many competitive
bids as  possible.  Sector  agencies  should
administer  the  procurement  process
including  advertising,  detailed  cost
evaluation  (for  comparison  with  bid
prices),  evaluation  of  bids,  negotiation
with contractors,  and  review  of
contractors'  performance.  Contracts
should  only  be awarded  after  budgetary
allocation  is  assured.ANNEX  III
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(xi)  Budget  implementation:  Sector  agencies  should  prepare  periodic
reporting.  (monthly  or quarterly)  progress  reports
and  accounts,  which  should  be
consolidated  and  annualized  by the  core
agencies.
(xii)  Monitoring  and  Responsibilities  of the  sector  agencies
evaluation.  include:  (a)  periodic  review  of  actual
expenditures;  (b)  analysis  of  variations
with  budget  estimates;  (c)  analysis  of
budgetary  lags;  and (d)  matching
financial  and  physical  progress.
Core  agencies  should  (a)  conduct  periodic
overall  progress  reviews  independently  or
jointly  with the  spending  agencies;  (b)
revise  policies  and  objectives  where
appropriate  in the  light  of these
reviews;  and  (c)  reallocate  funds  where
necessary.  (NB.  In many  countries,
monitoring  is  carried  cat  by a central
body.  This  may  be necessary  where  the
capacity  does  not  exist  in the  line
ministry  or sectoral  agency;  however,  it
is decirnhle that this activity should  be
carried  out  by those  in close  contact
with  the  project  in  questicn).
(xiii)  Budget  implementation:  Core  agencies  should  prepare  an  overall
cash  management.  plan  for  cash  management  to ensure  that
borrowing  is  within  limits  and  interest
on debt  minimized.
Sector  agencies  should  rapidly  surrender
excess  funds  or  process  requests  for
additional  funds  in a timely  manner.ANNEX  III
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C.  The  Budget  Process  in  Practice
(a)  Determination  of Overall  Spending  Levels
At each  point  in the  process,  a number  of factors  can  combine  to
divert  reality  from  the  theoretical  process  described  above.  In the  first
stage,  the  core  agencies  should,  in  principle,  determine  the  overall  level
of public  spending  within  the  budgetary  period  consistent  with  resource
availability  and  macroeconomic  stability.  In fact,  total  spending  may simply
result  from  the  mere  compilation  and  aggregation  of the  expenditure
requirements  of each  individual  program  or agency.  The  power  of the  core
agencies  to carry  out  their  task  is  often  limited  by a  number  of factors.
First,  the  relative  political  power  of some  of the  spending  agencies  may  be
such  that  they  can,  in effect,  determine  what they  will spend  by recourse  to
higher  authority  than  the  core  (or  central)  agencies.  Second,  forecasts  of
fiscal  receipts  are  plagued  by uncertainties  especially  when there  is
significant  reliance  on  zommodity  taxes.  Third,  in  many countries,  not  all
foreign  aid  or borrowing  flows  through  the  central  ministries.  In
Mauritania,  for  example,  the  core  agencies  had,  until  recently,  little
knowledge,  let  alone  de facto control,  of direct  arrangements  between
sector  agencies  and  foreign  providers  of funds.  Fourth,  aggregation  of
agency  proposals  leads  to  very  notional  magnitudes  which  cannot  possibly
help informed  decision-making  on a  multitude  of individual  programs.  Fifth,
central  authorities  are  frequently  hampered  in their  judgement  of agency
proposals  by lack  of  basic  information  on matters  such  as  number  of staff,
what  activities  are  underway,  what they  cost  etc.  The  information  gap
generally  becomes  wider  as  one  moves  away from  the  central  government
agencies  and  towards  the  local  authorities  and  public  enterprises.
(b)  Initial  Resource  Allocation
Many  of the  decisions  invnlved  in the  next  step,  the  initial
allocation  of the  estimated  available  resources  between  individual  agencies
and/or  programs,  may  already  have  been subsumed  in  the  previous  stage.
Again,  this  would  depend  upon  the  relative  political  power  of the  core  and
spending  agencies.  A number  of other  factors  may also  intervene  to  undermine
the  theoretical  process.  For instance,  budget  circulars  may  not  be
systematically  prepared  and  distributed  in  a timely  manner.  They  may contain
no cogent  indication  of  the  government's  goals  or  how these  are  to  be met
through  the  budget.  The  estimate  of the  resource  envelope  may  be grossly
inaccurate  for  reasons  cited  above.  Core  agencies  sometimes  resort  to
deliberately  underestimating  it in  order  to increase  the  degree  of de facto
central  control  over  resource  allocation.  This in turn  can lead  to the
proliferation  of supplementary  budgets  which  may increase  the  likelihood  of
hurried  expenditure  allocations  for  ill-thought  out  purposes.
It is at this  stage  of the  process  that  the  quality  of the
information  available  to the  core  agencies  becomes  a vital  consideration.
Indeed:  it is often  possible  to identify  the  key decision  points  in theANNEX  III
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cycle,  by tracing  the  flow  of information  or lack  of it.  Financial  data,
which  is  the  basic  raw  material  for  vffective  budget  formulation,  may  be
scattered  in  various  ministries  and  agencies.  Accounts  and  accounting
systems  may  not  be uniform  and  may  well  be in  conflict  with  each  other.  For
example,  the  codification  and  accounting  systems  are  often  different  for  the
current  budget,  prepared  by  budget  office  in the  finance  ministry,  and  the
capital  budget  which  is the  responsibility  of the  the  planning  authority.
Both  of them  may  be inconsistent  with  the  accounts  in  the  treasury
department  of the  finance  ministry  which  is  responsible  for  administering
actual  payments.  These  difficulties  in  the  core  ministries  are  often
compounded  by the  fact  that  the  sector  agencies  operate  with their  own  sets
of data  -which  will  again  likely  be different.  Even  when data  are  consistent,
it  is  by no means  unknown  for  the  spending  agencies  to conceal  the  full  cost
of a  project  in  an attempt  to  avoid  an adverse  decision.  As a result,
programs  that  have  initially  gained  budget  support  on the  basis  of
underestimation  have  subsequently  ballooned  (the  "camel's  nose"  phenomenen).
Again,  some  agencies  operate  with  a different  fiscal  year  to that  of the
central  government  which  impedes  attempts  to achieve  accounting  consistency.1
All this  confusion  not  only  involves  officials  in  a duplication  or
triplication  of  data  collection  and  processing,  but is  a  major  impediment  to
the  use  of the  budget  as  a policy  instrument.  One  of the  most  important
improvements  that  can  be made  to a  country's  budgetary  system  is the
construction  and installation  of  a financial  database  which  places  all
budgetary  information,as  well  as the  public  investment  program,  on a common
basis  which  can  be shared  by core  and  sector  agencies  alike.  While  this  is a
major  undertaking,  which  can  stretch  over  several  years,  the  direct  and
indirect  benefits  are  substantial.  Among  the  latter  are  the  fact  that  the
construction  and  operation  of a  new information  system  will force  different
agencies  to  work together  on solving  budgetary  problems  and  arriving  at a
common  understanding  of the  issues  involved  in solving  budgetary  conflicts.
(c)  Negotiations  Between  Sector  and  Core  Agencies
The  hardest  bargaining  normally  takes  place  at the  next  stage,  when
sector  agencies  respond  to the  core  agencies'  initial  proposals.  One  of the
techniques  most  widely  used in  the  subsequent  negotiations  is  the
incremental  approach:  rather  than  deliberating  over  the  general  desirability
of continuing  with  an ongoing  program  or project,  the  authorities  will
simply  focus  on  variations  in  outlays  compared  to  the  previous  exercise,  in
practice  concentrating  almost  exclusively  on proposed  increases.  The
implicit  assumption  is  that  no scrutiny  of  what  was  spent  under  previous
budgets  is  warranted;  complacency  regarding  existing  policies  becomes
inbred;  and  the  budgetary  review  process  becomes  one  more  impediment  to the
revitalisation  of public  expenditure  management.  Where  incrementalism
focusses  not  on programs  but  on line  item  categories  such  as  salaries,
materials,  debt  service  payments  etc,  the  effects  can  be even  more
1/  Although  rare  for  ministries  and  other  central  government  agencies,  this
is  not infrequent  for  public  enterprises  and  other  decentralized
entities.ANNX  III
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pernicious.  First,  this  involves  yet a further  departure  from  an objectives-
oriented  approach,  and,  second,  by concentrating  on the  minutiae  of line
items,  tends  to  lose  siglht  of the  broader  policy  issues.  Nevertheless,  these
techniques  are  widely  used and  have stood  the  test  of time  in  both
developing  and  develo3ed  countries;  these  factors  alone  account  for  a large
part  of their  appeal. Although,  in some  countries,  the  influence  of
incrementalism  has  been diminished  by changes  in  external  circumstances 3 or
through  the  introduction  of  medium  term  planning  and  improved  budgetary
techniques.  In  most  cases,  however,  it remains  deeply  embedded  in the
decision-making  process;  reform  efforts  should  be respectful  of the  hold it
has  over  decision-makers  and  try  to  ensure  that  any  suggested  alternatives
do not  diminish  still  further  the  often  fragile  financial  control  over  the
spending  agencies.
One  of the  consequences  of incrementalism  is  that  the  budget
process  becomes  almost  exclusively  concerned  with  the  often  small  amounts
available  for  additional  spending.  In a large  number  of countries,  these  are
frequently  below  10  percent  of total  foreseen  outlays.  As for  the  rest,  the
greater  part  of it is  frequently  "untouchable",  either  for  political  reasons
(salaries)  or  because  of financial  agreements  which  the  government  must
honor  (debt  servicing).  In such  circumstances,  there  is clearly  little  or  no
room for  adjustments  or adaptation  to  unforeseen  changes  in the  economic
environment.  If the  budgetary  gap  turns  out  in  practice  to  be too  large  to
finance,  then  recourse  must  be had  to a  number  of potential  palliatives.
Debt  servicing  obligations  may  be reduced  through  rescheduling,  or the
inflow  of new  foreign  resources  may  be increased  through  negotiatinn.
Frequently,  however,  it  is the  capital  budget,  together  with  operation  and
maintenance  expenditures,  which  bears  the  brunt  of the  cuts.  In  some
countries,  where  there  is  a separate  dev'elopment  budget,  it is  not  unknown
for  current  account  line  items  to  be shifted  to  this  budget  in  order  to
secure  financing,  sometimes  from  donor-provided  funds.  This  clearly  impedes
a government's  ability  to "deliver"  the  genuine  development  expenditures  as
programmed.  Nor  can  it  be expected  that  a more  relaxed  financial  background
will lead  to a  more  rational  structure  of public  spending.  On the  contrary,
it  often  leads  to  a deterioration:  salaries  and  fringe  benefits  are  ususally
increased,  together  with the  numbers  on the  public  payroll,  while  less
attention  is  paid to  quantitative  selection  procedures  for  new  projects  and
programs.
(d)  Cabinet  Anproval
Negotiations  between  core  and  sector  agencies  can  be quitelengthy,
and  several  modif'cations  may  be required  when the  draft  budget  is
considered  at  Cabinet  level.  The time  taken  by the  whole  process  causes
2/ See  especially  Aaron  Wildavsky:"A  Budget  for  All Seasons:  Why  the
Traditional  Budget  Lasts"  in  G. Bruce  Doern  and  Alan  H. Maslove  eds:  "The
Public  Evaluation  of  Government  Spending",  Institute  of Research  on
Public  Policy,  Ottawa,  1979.
3/ For  example,  the  financial  crisis  may  be sufficiently  grave  so as to  pose
challenges  to traditional  allocations  of resources;  this  is,  however,
comparatively  rare.ANEX  III
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major  problems  in  many  countries,  both  developing  and  developed.  This  can
become  particularly  acute  if the  cycle  has to  cope  with  significant  changes
to the  technical  draft  as  a result  of Cabinet  intervention.  This  may lead  to
revisions  in  expenditure  ceilings  which  require  changes  throughout  the
budget.  As the  time  between  the  draft  and  final  budgets  is  nearly  always
short,  spending  agencies  may find  it difficult  to  make  adjustments  within
the  constraints  of the  budget  calendar.  The  ad  hoc  budget  that  emerges  from
this  may  well  be  very different  from  the  approved  budget  that  reflects  the
full  adjustments.  The  same  thing  may,  of  course,  happen  when  the  changes  are
effected  by the  legislature,  or occur  as  a result  of  a higher  than
anticipated  rate  of inflation.  Much  needed  manpower  and  skills  that  should
be devoted  to  budget  implementation  are  therefore  required  to change  the
budget.
(e)  Consequences  of Fragmented  Responsibility
Added  to the  problems  of time  are  those  of fragmented  and
uncoordinated  decision-making,  often  linked  to  blurred  lines  of authority
and  roles  between  agencies.  Although  these  characterise  most  economies  to  a
greater  or lesser  extent,  attempts  to  reinforce  decision-making  capability
at central  level  lead  to a  particularly  acute  dilemma  for  developing
countries.  On the  one  hand,  economic  and  financial  crises  combine  with
weaknesses  in the  management  capabilities  of the  spending  agencies  to render
a  stronger  degree  of central  control  over  expenditures  indispensable.  On the
other,  the  central  authorities  often  lack  the  means,  both in terms  of
manpower  and  information,  to  make  central  control  effective.  Expenditure
management  can  thus  get  bogged  down  in lengthy  procedures,  subject  to
judgement  by actors  far  removed  from  the  consequences  of their  decisions.
These  procedural  and  institutional  difficulties  are  frequently
reinforced  by the  structure  of authority  and  role  designation  within  an
administration.  This  varies  from  country  to  country  and  is  a reflection  of
the  culture  of the  society.  In  some  cases,  executive  authority  as such  may
simply  not  be acknowledged;  instead  of decisons  being  deliberately  taken,
matters  may  simply  evolve  depending  on the  relative  political  strength  of
different  parties  at different  times.  Even  where  this  is  not  the  case,  it is
frequently  observable  that  different  roles  are  not  clearly  delineated  and
that  authority  is,  consequently,  fragmented,  unclear  and  uncoordinated.
Fragile  political  and  administrative  structures  tend  to  become  highly
personalized  so that  the  authority  boundaries  of an agency  can  expand  and
contract  in accordance  with its  leadership  and  staff  capability.  Even  within
more  established  and  sophisticated  structures,  lines  of authority  become
blurred  as a side  effect  of  efforts  to  build  consensus.  For  example,  the
preparation  of the  draft  budget  should  be the  responsibility  of,  say,  the
budget  bureau  or  corresponding  office  in the  finance  ministry.  The  attempt
to secure  the  agreement  by participation  of  other  agencies  may  lead  to  aANNEX II
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dilution  of the  primary  agency's  responsibility. 4 Moreover,  key  agencies
are  often  internally  divided;  this  tends  to  be even  more  acute  at a
political  level.  Cabinet  consensus  may  be difficult  or impossible  to attain.
Then there  is the  role  of the  legislature.  In  new  democracies,  or countries
recently  restored  to  democracy,  the  legislature  may insist  on a  much  more
active  role  in  budget  decision-making,  and  at  a much  earlier  stage  of the
process  than  the  executive  is accustomed  to.  Even  in  established
democracies,  the  legislature  may  have  a  heavy  role  to  play in  budget
formulation  which  can  contradict  or supercede  that  of the  executive  (e.g.
the  United  States).
In the  short  term,  the  state  of the  art  on expenditure  management
offers  little  to  governments  wishing  to  solve  these  dilemmas.  In the  longer
run,  the  development  of  adequate  expenditure  management  capabilities  in the
spending  agencies  is an  essential  prerequisite  to  more  effective  decision-
making.  Once this  is installed,  it  could  be reinforced  by the  gradual
introduction  of a system  of "control  through  incentives"  somewhat  parallel
to the  methods  of  monitoring  and  supervision  of  public  enterprises
frequently  advocated  by the  Bank.  In  essence,  this  would  mean the
establishment  of a system  of target  setting  and  performance  monitoring
linked  to  rewards  and  prnalties  for  the  individuals  involved  in  budgeting
and  executing  the  activities  concerned.  Such  ideas  are far  from  new.  In the
4/  Many administrations  resort  to  the  use  of committees  in  an attempt  to
build  consensus.  However,  considerable  attention  should  be paid  to their
composition  and terms  of  reference  since  otherwise  they  can  easily  have  a
number  of  nefarious  consequences  for  the  budgetary  process.  First,
decision-making  by committee  generally  takes  longer.  Second,  the  outcome
of committee  deliberations  tends  to  be  highly  dependent  on the
characteristics  and  interelationships  of the  individuals  involved;  it is
thus  less  predictable  and  more  arbitrary.  Third,  committtee  membership
may  well  be short  lived;  accountability  's  thus  undermined.  Fourth,
unless  all  affected  parties  are  represented,  they  may  well try  to
undermine  committee  decisions;  on the  other  hand,  insuring  their
representation  may  well  make  the  committee  unwieldly.  Recourse  to
committees  is  often  a substitute  for  more  deep-seated  reform  of the  core
institutions;  it  is  motivated  by the  powerful  forces  of consensus
building  and  dilution  of responsibility.  Unless  roles  are  clearly
defined,  and  along  with them  areas  of responsibility  and  accountability,
it is to  be expected  that  agencies  and  officials  will take  the  safe  route
of committee  formation.  A more  promising  approach  over the  longer  term
would  be to undertake  a reorganization  of the  key  agencies  and  their
interrelationships.  This  would  imply  redefinition  of job  descriptions,
assessments  of  manpower  requirements  and  perhaps  some  modifications  in
the  govenment's  overall  organization  chart.ANEX  III
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late  1960s,  Schultze 5 suggested  that  incentives  be included  in the  design
and  formulation  of the  budget  and  of individual  budgetary  programs.  These
should  clearly  not  cover  the  whole  gamut  of government  spending,  but  could
be applied  in  areas  which  lend  themselves  more  readily  to the  specification
of output,  costs  and  measures  of  performance.  The  practical  application  of
such  an approach  is  limited  by the  philosophy  of  public  service  which  does
not  normally  include  direct  performance  incentives  in  the  carreer  path  of
state  employees  (at  least  in  central  and  local  government).  However,
selective  application  of this  approach  may  be worthy  of further  exploration.
(f)  Imglementation  Issues
These  can  conveniently  be divided  into  problems  of control  and  cash
management.  By control  is  meant  not  merely  ensuring  that  expenditures  are
kept  within  limits  imposed  by resource  availability  (itself  a difficult
task),  but also  that  they  reflect  the  broad  goals  of policy.  Most
expenditure  management  systems  in  developing  countries  lack  the  means  to
achieve  control  in this  broader  sense.  Specifically,  they  often  do not  have: 6
- a  well-defined  work  program  for  each  of the  spending  agencies
indicating  forecasts  of  when financial  and  other  key  resources
will  be needed;
- a system  of periodic  reviews  to  replan  and  reschedule  in the
light  of previously  unforeseen  obstacles  and/or  changes  in
costs;
- an established  procedure  of  periodic  releases  of funds  to
spending  agencies  relating  financial  flows  to the  program  of
a.tivities;
- a financial  manrgement  information  system  providing  an up-to-
date  and  accurate  account  of commitments,  expenditures  and  the
status  of funds  allocated  for  a particular  activity  and/or  to
a particular  agency;
- a  well-functioning  and  adequately  supervised  procurement
system  for  the  acquisition  of  goods  and  services;
5/ See  Charles  L. Schultze:  "The  Politics  and  Economics  of Public  Spending",
the  Brookings  Institution,  Washington  DC, 1968,  and  "The  Role  of
Incentives,  Penalties  and  Rewards  in  Attaining  Effective  Policy,"
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington  DC, 1969.
6/ For  further  details,  see  F.  Khalid:  "Budget  Execution  and  Cash
Management,"  in "Issues  in Budgeting  and  Expenditure  Control,"  IMF,  1982.ANNEX  III
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a simple  but functional  reporting  system  for  verification  of
vork in  progress,  tailored  according  to the  varying
requirements  of the  levels  of  hierarchy  involved  in  budgetary
execution  and  subjected  to  an institutional  review  process
(monthly,  quarterly  etc.  depending  on the  importance  and
nature  of the  activity);  or.
an evaluation  and  audit  system,  administered  by an independent
body (either  within  the  government  or answerable  separately  to
parliament),  capable  not  merely  of financial  audit  but  also  of
the  extent  to  which  a  project  or activity  realized  its  wider
goals.
Consequently,  there  is,  at  best,  an overemphasis  on financial
control  as an end  in itself.  This  can  reach  the  point  where  it  seriously
hampers  the  work of the  spending  agencies.  Highly  complex  procedures  for  the
release  of funds  are  often  combined  with  a confusion  of the  treasury
function  with that  of  expenditure  control  (i.e.  funds  will  be  held  up at the
point  of release  whether  or not  all  steps  have  been  properly  carried  out,
since  this  is the  only  effective  way  of keeping  within  overall  spending
limits).  This  not  only  makes  it  nearly  impossible  for  the  spending  agencies
to  plan  their  activities,  but  also  rules  out  effective  delegation  of
responsibility  or the  establishment  of accountability  in the  use  of  public
funds.
Good  cash  management  (i.e.  the  meeting  of the  government's  daily
cash  requirements  at  a minimum  cost)  can  save  governments  substantial
amounts,  as  well as supporting  wider  aims  of  monetary  and fiscal  policy. 7
Despite  this,  it is  a neglected  area  of public  expenditure  management.  There
are three  main reasons  for  this.  First,  spending  departments  rarely  have
incentives  to  manage  their  cash  well,  since  the  costs  of poor  management,  in
terms  of interest  charges,  are  usually  borne  by the  budget,  while  the
benefits  accrue  to the  finance  ministry  and/or  central  bank.  Second,  budget
execution  focuses  primarily  on release  of funds  to line  agencies,  while  the
actual  spending  of the  money  is  usually  several  stages  further  removed.
Third,  accounting  information  systems  used  most  frequently  by g-vernments  do
not  generate  flow  of funds  data  but  concentrate  rather  on  Rost  hoe
accountability  for  resources  rele ned  to line  agencies.  The  institutional
prerequisites  for  effective  cash  mtaagement  may  also  be missing.  There  is
frequently  no central  authority  responsible  for  this  function.  Because  of
defects  in the  budgetary  system,  or  with  a view  to escaping  surveillance  as
much as  possible,  line  agencies  often  prefer  to  generate  special  funds  over
which  they  have  control  rather  than  return  their  surplus  cash  to a  central
pool.  This  can lead  to a situation  in  which  the  core  agencies  are  forced  to
borrow  to  meet the  government's  day-to-day  cash  requirements  at a  rate  of
interest  higher  than  that  earned  on the  line  agencies'  cash  surpluses
deposited  with the  commercial  banks.
7/ For  example,  when  the  monetary  authorities  are trying  to keep  a tight
hold  on credit  expansion,  cash  management  procedures  should  not  permit
public  agencies  to  build  up large  balances  with  commercial  banks.ANNEX  III
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D. Tvnical  Responses  to  Defects  in the  Budgetary  Syste
The  practical  problems  associated  with the  budgetary  process  have
led  both  core  and  line  agencies  to  adopt  a  number  of ameliatory  measures  and
methods  to  deal  with  conflicts  and  facilitate  the  allocation  of funds  to
activities  deemed  politically  important.  The  most  comaon  are  extra-budgetary
activity,  earmarking  of funds,  and  supplementary  budgets.  All these  methods
are,  to a large  extent,  palliatives  and  substitutes  for  deeper,  and  hence
politically  difficult,  institutional  reforms.  Moreover,  their  adoption  can
have damaging  consequences  for  the  government's  ability  to  mange  public
expenditures  effectively.
(a)  Extra.-Budgetary  Activity
As a result  of the  defects  in the  traditional  budgetary  procedures,
more  and  more  activities  tend  to shift  from  the  national  budget  to  other
sources  or  methods  of financing.  These  are  often  less  visible  end  hence  less
subject  to  public  scrutiny.  Numerous  extra-budgetary  fund3  are  created,  some
of the  them  with  donor  encouragement  and  even  active  support,  to ensure  the
establishment  or continuation  of agencies,programs  and  projects.  Officials
dislike  the  uncertainty  and  delays  associated  with  normal  budgetary
allocations  and  much  prefer  effectively  controlling  their  own  finances.
Donor  influence  is  often  a  major  factor;  in  some  countries  foreign  funding
does  not  pass through  the  national  budgetary  system.  In  Mauritania,  for
example,  a recent  study  found  that  over  90  percent  of investment
expenditures  are financed  from  foreign  grants  and  loans  and  all  are  extra-
budgetary.  While  useful  in  terms  of operational  flexibility  and  guaranteeing
the  continuation  of some  vital  functions,  extra-budgetary  funds  are
frequently  abused.  In  many  countries  it  can  be seen  that  funds  are  still
directed  to  projects  and  activities  that  have  outlived  their  usefulness;  in
some  cases,  they  may  even  have  ceased  to  exist,  and  the  money  is channelled
to  other,  non-mandated  uses.  Mo;eover,  they  not  only  undermine  practically
all  the  principles  of sound  budgetary  management,they  can  escape  comparison
with  other  uses  of funds  and  hence  the  choices  which  should  be involved  in
the  budgetary  decision  process.  It is  of little  use,  however,  to  bewail
their  increasing  prevalence  while  failing  to address  the  deficiencies  of the
budgetary  process  itself,  which  are  frequently  their  main  cause.
(b)  Earmarkinz
Earmarking  is  another  technique  widely  used to  circumvent  the
normal  budgetary  process.  It  can  take  the  form  either  of a  specific
allocation  of a  percentage  of revenues,  or the  direction  of a  particular
category  of revenue,  to  a  particular  agency.  It is  prevalent  in Latin
America  and  in  East  Asia.  Although  less  conspicuous  in  systems  inherited
from  the  British  or the  French,  it  is increasingly  practiced  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa.  At least  in theory,  it  has  a  number  of advantages.  It  can  ensure
funding  for  certain  activities  and  reduces  uncertainty.  It  can  provide  a
direct  link  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of a  particular  type  of taxation.ANNXIII
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It should  ease  performance  measurement  and the  establishment  of cost-cutting
incentives.  It  can  help the  executive  reduce  the  delays  associated  with
legislative  approval  of the  budget  process.  In  practice,  there  are  as many
problems  as  benefits  arising  from  these  so-called  advantages.  The link
between  taxation  costs  and  benefits  is often  obscure  and  not  apparent  to
taxpayers.  Administratively,  the  growth  of  earmarking  undermines  the
authority  of the  central  budgeting  process  and  that  of the  legislature.  It
encourages  an enclave  mentality  among  those  responsible  for  administering
the  funds.  Agencies  tend  to  become  a law  unto  themselves  and  aggravate  the
complexity  of the  budget  process.  The  resulting  lack  of fungibility  of
public  resources  often  results  in  new  expenditures  being  incremental  rather
than  substituting  for  existing  ones  which  are  protected  from  cuts  by their
access  to earinarked  resources.  Moreover,  since  most  major  new initiatives  in
public  expenditure  are  financed  externally,  the  end  result  is  both  an
overall  increase  in  public  spending  and  an  addition  to the  external  debt
burden.  Access  to  nonfungible  resources  may  also  distort  the  sectoral
pattern  of investment,  especially  during  fiscal  austerity.  Again,  donors  are
often  a  major  part  of the  problem:  they  encourage  earmarking  for  similar
reasons  as extrabudgetary  funds  (which  can  also  be financed  from  earmarked
revenues).  Thev  often  insist  on the  specific  provision  of counterpart  funds
for  individual  projects  and  programs,  rather  than  allowing  the  government
contribution  to  be financed  from  general  budgetary  allocations.  This can
lead  to the  accumulation  of "slush  funds"  which  the  government  may  use for
non-budgeted  projects  provided  that  they  can  persuade  the  donor  to release
the  funds.  In Zambia,  for  example,  a large  and  ill-conceived  expansion  of
the  agricultural  credit  program  was  financed  by PL480  funds  from  US food
aid.  In general  terms,  governments  should  be encouraged  to  phase  out
earmarking,  though  this  should  be gradual  and  accompanied  by efforts  to
reform  the  budgetary  process.
(c)  Sunnlementary  Budgets
Core  agencies  may  resort  to  supplementary  budgets  in  an effort  to
increase  their de facto control over expenditures --  for example, by
artificially  depressing  the  total  amount  of resources  in the  initial
budgetary  envelope  and  then  subsequently  meeting  requests  through
supplementary  appropriations.  Sometimes,  the  legal  framework  makes  the  use
of such  supplements  unavoidable.  In Colombia,  for  example,  the  constitution
requires,  first,  that  the  budget  be balanced  in the  formalistic  sense  that
expenditures  must  not  exceed  legally  confirmed  resource  availability,  and,
second,  that  e3timated  revenues  not  increase  by more  than  10  percent  over
the  previous  year's  budget.  Tnis  means  in  practice  that  the  initial  budget
only  partially  covers  expenditures  during  the  year,  so that  a series  of
supplementary  budgets  are  formulated  as  more  resources  become  available.  In
recent  years,  there  have  been  up to five  supplements  accounting  for  as much
as 50  percent  of the  initial  allocation.  Inevitably,  the  additions  are
prepared  in  a hurry  without  an evaluation  of their  consistency  with the
original  budget  or the  overall  development  strategy.  Undesirable  thouigh  such
a system  is,  at least  the  core  ministries  maintain  a degree  of  effective
control  over  expenditure  decisions.  By contrast,  in  some  Sub-Saharan  AfricanANNEX  III
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countries  it is  the  spending  ministries  which  can  determine  the  size  of the
supplements.  In Zambia,  for  instance,  the  Central  Bank  maintains  a
"revaluation  account"  under  which  government  payments  are  automatically
made,  whether  or not  the  expenditure  was authorized  in the  budget.  Spending
ministries  are  allowed  to  overdraw  their  accounts  with  Ministry  of Finance
approval  being  provided  only  retrospectively  through  the  supplementary
budget.  In 1986,  the  supplementary  budget  was  almost  as large  as the
original  operational  budget  and  was the  major  contributor  to a  very  large
deficit.  Again,  as  with  earmarking  and  extra-budgetary  funds,  the  only  cure
in  the  long  run  is  a reform  and  streamlining  of the  main  budget  process.PPR Working  Paper  Series
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